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ABSTRACT 
Many large organizations rely on manual assignment processes, despite the theory of 
bounded rationality indicating that time and cognitive constraints would limit the quality 
of assignments. This research used participant experiments to explore the effect of 
information load on assignment quality: participants, motivated by induced value theory, 
performed the role of decision makers; and information load was identified by the 
number of personnel requiring assignment and the number of attributes to be considered. 
Results varied considerably between participants, despite a relatively homogenous group 
of participants and low information loads compared to what would be experienced in 
actual military assignment processes. Having analyzed the shortcomings of manual 
assignment processes, this research examined two-sided matching as the basis for a 
decision support system.  It was demonstrated that two-sided matching could be used to 
assign personnel to positions in hierarchies. Multi-attribute utility functions were used to 
generate position preferences based on a variety of attributes, some relevant to the 
organization and others to its subordinate units. Computational experiments showed that 
assignments are responsive to the utility function weights, allowing decision makers to 
quickly examine various assignment sets under different conditions. The effects of 
preference list indifference on two-sided matching were also examined. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The effective assignment of personnel to positions (jobs) has been described as a crucial 
function for organizations. However, many large organizations rely on manual processes 
to generate assignments, despite the theory of bounded rationality indicating that time 
and cognitive constraints would limit the quality of assignments produced. While the 
effect of information overload has been examined in fields such as consumer behavior, it 
has not previously been examined in relation to assignment decision making, which is 
arguably more complex because each individual assignment affects the remaining options 
available. Experiments were used in this research to explore the effect of information 
overload in assignment processes conducted without decision support, with participants 
performing the role of assignment decision makers. These experiments revealed that: 
decision makers tend to focus on one group (positions) to the detriment of the other 
(personnel); there is considerable variability in decision quality, despite the use of a 
relatively homogenous group of decision makers in the experiments; a sequential 
heuristic was used by some decision makers, resulting in poorer outcomes for the last 
personnel to be assigned; and decision makers are likely to over-estimate their abilities. 
Having identified the problem with existing assignment processes that lack 
decision support, a two-sided matching algorithm was explored as the basis for a decision 
support system. Two-sided matching was selected because it produces stable results, and 
under certain conditions it is a dominant strategy for participants to submit their true 
preferences.  
Two-sided matching has been successfully applied in a number of applications, 
such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Most existing applications are 
characterized as markets; that is, they involve the assignment of autonomous participants 
(e.g., medical students and residency programs). Some more recent applications, such as 
the New York City high school match, demonstrate some features of hierarchical 
organizations; that is, subordination exists, and the organization and its subordinate 
elements (e.g., Department of Education and schools) each have an interest in the 
assignment of students. Using the example of military personnel assignments, this 
 viii 
research demonstrates that multi-attribute utility functions may be used to combine 
attributes that are relevant to the organization and its subordinate units. Computational 
experiments were used to demonstrate that two-sided matching assignments are 
responsive to the utility function weights, and therefore it is possible to produce 
assignments that will tend to favor some attributes over others. However, the 
responsiveness of the assignments to the utility function weights depends on the 
correlation of preferences with respect to each attribute.  
Two-sided matching requires rank-ordered preference lists from all participants 
(e.g., the personnel and positions in a military assignment process). When the positions’ 
preferences are determined through multi-attribute utility functions, many preference ties 
are likely, due to the limited number of attributes available and the typically discrete 
nature of these attributes. When preference list indifference exists and ties are broken 
randomly, the two-sided matching assignments remain weakly stable. Further, different 
results are possible from different tie breakings. While existing applications typically 
require participants to submit strictly ordered preference lists, this research examined 
how assignments could be improved by exploiting preference list indifference. This is 
particularly relevant to hierarchical organizations where subordination exists. 
Computational experiments were used to demonstrate the range of results that are 
possible when tied preferences are broken in different ways. Each experiment involved 
multiple trials, with tied preferences randomly broken at each trial. These experiments 
demonstrated how assignments are influenced by the number of agents seeking 
assignment, their preference list length, the degree of indifference in their preferences, 
and the extent to which their preferences are correlated. 
It is not suggested that a decision support system should replace career managers 
or that such systems should produce assignments autonomously. However, a decision 
support system could quickly provide career managers with a range of options. Such a 
system would ensure a consistent consideration of attributes and with less variability than 
occurs in the absence of decision support. Further, if the decision support system is based 
on a two-sided matching algorithm, the assignments will be stable and it will be a 
dominant strategy for personnel to submit truthful preferences. 
 ix 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The “assignment of individuals to positions in a manner that makes use of their 
skills while providing adequate job satisfaction is crucial to the smooth and economical 
function of the organizations.”  (Klingman & Phillips, 1984, p. 1362) 
A. MARKET DESIGN 
Markets exist in a variety of forms to facilitate the exchange of information, 
goods, services and payments  (Bichler, Field, & Werthner, 2001). While the existence of 
markets can be traced back over the centuries to barter economies, the design of markets 
is regarded as a new discipline that has been emerging since the 1990s (Roth, 2002). 
Large markets that have undergone successful design during this period include the 
(re)design of the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) (Roth & Peranson, 
1999), and the design of auctions for the sale of rights to the radio spectrum by the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission (Banks, Olson, Porter, Rasssenti & Smith, 2003). 
However, market design is not necessarily a simple matter; poor design, testing and 
implementation can lead to market failure as indicated by the failure of some regional 
British residency markets (Roth, 1991), and the more spectacular failure of the 
Californian electric market (Crow, 2002), which had significant consequences on 
customers and almost led to bankruptcy of the utility companies.  
This research focuses on the design of a labor clearinghouse—a market in which 
personnel are assigned to positions, where positions are the jobs or appointments within 
an organization. Labor clearinghouse assignments have been used in a variety of 
contexts, including the allocation of medical residents to hospital residency positions 
(Roth, 1991), the allocation of law students to U.S. federal judicial clerkships (Avery, 
Jolls, Posner & Roth, 2001), the allocation of students to New York City high schools 
(Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak & Roth, 2005), and the allocation of personnel to tasks in 
manufacturing (Zulch, Rottinger & Vollstedt, 2004).  
A well-designed labor clearinghouse can benefit both participants and the 
administering system: for example, after the redesign of the New York City high school 
  2 
assignment process involving over 90,000 students annually, the number of students 
receiving their first preference increased from approximately 24,000 to 31,000, and the 
number of administrative assignments (cases where students were assigned to schools 
that they did not list) managed by the Department of Education decreased from 30,000 to 
3,000 (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). However, Roth (1991) provides examples of labor 
clearinghouses that have failed, and indicates that to avoid such failures, it is necessary to 
ensure that the design of the labor clearinghouse meets the needs and nature of the 
market.  
In the broad use of the term, a market is “any place or mechanism in which goods 
and services are traded” (Thompson, 2001, p. 3). However, it is useful to distinguish 
between the different types of institutions in which labor clearinghouses may exist. 
Williamson (1975) refers to two institutional forms that exist for exchange; markets and 
hierarchies. He defines a market more narrowly as an exchange between autonomous 
economic entities, which is in contrast to hierarchical transactions where a “single 
administrative entity spans both sides of the transaction” and subordination exists in some 
form (Williamson, 1975, p. xi). This delineation between markets and hierarchies closely 
resembles the distinction between external and internal labor markets respectively. 
Doeringer and Piore (1985) define an external labor market as an exchange in which the 
allocation of labor is determined from “conventional economic theory where pricing, 
allocating and training decisions are controlled directly by economic variables,” while an 
internal labor market occurs where “the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a 
set of administrative rules and procedures” (p. 2). When Doeringer and Piore (1985) and 
others refer to internal labor markets, it is clear that these are not markets as defined by 
Williamson (1975), but rather the exchanges that occur within a hierarchy. This research 
is predominantly focused on internal labor market clearinghouses, that is, those that exist 
in hierarchies.  
The nature of the institution, whether it is a market or hierarchy, determines the 
signals that are produced in the event of assignment inefficiency or instability. In external 
labor assignment markets, inefficiencies or instability can lead to failure that is often 
evident and manifested by declining participation or market unraveling; situations that 
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have been explored by Roth (1991) and Roth and Peranson (1999). However, in a 
hierarchical organization where participation is compulsory, such direct manifestations 
cannot occur to reveal the extent of market inefficiencies, and hence market inefficiencies 
may only appear indirectly; for example, lower productivity or higher attrition due to 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, managers of hierarchical organizations may not be aware of 
inefficiencies in their assignment processes, and may incorrectly attribute indicators such 
as higher attrition to other phenomena.  
While the nature of hierarchical institutions may mask the signals that reveal 
inefficiencies in labor assignments, the problem is exacerbated if these hierarchies use 
manual assignment processes, since bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) limits the ability 
of decision makers, and therefore assignments are likely to be inefficient. Here the 
efficiency is used in the economic sense and refers to the value that is available to the 
participants, both personnel and positions. An inefficient outcome is one where it is 
possible for greater value or utility to be provided to the participants; for example, 
personnel being assigned to preferable positions, and / or positions being assigned 
personnel that better meet requirements.  
Militaries are exemplars of hierarchical institutions where, for uniformed 
members, participation in the labor assignment process is compulsory, and assignments 
are typically conducted manually or with limited decision support: Blanco and Hillery 
(1994) state that, until the 1980s, for the U.S. Navy, “the process of matching people to 
jobs and making assignment decisions was exclusively a manual process” (p. 814). While 
some decision support has since been provided, Short (2000) reveals that “there is no 
single tool to help the detailers ‘mentally juggle’ diverse policies, procedures, and 
information” (p. 22), and so the process remains bounded by the cognitive ability of the 
decision makers.  
The preceding discussion highlights two problems that may exist in a hierarchical 
organization that uses manual labor assignment processes; firstly, the assignments are 
likely to be inefficient due to bounded rationality, and secondly, the managers of such 
organizations may not be aware of the full extent of the problem. This research addresses 
these two issues. Experimental work examines the nature of manual labor assignments to 
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determine the conditions where human decision makers may perform well, and 
conditions where bounded rationality may cause inefficiency. Then, for situations where 
human decision makers perform poorly in the absence of decision support, computational 
experimentation is used to examine how a decision support system utilizing two-sided 
matching processes may be used to improve the efficiency of the assignments.  
B. THE ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL 
It is frequently acknowledged that people are an organization’s most important 
asset; Sikula (2001) states, “It is unquestionably true that human resources are every 
organization’s most important and most valuable assets. This has been recognized for 
decades now, but it still is lacking in practice in business” (p. 421). In order to achieve 
best practice with human resources, organizations must address the various functions that 
are involved, and depending on organization size, these may include recruiting, training, 
mentoring, career management, personnel assignments (or allocations), payroll and 
compensation. This research addresses just one of these functions; the assignment of 
personnel to positions. The assignment process seeks to ensure that an organization’s 
personnel are employed in a manner that suits the needs of the organization while 
satisfying the individual. While an organization’s personnel may have the correct skill 
mix, unless the assignment process is effective, the personnel may be employed in the 
wrong positions, thus leading to sub-optimal organizational outcomes. To meet the 
organization’s requirements, it is necessary to have a well-designed labor assignment 
process. 
When hiring new personnel, many organizations undertake a process of 
classification and selection to ensure that the personnel they employ have the requisite 
knowledge, skills and abilities to fill their initial appointment. While this initial 
classification and selection is often well planned and structured, in many organizations 
the subsequent reassignment of personnel is ad hoc, primarily conducted as necessitated 
by staff retirements, resignations, promotions etc. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
literature on classification and selection is quite extensive (for example, Monahan & 
Muchinsky (1983) reviewed 394 personnel selection studies published solely in the 
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Personnel Psychology journal) but limited when it comes to examining internal labor 
assignment processes. Despite this lack of scholarly attention, there are some hierarchies, 
most notably military organizations, where the internal assignment of labor is a 
significant and regular process, with large batches of personnel and positions considered 
for assignment simultaneously. In large military forces, the number of annual 
assignments undertaken is considerable. At a time when the U.S. Navy had 
approximately 500,000 enlisted personnel, Liang and Buclatin (1988) claim that the Navy 
assigned approximately 200,000 people to jobs each year. An annual assignment of 40 
per cent of a force each year is a reasonable approximation for other services and nations 
where tenure in a position generally varies between one and three years. 
There is evidence that military personnel feel that more could be done to 
incorporate their preferences in the assignment decision-making process. The Australian 
Defence Organisation administers the annual Defence Attitude Survey to 30% of 
uniformed and civilian personnel to gauge attitudes towards a variety of issues, one of 
which is career management. The responses to two questions reveal the satisfaction with 
extant assignment decision processes. From the 2009 Defence Attitude Survey, 70% of 
Army respondents agreed with the statement, “Individual posting preferences need to 
have more influence,” while 50% agreed with the statement, “My views are considered 
when postings are planned.”1 Such responses provide the motivation for this work. 
C. THE COMPLEXITY OF ASSIGNMENT DECISIONS 
Not only are military assignments large-scale problems, they are also complex, 
where complexity is a function of the number of criteria to be considered in making the 
assignments. In examining the U.S. Marine Corps assignment process, Klingman and 
Phillips (1984) state that each assignment may consider from 3 to 15 criteria. Regarding 
the U.S. Navy, Liang and Buclatin (1988) state, “For each person, a maximum of five 
trained skills may be recorded. A job may have a requirement for up to nine skills, some 
of them alternative” (p. 183). Further to the consideration of skills criteria, Liang and 
Buclatin investigate a significant factor in the U.S. Navy assignment process; making the 
                                                 
1 Australian Defence Organisation, 2009 Defence Attitude Survey. 
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best use of training spaces when the skills of the distributable personnel do not meet the 
requirements of the positions. Additional complexity is provided by the need for decision 
makers to consider relevant policies and the preferences of the personnel who are being 
assigned. 
With such a large number of assignments to be made and multiple criteria to be 
considered for each assignment, the process is far from simple. Despite this, many 
military services continue to assign personnel with manual processes, or processes that 
involve limited system support. While such processes may yield satisfactory results, it is 
worth considering whether more effective results could be achieved more efficiently 
through a well-designed market. Eppler and Mengis (2004) review decision-making 
research in disciplines such as accounting, organization science and consumer behavior, 
and show that there is considerable evidence that humans make poor quality decisions 
under excessive information loads. While the effects of information load on decision 
quality have been examined in a number of disciplines, such behavior has not been 
examined in relation to assignment decision making, which it could be argued is more 
problematic due to preferences of participants on both sides of the market, and the need 
for multiple decisions and tradeoffs. Therefore, to examine the effects of information load 
on manual assignment decisions, the following research question is posed: 
Research Question One: How does human decision quality vary in relation to the 
size and complexity of an assignment problem?  
The results of this research will demonstrate situations where manual decision 
processes are appropriate, and situations where decision support systems (DSS) should be 
used. This process of understanding the problem helps define the crisis with the status 
quo, which according to Kotter (1996), is the first step to managing change.  
While a DSS may be designed to improve the quality of assignments in labor 
markets, different assignment mechanisms are possible for such a DSS. The next section 
explores the relative merits of three different assignment mechanisms. 
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D. ALTERNATIVE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISMS 
The first approach considered for assigning personnel to positions is pure binary 
integer programming (Render & Stair, 2000). This approach is based on a linear 
programming model that maximizes (or minimizes) an objective function, but is termed 
pure because only integer outcomes are acceptable, and binary because only 0-1 
outcomes are acceptable (each person may be assigned to only one position). An integer 
programming approach is suitable if assignments are primarily expected to maximize an 
objective function, but there are disadvantages to such an approach. One disadvantage is 
that it is not necessarily a dominant strategy for personnel to state their true preferences 
under an integer programming approach, which therefore enables personnel to 
strategically manipulate the process to their advantage. Also, optimization may return 
unstable assignments; that is, assignments where a person and position are not matched, 
but prefer each other to their assigned partners.  
Genetic algorithms provide another potential assignment approach. Genetic 
algorithms use biological evolutionary concepts to develop an outcome, and are best 
suited to complex situations. Goldberg (1989) explores how genetic algorithms differ 
from traditional optimization techniques, while Biethahn and Nissen (1995) provide a 
table outlining the advantages and disadvantages of genetic algorithms. Herrera, Lopez, 
Mendana and Rodriguez (1999) state, “GAs are powerful in difficult environments where 
the space is usually large, discontinuous, complex and poorly understood. They are not 
guaranteed to find the global optimum solution to a problem, but they are generally good 
at finding acceptably good solutions to problems quickly” (p. 311). That is, genetic 
algorithms are particularly suited to problems where the decision space is discontinuous 
and poorly defined. However, as will be described in this research, the situation within a 
labor assignment process may be relatively well defined, and therefore genetic algorithms 
do not offer significant outcome advantages over optimization techniques, although there 
may be efficiency gained in the process of achieving the outcome. Furthermore, like 
integer programming, genetic algorithms do not necessarily make truthful revelation of 
preferences a dominant behavior. 
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The third approach to the assignment problem is through algorithms that provide 
stable outcomes, such as deferred-acceptance two-sided matching algorithms, which are 
reviewed in detail by Roth and Sotomayor (1990). There are a number of advantages to 
using two-sided matching algorithms. First, the algorithm necessarily considers the 
preferences of both sides of the market. Second, under certain conditions it is a dominant 
behavior for participants on at least one side of the market to truthfully reveal their 
preferences. Third, alternative results appear when preference list ties are broken in 
different ways thereby enabling alternative outcomes to be explored by the decision 
maker. Fourth, while the algorithm does not produce an optimized outcome, it does 
produce a stable outcome. While this will be described in more detail later, it can be 
considered a situation where there is no person and position that both prefer one another 
to their assigned partners. A disadvantage of the two-sided matching algorithm is that 
unless complete preference lists are used (i.e., every person provides a rank-ordered 
preference list of every position and vice versa), the algorithm does not guarantee that all 
participants will be matched. Additionally, there is no inherent mechanism to ensure high 
priority positions are filled. However, different mitigation strategies are available; for 
example, longer preference lists and priority or secondary matching rounds.  
Given the nature of the assignment problem, there are considerable benefits 
available to personnel who would seek to manipulate the system by misrepresenting their 
true preferences. Such misrepresentation under some matching mechanisms could lead to 
the attainment of a preferable assignment. Therefore, a key consideration is to select an 
assignment mechanism that makes it a dominant strategy for participants to truthfully 
express their preferences. Two-sided matching is an assignment mechanism that uniquely 
satisfies this consideration while having other desirable properties, and therefore this 
research will focus on the use of two-sided matching algorithms. 
E. APPLYING TWO-SIDED MATCHING 
Based on a comparison of the relative merits of each assignment approach, this 
research is focused on the use of two-sided matching algorithms as the assignment 
mechanism at the heart of the decision support system. These algorithms have been used 
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in a number of different applications as outlined by Roth (1991), Roth and Peranson 
(1999), Irving (2000) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005), however they have not been 
applied to strictly hierarchical organizations, and therefore the application is not 
straightforward. As indicated by the name, two-sided matching algorithms are based 
upon the preferences submitted by participants on two sides of a market (or hierarchy), 
e.g., students and schools. In a hierarchy, the workers and jobs are analogous; however, 
there may also be system level (organization) factors to be considered. For example, in a 
military organization, personnel have preferences for positions, commanders have 
preferences for personnel to fill positions within their command (or at least can express 
preferences over different criteria), and at the system level, the military service has 
preferences regarding the characteristics of assignments. For a large hierarchical 
organization with system level criteria to be considered, this paper proposes a multi-
attribute utility approach to facilitate the determination of rank-ordered preference lists of 
personnel for each position. Such an approach ensures a consistent consideration of 
relevant criteria for all assignments. 
Given that this paper explores the design of a new type of two-sided matching 
market, there are new issues to be considered as part of the design process. In a large 
hierarchical organization such as a military internal labor market, there are clusters of 
homogeneity (groups of personnel or positions that have relatively similar characteristics, 
at least in terms of measurable and available data), which implies that there will be 
clusters of indifference in preference lists. While existing applications of two-sided 
matching require participants to submit strictly ordered preference lists, this may not be 
reasonable in a hierarchical organization, and therefore it is necessary to examine the 
issue of preference list indifference and its impact on two-sided matching outcomes. This 
leads to the second research question: 
Research Question Two: What effect does preference list indifference have on a 
two-sided matching outcome, and how can a decision maker use this to produce better 
outcomes? 
Another issue to be examined as part of the market design is how position 
preferences will be determined. In external labor markets such as the National Resident 
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Matching Program, this is the responsibility of individual hospitals; however, such an 
approach is not feasible in an internal labor market where position and system level 
criteria must each be considered. It is proposed that a multi-attribute utility approach be 
used to determine the rank-ordered list of preferred personnel for each position. This 
approach would allow each position’s preference list to include a consideration of both 
position and system level criteria, with weights indicating the relative importance of 
different criteria. It is necessary to examine the effects that such a multi-attribute 
approach would have on the stability of assignments, the incentive behavior of 
participants, and the sensitivity of assignments to differing weights. This leads to the 
third research question: 
Research Question Three: How can a large hierarchical organization use two-
sided matching when position and organization-level factors require consideration? 
The second and third research questions will be addressed through computational 
experimentation similar to that demonstrated by Nissen and Buettner (2004). Such an 
approach is appropriate for the following reasons: firstly, field observation is not possible 
because markets of the type under examination do not currently exist; and secondly, 
when compared to laboratory experimentation, the computational experimentation allows 
a far greater number of scenarios to be examined in a relatively short time. 
F. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The first and broadest contribution of this research relates to the concept of 
market design; the research examines the labor assignment process within hierarchical 
organizations and builds the case for redesign of such processes. The research then 
proposes a design that may be used for military labor assignments, and may well be 
applicable to other hierarchical organizations.  
In establishing the requirement for redesigning the labor assignment process, the 
research examines the effect of information load on assignment decision making in a 
complex situation. While the effects of information load on decision quality have been 
explored in other contexts, this paper makes a new contribution by specifically examining 
how assignment decision making is affected by complexity. Through understanding the 
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deleterious effects of complexity on manual assignment decision quality, it will be 
possible to demonstrate to managers the advantages of assignment decision support 
systems and how such systems may be implemented. 
For managers seeking to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of assignment 
decision making, under certain conditions two-sided matching is a useful mechanism. 
However, determining position preferences is not straightforward because, in a 
hierarchical organization, both position level and system level criteria may be relevant. 
This research investigates how a multi-attribute utility approach that considers both 
position and system level criteria may be used to construct the preferences for the two-
sided matching process, and provides indicative results and analysis. This demonstrates 
that two-sided matching algorithms may be applied to hierarchical institutions where 
system-level criteria are relevant. 
While other research makes it clear that preference list indifference will have an 
effect on assignment outcomes, the dimensions of this effect have not been explored, nor 
has there been analysis of whether the outcome may be improved by allowing preference 
list indifference. This research demonstrates that when two-sided matching is applied to 
hierarchical institutions, it may be to the benefit of the decision maker to allow 
participants to express indifference in their preference lists.  
Finally, while existing two-sided matching applications are entry-level markets, 
this research demonstrates the application of two-sided matching to a hierarchical 
organization. A military personnel assignment process is used for demonstration 
purposes. 
G. DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a 
review of the relevant literature from the fields of human decision making, two-sided 
matching and multi-attribute utility theory. Chapter III outlines the research design that 
will be used to address the research questions already posed. Chapter IV explores the 
performance of human decision making in complex assignment problems. Chapters V 
and VI each examine two-sided matching issues; the impact of preference list 
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indifference on two-sided matching assignments, and the effect of determining 
preferences through a multi-attribute approach. Chapter VII provides the conclusion and 
recommendations for further work.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews three key fields pertinent to the research; human decision 
making, two-sided matching and multi-attribute utility theory. 
A. HUMAN DECISION MAKING 
The literature to be covered in this section of the paper is summarized in Table 1. 
Reference Relevant Concepts 
Cosmides and Tooby 
(1994) 
Identified that the human mind performs particularly well for 
some cognitive activities (e.g., speech recognition, grammar 
acquisition). 
Simon (1955) Established that human decision-making is limited by bounded-
rationality. 
Miller (1956) Established that humans have a limit to the amount of 
information that can be stored and processed. 
Arthur (1994) Identified that there is a limit to which human logical capacity 
is able to cope. 
Gates and Nissen (2002) Identified that some organizations rely upon the cognitive skills 
of decision makers to assign personnel to jobs in a complex 
situation. 
Eppler and Mengis 
(2004) 
Reviewed information overload in a variety of disciplines. 
Jacoby, Speller and 
Kohn (1974) 
Found that information overload, as measured by increasing 
complexity, leads to poorer quality decisions in a consumer 
domain. 
Jacoby, Speller and 
Berning (1974) 
Confirmed the findings of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn (1974) in a 
replication study. 
Summers (1974) Criticized the methodology of Jacoby et al. 
Wilkie (1974) Criticized the methodology of Jacoby et al. 
Jacoby (1977) Responded to earlier criticisms of the work of Jacoby et al. 
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Malhotra et al. (1982) Criticized the methodology of Jacoby et al. 
Malhotra (1982) Confirmed the effect of information overload on consumer 
decision making. 
Keller and Staelin (1987) Confirmed the effect of information overload when information 
defined by dimensions of quality and quantity. 
Henry (1980) Examined the effect of individual information processing 
ability on decision-making accuracy. 
Houser et al. (2004) Classified subjects by decision-making strategies in a complex 
decision-making scenario. 
Hahn et al. (1992) Confirmed the effect of information overload when subjects 
were placed under time-pressure. 
Casey (1980) Confirmed the effects of information overload on bank loan 
officers. 
Larichev et al. (1988) Confirmed the effects of information overload when using a 
classification schema to examine decision-making accuracy. 
Table 1 Human Decision-Making Literature 
Humans make countless decisions on a daily basis. For most people, many simple 
decisions are conducted frequently and require little thought (e.g., what to wear to work), 
while more complex decisions tend to be less frequent and require more significant 
consideration (e.g., the purchase of a car). But do we necessarily make the best decisions 
in all cases? 
For certain cognitive processes, humans perform particularly well. Cosmides and 
Tooby (1994) state, “On evolutionary recurrent computational tasks, such as object 
recognition, grammar acquisition, or speech comprehension, the human mind greatly 
outperforms the best artificial problem-solving systems that decades of research have 
produced” (p. 329). However, as will be reviewed, humans do not perform as well in all 
cognitive aspects. Of interest to this research are the conditions where assignment 
decisions are likely to be degraded if conducted by humans without decision support.  
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1. Rational Behavior and Bounded Rationality 
Simon (1955), states the traditional economic definition of a rational person as 
one who “is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment, … 
and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of 
action that are available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the highest 
attainable point on his preference scale” (p. 99). However, cognitive limits prevent 
humans from always achieving such a utility maximizing outcome. According to Miller 
(1956) in his paper on the magical number seven, “the span of absolute judgment and the 
span of immediate memory impose severe limitations on the amount of information that 
we are able to receive, process, and remember” (p. 95). Due to cognitive constraints, 
Simon introduced the idea that decision making is not always rational, but may be 
bounded, with bounds being imposed due to information or time constraints. 
Consequently, Simon (1955) states, “actual human rationality-striving can at best be an 
extremely crude and simplified approximation” (p. 101). Further, Arthur (1994) states, 
“There are two reasons for perfect or deductive rationality to break down under 
complication. The obvious one is that beyond a certain level of complexity human logical 
capacity ceases to cope—human rationality is bounded. The other is that in interactive 
situations of complication, agents cannot rely upon the other agents they are dealing with 
to behave under perfect rationality, and so they are forced to guess their behavior” (p. 
406). While assignment decision making in the context explored here is not interactive, 
the first of Arthur’s two reasons is relevant and will be explored.  
There are a wide variety of tasks where humans are called upon to use their 
cognitive abilities to make assignments or allocations. Some diverse examples include the 
assignment of projects to students (Harper, de Senna, Vieira & Shahani, 2005), referees 
to games (Scarelli & Narula, 2002), court cases to judges (Yang & Dean, 1993), and 
personnel to positions (Suh, Byun & An, 1993). In some of these situations, only agents 
on one side of the relationship have preferences over potential assignments (e.g., projects 
to students), while in other situations all agents have preferences over potential 
assignments (e.g., personnel to positions). Assignment processes may also be 
characterized by size and complexity; size referring to the number of objects requiring 
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assignment, and complexity referring to the number of criteria to be considered in making 
assignments. Despite the existence of large and complex assignment mechanisms, Gates 
and Nissen (2002) find that some of these mechanisms (e.g., military forces and 
government organizations) rely upon administrative procedures to match people with 
jobs. Specifically, they state, “Hierarchical job assignments rely upon the cognitive 
process of centralized, administrative professionals to match individual capabilities and 
job requirements and to reflect both the job’s relative priority and the individual’s job 
preferences” (p. 5). While bounded rationality indicates that in such large and complex 
situations human decision makers will achieve less than optimal outcomes, bounded 
rationality does not indicate where the limits of human rational behavior lie; for example, 
the number of criteria or the number of objects that a decision maker can consider, and 
how these multiple dimensions interact. Using experimental techniques, it is possible to 
test the limits of human rationality under varying assignment conditions, such as 
decision-space size and complexity. The next section reviews studies that have examined 
the effects of decision making under complexity in other fields. 
2. Prior Investigation of Information Overload 
As a decision situation becomes more complex, there is a greater information load 
on the decision maker. In a comprehensive review of information overload in various 
disciplines, Eppler and Mengis (2004) state that the performance of a decision maker 
“correlates positively with the amount of information he or she receives—up to a certain 
point. If further information is provided beyond this point, the performance of the 
individual will rapidly decline” (p. 326). The effect of information overload has been 
studied extensively in the field of consumer research and behavior, and this field provides 
useful parallels to assignment decision making.  
Starting with the works of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn (1974), the effects of 
complexity and information overload with respect to consumers has been examined by a 
number of researchers. In these studies, complexity is typically defined by the number of 
brand choices and the number of attributes describing each brand. While it is now 
generally acknowledged that increasing complexity leads to consumer information 
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overload, in turn leading to poorer quality decisions, such beliefs did not always prevail. 
Jacoby, Speller and Kohn (1974) defied the notion that more product information is 
necessarily better for consumers. They provided subjects with a variety of fictional 
laundry detergent brands with varying amounts of information provided about the brands. 
The total information was classified as the number of brands multiplied by the number of 
items of information per brand. Decision quality was measured as the ability of each 
subject to select a brand that best met their individual needs, where the individual needs 
were ascertained from a questionnaire conducted at the start of the experiment. A 
curvilinear relationship (an inverted U-shape) was found such that the ability of subjects 
to select a detergent that best satisfied their needs was poorest at the low and high levels 
of total information, while subjects provided with intermediate levels of information 
made the best quality decisions. Jacoby, Speller and Berning (1974) confirmed these 
findings in a replication study where different product categories were chosen (rice and 
prepared dinners), and the subjects were housewives rather than students.  
The works of Jacoby, Speller and Berning (1974) and Jacoby, Speller and Kohn 
(1974) were criticized by Summers (1974) and Wilkie (1974), primarily on 
methodological grounds. Jacoby (1977) responded, and summarized the two primary 
criticisms as; “(1) how does one define information load in the consumer context, and (2) 
how does one assess decision quality?” (p. 570). In the conclusion of his rejoinder, 
Jacoby (1977) states, “though our critics may disagree with our methods, measures, and 
analyses, they do not contest the existence of information overload in the consumer 
context” (p. 572).  
Malhotra, Jain and Lagakos (1982) state that they have three major reservations 
regarding the work of Jacoby et al., and that these reservations are similar to those raised 
previously by Summers (1974) and Wilkie (1974). First, Malhotra et al. (1982) argue that 
“the number of brands and the number of information items (attributes) per brand are 
conceptually as well as psychologically different dimensions” (p. 29), and therefore 
Jacoby et al., should not have defined the total amount of information as the product of 
the dimensions. Second, Malhotra et al. (1982) state that “the probability of making a 
correct choice by chance alone is inversely proportional to the number of brands” (p. 29), 
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and so the effects of chance factors should have been included. Third, Malhotra et al. 
(1982) question the approach “of using weighted Euclidean distances of the brands in the 
choice set from the ideal brand to measure correct choice” (p. 29), because of the 
problems with ideal point measurement. Despite the methodological criticism of Jacoby 
et al., in another article Malhotra (1982) does claim to find strong evidence for 
information overload effects.  
Given the preceding controversy regarding information overload and techniques 
for examining it, Keller and Staelin (1987) took a new approach of defining information 
in the consumer context by the dimensions of quality and quantity, with the perspective 
that information overload occurs “when the incremental decreases in decision 
effectiveness due to additional information quantity are greater than the incremental 
increases in decision effectiveness due to additional information quality” (p. 202). They 
too found that too much information causes a decrease in decision effectiveness. 
Therefore, while there have been a variety of criticisms regarding methods used to test 
for information overload, there is at least general agreement that the information overload 
effect does exist.  
Henry (1980) also examined information processing accuracy in the consumer 
behavior domain, however his approach was different for two primary reasons. Firstly, he 
examined the effect of an individual’s information processing ability on processing 
accuracy. Secondly, he used a more detailed concept of complexity; defined as an 
interplay between the number of brands, number of attributes per brand and the scaling 
employed by each attribute. Based on his results, Henry produced a linear regression 
equation of the relationship between the dependent variable, information processing 
accuracy, and the independent variables; complexity (measured as the number of 
dimensions presented) and individual processing ability (measured by a score in a 
paragraph completion test). The coefficient for complexity was negative and statistically 
significant, confirming the information overload effect, while the coefficient for 
individual processing ability was positive and statistically significant, indicating the 
higher accuracy of people of higher processing ability. Henry also claims that when 
individual cognitive limits are approached, consumers attempt to limit stress by 
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simplifying the problem, e.g., restricting either the number of alternatives considered or 
the number of attributes considered, or simplifying the attribute scaling.  
While Henry (1980) examined the effect of the decision makers’ ability on 
decision outcome, Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004) sought to classify human subjects 
by the behavioral strategies that they employed in a complex situation. From the results 
of controlled laboratory experiments, subjects were classified into three types according 
to their behavior; those that are “near-rational” and achieve outcomes close to optimal, 
those that are “fatalist” and give up on achieving a near-optimal strategy if they make 
some poor early choices, and those that are “confused” and irrational in their decision 
making. They confirmed that people use different decision strategies and that outcomes 
vary between decision makers.  
Like Jacoby et al., Hahn, Lawson and Lee (1992) also found an inverted U-shape 
function relating decision quality to information load, however Hahn et al., claim that this 
inverted U-shape only appears when the subjects are under time pressure. In the absence 
of time pressure, they claim that subjects continued to show improvements in decision 
quality as the number of attributes increased to a maximum of 20 (for 10 alternatives). 
While Hahn et al., have an interesting hypothesis regarding the effects of time pressure, 
there are concerns regarding the methodology, including: the selection of subjects (high 
school students), an apparent lack of interest from the subjects (the authors state, “72 
subjects [17%] were excluded due to failure to follow the instructions seriously” (p. 
371)), a confounding of one of the focus variables with type of student (groups comprised 
either students from vocational high schools or from college preparatory schools), and 
poor / unclear experimental rewards (rewards appeared to have been unspecified at the 
start of the experiment other than “the persons who made the best choice would receive 
awards”(p. 370)). Therefore, it is questionable whether the experiments by Hahn et al., 
proves that information overload only appears when subjects are under time pressure. 
In a financial study, Casey (1980) examined the effects of information load on 
bank loan officers. This study examined the ability of bank loan officers to predict 
bankruptcy and found that subjects with the highest information load were slower and 
had no greater predictive ability than those with lesser information loads. This provides 
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additional support for the idea that humans become overloaded by information, and 
although the additional information may be important and relevant, humans are unable to 
effectively process large volumes of information.  
Larichev, Moshkovich and Rebrik (1988) used a different type of experiment to 
examine the effects of complexity on human decision making. They used multi-attribute 
classification problems whereby subjects were required to separate objects into decision 
classes of various sizes. The ability of subjects to perform these tasks consistently, i.e., 
without making errors involving the assignment of a dominating object to an inferior 
decision class (and vice versa), was the conceptual measure of a subject’s accuracy. 
Complexity was defined by three parameters; the number of attributes that characterize 
the objects, the number of estimates of each attribute on ordinal scales, and the number of 
decision classes to which the objects were to be assigned. Their work confirms the effects 
of information overload found elsewhere, and an understanding of this limitation of 
human ability with regard to the classification process is useful in that it may actually be 
one of the intermediate cognitive steps used by decision makers to generate effective 
assignments. For example, to determine the suitability of personnel for a position, the 
decision maker may classify the personnel into classes such as 1) ideal for the position 
considered, 2) suitable for the position considered, and 3) unsuitable for the position 
considered.  
While the results of experiments regarding information overload in other 
disciplines are informative, also of value is the definition of complexity, primarily 
established in the consumer research domain. Complexity and information load are 
typically defined by the number of alternatives available, the number of attributes used to 
measure the alternatives and the types of scales used to measure the attributes. In the 
assignment context it is possible to measure complexity with similar dimensions, 
however, there are additional dimensions of complexity not found in consumer behavior. 
Firstly, the decision maker is not seeking the best person for a single position, but rather 
seeks to evaluate the best person for multiple positions, which likely necessitates 
tradeoffs since each assignment made restricts the set of personnel and positions available  
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for the remaining assignments. Furthermore, in addition to the positions having 
preferences over the characteristics of personnel, the personnel also have preferences 
over the positions to which they wish to be assigned.  
As outlined, a variety of experiments have examined the effects of information 
load on decision quality. Such experiments have been primarily in the consumer behavior 
domain, although examples in other areas do exist. However, none have dealt with the 
more complex environment of an assignment process.  
B. TWO-SIDED MATCHING 
The literature to be covered in this section of the paper is summarized in Table 2. 
Reference Relevant Concepts 
Gale and Shapley (1962) Provided first examination of two-sided matching 
markets 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) Reviewed two-sided matching theories 
Roth (1991) Reviewed matching markets in the UK 
Erdil and Ergin (2007) Outline a ‘stable improvements cycle’ for dealing with 
preference list ties 
Dubins and Freedman (1981) Examined dominant strategies for participants in two-
sided matching market 
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) Examined the possibility of strategic manipulation of 
preferences to obtain preferable outcome 
Roth and Rothblum (1999) Examined practical limits on ability of participants to 
strategically manipulate outcomes 
Crawford (1991) Examined the effect of introducing new participants into 
a two-sided matching market 
Irving and Leather (1986) Examined the number of stable matches in a market with 
complete preference lists 
Roth and Peranson (1999) Reviewed the modification of the NRMP algorithm and 
its effects on assignment outcomes 
Roth (1985) Examined the differences between one-to-one and many-
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to-one matching markets 
Irving et al. (1987) Examined techniques to obtain all possible stable 
assignments in a two-sided matching market 
Roth and Vande Vate (1990) Developed instability chain algorithm to handle two-
sided matching market complexities 
Irving (1994) Introduced new definitions of stability in markets that 
have preference list indifference 
Manlove (1999) and Iwama 
et al. (1999) 
Examined computational complexity of finding strong 
and super stable matches in markets with preference list 
indifference 
Irving et al. (2000) Examined the probability of finding super-stable 
solutions in markets with preference list indifference 
Gent and Prosser (2002) Developed process to determine the smallest and largest 
number of matches in a market with preference list 
indifference 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2007) Examined the tradeoff between incentives and efficiency 
in the NYC schools match 
Mongell and Roth (1991) Examined application of two-sided matching to sorority 
rush 
Barron and Várdy (2004) Recommended use of two-sided matching for 
International Monetary Fund Economist Program 
Teo et al. (2001) Recommended use of two-sided matching for allocation 
of high school students in Singapore 
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 
(2003) 
Recommended use of two-sided matching for certain 
high schools in U.S.A. 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) Reviewed application of two-sided matching to New 
York City Department of Education high schools 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) Outlined two potential assignment mechanisms for 
Boston Public Schools 
Table 2 Two-Sided Matching Literature 
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If assignment decisions are adversely affected by human cognitive limitations, 
then the efficiency and effectiveness of assignment processes may be improved by 
implementing a decision support system. For reasons outlined in the introduction, this 
research focuses on two-sided matching processes as the mechanism by which 
assignments are generated. 
Two-sided matching is a systematic process for generating assignments in 
situations where members belong to one of two distinct groups, and members of one 
group seek a partner from the other group. There are two broad classes of two-sided 
matching; one-to-one matching and many-to-one matching. One-to-one matching is 
generally visualized as a marriage market where men and women seek partners in 
marriage, with participants only able to be paired in a one-to-one monogamous 
relationship with a partner from the opposite sex. Many-to-one matching is often 
characterized as a matching between workers and firms, where each firm can employ 
many workers, but each worker can work for only one firm. 
The theoretical study of two-sided matching began with the paper “College 
Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” by Gale and Shapley (1962). However, 
systematic two-sided matching existed in practice from 1951 in the National Intern 
Matching Program (NIMP), known today as the National Resident Matching Program 
(NRMP), a many-to-one matching market that assigns medical students to hospital 
residency programs. A number of concerns relating to the matching process existed in the 
medical matching market prior to implementation of the NIMP. For example, Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990) state, “Students who were pressured into accepting offers before their 
alternate status was resolved were unhappy if they were ultimately offered a preferable 
position, and hospitals whose candidates waited until the last minute to reject them were 
unhappy if their preferred alternate candidates had in the meantime already accepted 
positions” (p. 3). As such, during the 1940s, the U.S. medical residency market went 
through a period of ever decreasing time intervals during which students had to accept or 
decline offers. The interval was reduced from ten days in 1945 to 12 hours in 1949, 
although the American Hospital Association determined that even the 12-hour waiting 
period was too long. To avoid the uncertainty of whether waiting list offers would 
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become confirmed, and the associated last minute rejection of offers, the NIMP was 
introduced for the 1951–52 market. Since inception, the NIMP (and now the NRMP) has 
been a voluntary process, and the high participation rate is testimony to the ability of two-
sided matching to solve at least some of the problems that were faced by medical students 
and residency programs. In 2003, 16,538 medical students matriculated from U.S. 
medical schools, and 15,101 (91.3%) of these participated in the NRMP together with 
15,903 independent applicants (former graduates of U.S. medical schools or graduates of 
foreign medical schools). 
Gale and Shapley (1962) describe a problem in the college market similar to that 
described in the medical market; the problem for colleges is that they do not know 
“whether a given applicant has applied elsewhere; …how he ranks the colleges to which 
he has applied; … which of the other colleges will offer to admit him” (p. 9). Applicants 
face similar problems in that they do not know how competitive they will be for certain 
colleges, and they do not know which colleges are likely to provide offers. These 
problems impact decision making when applicants are placed on college waiting lists 
pending vacancies, for the applicants must decide whether to accept a confirmed offer 
that may have been provided by a college, or wait and hope that a vacancy occurs at 
another preferred college where they are on the waiting list. If the applicant accepts a 
college’s confirmed offer, but later rejects it when a preferred college’s waiting list offer 
becomes a confirmed offer, this either leaves the first college with a vacancy, or causes a 
ripple effect as the first college sends out new offers to applicants that were on its waiting 
list. Therefore, one of the problems that two-sided matching resolves is the strategic 
manipulation that participants encounter when deciding what preferences to submit, and 
what offers to accept. 
1. The Stability of Matches 
One of the desirable qualities exhibited by two-sided matching assignments is 
stability. A matching outcome is stable if no agent is forced into an unacceptable 
assignment and no individual assignments are unstable. Using the example of the NRMP, 
an unstable assignment would be one in which a medical student and residency program 
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are not matched to each other, but prefer each other to their assigned partners. Such a pair 
is referred to as a blocking pair, and in a voluntary procedure, blocking pairs could 
withdraw from the process and organize their own match externally. However, two-sided 
matching guarantees a stable outcome; one that has no blocking pairs. 
Gale and Shapley (1962) describe a “deferred-acceptance” algorithm for both a 
one-to-one and many-to-one market and prove that the algorithm produces stable 
matches. The algorithm for a many-to-one market is given as follows;  
First, all students apply to the college of their first choice. A college with a 
quota of q then places on its waiting list the q applicants who rank highest, 
or all applicants if there are fewer than q, and rejects the rest. Rejected 
applicants then apply to their second choice and again each college selects 
the top q from among the new applicants and those on its waiting list, puts 
these on its new waiting list and rejects the rest. The procedure terminates 
when every applicant is either on a waiting list or has been rejected by 
every college to which he is willing and permitted to apply. At this point 
each college admits everyone on its waiting list. (p. 13) 
To see that the process must generate a stable outcome, consider a student S and 
college C who are not matched to each other, but S would prefer C to the college to 
which he / she has been matched. Given that S prefers C to his / her assigned college, S 
must have proposed to C during the process. However, C must have rejected S in favor of 
another student(s) that C prefers, because C will only keep on its waiting list its q most 
preferred applicants. Given that C prefers its assigned applicants to S, C and S cannot be 
a blocking pair and hence the matching is stable. The deferred-acceptance procedure for 
the one-to-one market operates in the same way as described for the many-to-one market 
if it is assumed that each college has a quota of one, and so the proof of stability is 
unchanged. 
To examine whether the success of the NRMP is due to its stable outcomes or 
some other factors, Roth (1991) examined the experiences from several centralized 
matching markets for new physicians in the United Kingdom. Rather than a national 
market for medical students as exists in the U.S., the UK market is divided into a number 
of smaller regional markets. Of the seven different UK markets that have used 
computerized matching techniques, Roth found that the two that use stable matching 
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techniques have survived, while three of the five unstable techniques have failed. While 
not a statistically large sample, he finds that stability is in fact an important concept that 
relates to the success of the market.  
Two further concepts appear to have been related to the markets that failed; 
firstly, there was no dominant strategy for any agents to submit their true preferences, and 
secondly, the students and hospitals in these failed markets increasingly negotiated 
private arrangements in advance of the centralized match. In the two nonstable markets 
that have survived, Roth hypothesizes that they continue to operate due to the smaller 
sizes of these markets that puts social pressure on students to accept appointments, 
regardless of whether they are stable or not.  
When different matching mechanisms are possible, the stability provided by two-
sided matching is a desirable property. Erdil and Ergin (2007) outline that legal and 
political issues favor stable mechanisms in certain applications, such as school choice. 
2. The Nature of Matches Generated by the Deferred-Acceptance 
Algorithm 
Some of the features of the assignment outcomes differ according to whether the 
relationship is a one-to-one matching or many-to-one matching, and hence these two 
situations will be examined separately. The findings discussed in this section, unless 
otherwise stated, are based upon participants having strict preferences. The issue and 
implications of preference list ties will be addressed later. 
a. One-to-One Matching  
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that when preferences are strict, a stable 
matching exists for every marriage market. It is possible that there is more than one stable 
matching for a market. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that if multiple stable matches 
exist for a single market, the set of people who are single is the same for all stable 
matches. 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) describe an M-optimal stable matching as one 
that every man likes at least as well as any other stable matching. Similarly, the W-
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optimal stable matching is the stable matching that all women agree is best. Furthermore, 
“When all agents have strict preferences, the M-optimal stable matching is the worst 
stable matching for the women; that is, it matches each woman with her least preferred 
achievable mate. Similarly, the W-optimal stable matching matches each man with his 
least preferred achievable mate” (p. 33). The matching produced by the deferred 
acceptance algorithm is the M-optimal stable matching when the men propose, and W-
optimal when the women propose. 
While the assignment outcome may be stable with respect to the stated 
preferences, it is necessary to consider whether the process encourages participants to 
state their true preferences. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) identify that there is no stable 
matching mechanism where stating true preferences is a dominant strategy for every 
agent. However, Dubins and Freedman (1981) show that, when the male proposing 
algorithm is used, it is a dominant strategy for the men to state their true preferences, and 
similarly the female proposing algorithm makes it a dominant strategy for women to state 
their true preferences. So, under the male proposing algorithm, for each man operating 
independently, there is nothing he can do better than to state his true preferences.  
While the male proposing algorithm makes it a dominant strategy for men 
to tell the truth, it is not a dominant strategy for women to tell the truth under the male 
proposing algorithm. In fact, based on the male-proposing algorithm, Gale and 
Sotomayor (1985) show that “If there is more than one stable matching, then there is at 
least one woman who will be better off by falsifying, assuming the others tell the truth” 
(p. 264). If the women truncate their preferences by maintaining the true order, but 
deleting all men ranked below their W-optimal partners, it is possible for the women to 
obtain the W-optimal outcome by this misrepresentation even though the men propose 
(the proof of this follows from the fact that the same participants are single at every stable 
match). However, what makes this difficult for the women is that they must know their 
W-optimal partners.  
In addition to truncation strategies, women can also benefit by submitting 
preferences that are not of the true order. By altering the true order of preferences, a 
woman is indicating which of two men to reject when she has an offer from both. The 
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one that is rejected can lead to a chain of further rejections, which in turn may lead to a 
better offer for the woman. Therefore it is necessary for the woman to know what further 
rejections and offers will result from her altering of her preferences. Roth and Rothblum 
(1999) show that such a strategy of misstatement requires detailed information about the 
preferences of the other men and women, and therefore conclude that submitting 
truncated preferences is a much easier form of strategic manipulation, although 
participants who truncate their preferences excessively run the risk of being unmatched at 
the conclusion of the matching process.  
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that the male proposing algorithm 
produces a result that is weakly Pareto optimal for men, that is, there is no other 
matching, stable or not, that all men prefer. However, it is not possible to guarantee that 
the male proposing outcome is strongly Pareto optimal; an outcome that some men would 
prefer and others would be indifferent to. As shown by Dubins and Freedman (1981), it is 
possible to find unstable matches that leave some males no worse off, while improving 
the situation of the rest. Therefore, depending on the size of the market and the degree of 
knowledge of each participants’ preferences, it is possible that a group of men may, in 
collusion, manipulate their preferences to obtain an outcome that will benefit some 
members of the group while leaving other members of the group indifferent to the 
outcome. While theory demonstrates the ability of participants to submit false preferences 
to obtain a strongly Pareto optimal outcome, experimentation is warranted to determine 
the ease with which participants could engage in such behavior. 
A dominant strategy is defined as one that is a best response to whatever 
other participants may do. Under the male proposing algorithm, it is a dominant strategy 
for men to state their true preferences. While there is no such dominant strategy for 
women under the male proposing algorithm, there are equilibrium strategies as discussed 
by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), where each participant’s strategy is in equilibrium if no 
player can achieve a better outcome by changing their strategy if all other participants 
leave their strategies unchanged. Such equilibrium is known as Nash equilibrium. Roth 
and Rothblum (1999) examine equilibrium strategies and consider the information that 
participants require in order to pursue equilibrium strategies. For example, a strong 
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equilibrium strategy is for the women to submit preferences truncated such that the last 
male appearing on each woman’s preference list is the woman’s W-optimal partner. 
However, as mentioned already, such a strategy requires the women to have detailed 
knowledge in order to know their W-optimal partners.  
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that if a man in the market extends his 
preference list to include more women, this cannot help the other men and cannot harm 
the women. Furthermore, applying Gale and Sotomayor’s Lemma 1 (1985), any men who 
prefer the matching derived from the men’s original shorter preference list will be 
matched with women who prefer the matching derived from the men’s longer preference 
list. That is, for two stable matches µ and µ’ from a single market, if a man m prefers his 
partner at match µ to his partner at µ’, then both of his female partners at µ and µ’ will 
prefer the match µ’ to the match µ. 
If a new woman enters the market, it weakens the competitive position of 
the other women, while strengthening the competitive position of the men. As shown by 
Roth and Sotomayor, (1990) and Crawford (1991), at the M-optimal matching, no man 
can do worse by the introduction of a new woman into the market, and assuming that the 
new woman becomes matched to a man who was previously matched, there are some 
women who will have a less desirable partner due to the introduction of the new woman. 
From Irving and Leather (1986), in a marriage market consisting of n men 
and n women who each submit complete preference lists, the number of stable matches 
grows exponentially as n increases. However, Roth and Peranson (1999) examine the 
number of stable matches in the NRMP, where preference lists are incomplete, and 
conclude, “When preferences are highly correlated (i.e., when similar programs tend to 
agree which are the most desirable applicants, and applicants tend to agree which are the 
most desirable programs), the set of stable matchings is small” (p. 767). 
b. Many-to-One Matching 
Many-to-one assignment situations are described here in terms of workers 
and firms, where each firm can accept multiple workers, but each worker can accept a job 
at only one firm. Many, but not all, of the findings relating to one-to-one matching 
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generalize to many-to-one matching. In some literature, e.g., Dubins and Freedman 
(1981) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the many-to-one situation is conceptually broken 
down to resemble a one-to-one situation, by considering each firm to be divided into 
multiple pieces of itself, with each piece having a quota of one, and the preferences of 
each piece of a firm being identical to the preferences of the firm. By considering a 
many-to-one situation in such a way, it is apparent that a stable outcome will always 
exist. Furthermore, it follows that for a given situation the same workers will be 
unmatched at every stable outcome and firms will have the same number of jobs vacant 
at every stable outcome. 
Stability in a many-to-one situation can be determined by considering 
individual stability and pairwise stability. Individual stability is based on the notion that 
the process is voluntary and any worker or firm can remain unmatched rather than being 
forced to accept an undesirable partner, and hence a matching is individually stable if no 
participant is forced into an unacceptable match. A matching is pairwise stable if there 
are no blocking pairs consisting of a worker and firm, where each would prefer to be 
matched to the other than to their assigned partner(s). The implication of this is that 
stability can be identified by knowing the preferences of the workers and firms, and does 
not require knowledge of a firm’s preferences over groups of workers. 
Just as there exist M-optimal and W-optimal outcomes for one-to-one 
matching situations, there also exist worker and firm-optimal outcomes for many-to-one 
matching situations. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) describe these outcomes in terms of the 
residency matching process: “When preferences are strict, there exists a hospital-optimal 
stable matching that every hospital likes as well as any other stable matching, and a 
student-optimal matching that every student likes as well as any other stable matching” 
(p. 139). 
While the results above mirror those from the one-to-one matching 
situation, the opportunities for strategic behavior are somewhat different. Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990) state, “When preferences over individuals are strict, the student-
optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the students, but the hospital-
optimal stable matching need not even be weakly Pareto optimal for the hospitals” (p. 
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139). This is realized by first considering the one-to-one situation where the M-optimal 
solution is weakly Pareto optimal for the men, indicating that there is no other matching, 
stable or not, that all men prefer. However, in the many-to-one situation, while it is not 
possible for every job in a firm to prefer a matching to that provided by the firm optimal 
solution, an alternative solution may result in some of a firm’s jobs being indifferent to 
the alternative solution while the other jobs at the firm prefer the alternative solution. 
Therefore, it is possible that some firms would prefer an alternative matching to the firm-
optimal outcome. Or as stated by Roth (1985), “There may exist outcomes that all 
colleges strictly prefer to the C-optimal [college-optimal] stable outcome” (p. 283). 
Therefore, under either the firm or worker optimal algorithms, firms have an incentive to 
misrepresent their preferences to obtain a better outcome. For workers it remains a 
dominant strategy to state their true preferences when the worker-optimal algorithm is 
used, but not under the firm-optimal algorithm.  
One of the problems with the early version of the NIMP algorithm was 
that it was a hospital-optimal algorithm; therefore, there was no dominant strategy for 
either hospitals or students to state their true preferences. Roth and Peranson (1997, 
1999) examine the change of the NRMP algorithm to a student-optimal solution, an 
algorithm that does at least give students the incentive to state their true preferences. 
Interestingly, by using actual rank-order lists submitted to the NRMP in 1987 and from 
1993–1996, and comparing the matches generated by both the hospital and student-
optimal algorithms, it was found that less than 0.1% of applicants would have been 
affected by a change to the applicant-proposing algorithm (Roth & Peranson, 1997). This 
is primarily due to the correlation of preferences, which leads to minimal difference 
between the hospital and student optimal outcomes.  
3. Determining an “Optimal” Stable Match 
While the deferred-acceptance algorithm leads to a solution that either the men or 
the women regard as providing their best achievable partner, Irving, Leather and Gusfield 
(1987) consider a procedure to improve the average satisfaction of men and women, 
where satisfaction is measured by each partner’s rank. The procedure operates as follows; 
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using preference lists that include only acceptable partners, the male proposing algorithm 
starts, and when a woman w receives a proposal from a man m, woman w deletes all men 
ranked lower than m. The men deleted from w’s list also delete w from their preference 
lists. This produces what Irving et al., refer to as the “male oriented shortlists.” From the 
shortlists, rotations are identified, where “a rotation ρ is a sequence 
ρ = (m0,w0), …, (mr-1,wr-1) 
of man / woman pairs such that, for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ r-1), 
(i) wi is first in mi’s shortlist; 
(ii) wi+1 is second in mi’s shortlist (i + 1 taken modulo r)” (Irving et al., 1987,  
p. 535) 
Within a rotation defined as above, if each man mi exchanges his partner wi for 
wi+1 then the resulting match is also stable. Irving et al., continue to show that by 
eliminating rotations it is possible to reveal every stable matching. Of the stable matches 
for a given instance, the stable match that provides the best average satisfaction for the 
men and women is selected.  
One of the key facets focused on by Irving et al. (1987), is the computation time 
required to determine the “optimal” stable matching. Given that the maximum number of 
stable matchings for a situation of size n by n grows exponentially, the procedure 
produced by Irving et al. (1987) reduces the computation time from an exponential worst 
case to O(n4)-time. 
4. Market Complexities 
Roth and Peranson (1999) describe four types of complexities that exist in the 
NRMP; couples seeking positions close to one another; applicants with supplemental lists 
for second-year positions; positions in residency programs that revert to different 
programs if unfilled; programs who seek to have an even number of positions filled. The 
deferred acceptance algorithm, as described previously, cannot handle such complexities, 
so Roth and Peranson (1997, 1999) use the instability-chaining algorithm, first described 
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in Roth and Vande Vate (1990), to handle these complexities in the redesign of the 
NRMP. For the NRMP, the instability-chaining algorithm considers the entire set of 
residency positions, introduces the medical students one at a time, and resolves any 
instability due to market complexities as they arise, before introducing new students into 
the algorithm. 
5. Indifference / Preference List Ties 
When preferences are not strict, different outcomes are achievable for different 
orderings of tied preferences. It is possible for some participants to be matched at one 
preference ordering yet unmatched at a different ordering of the tied preferences. 
Consider the example of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) that comprises “a marriage market 
with two men and only one woman. If the woman prefers either man to being single, but 
is indifferent between them, and if both men prefer the woman to being single, then there 
are exactly two stable matchings, and each of the men is single at one of them and 
married at the other” (p. 48). Since each man would prefer to be matched to the woman 
rather than be left unmatched (because only acceptable partners are listed), the men do 
not agree on which of the two outcomes is the better match. Therefore, when preferences 
are not strict, there need be no M-optimal (or W-optimal) stable matching since an M-
optimal matching is defined as one that every man likes at least as well as any other 
stable match. 
In the case that some man or woman is indifferent between two or more possible 
partners, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) propose a fixed tie-breaking rule, such as to 
alphabetically order preferences where ties occur. While this may ensure a standard and 
reproducible result, it may not necessarily ensure the “best” outcome. While under strict 
preferences the men agree that the M-optimal outcome is best and women agree that the 
W-optimal outcome is best, there is no M or W-optimal outcome under indifference, and 
therefore there is no definition of what constitutes the “best” outcome.  
Irving (1994) suggests, “In practical instances, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect 
each participant to provide a strict preference ordering of all of his/her prospective 
partners. If indifference is permitted, so that each person’s preference list becomes a 
  34 
partial order, the character of the problems changes somewhat” (p. 262). Because 
participants may be matched to partners that they either strictly prefer or are indifferent 
towards, Irving introduces new definitions of stability for use when participants may 
express indifference. The notion of who constitutes a blocking pair is different for each 
definition: 
• A weakly stable match has no blocking pairs, where a blocking pair is 
defined as any couple, each of whom strictly prefers the other to their 
assigned partner. When ties are broken arbitrarily and the Gale-Shapley 
Deferred Acceptance algorithm is applied, the resulting match is weakly 
stable.  
• A strongly stable match has no blocking pairs, where a blocking pair is 
defined by any couple (m, w), where m strictly prefers w to his assigned 
partner, and w either strictly prefers m or is indifferent between her 
assigned partner and m (and vice versa for m and w). 
• A super stable match has no blocking pairs, where a blocking pair is 
defined as any couple that either strictly prefers each other to their 
assigned partners, or are indifferent between each other and their assigned 
partners.  
Irving (1994) shows that, while the deferred acceptance algorithm guarantees a 
stable match in a situation without indifference, the deferred acceptance algorithm 
guarantees a weakly stable match when indifference is expressed. Irving also provides 
algorithms to produce both strongly and super stable matches, however there is no 
guarantee that such solutions will exist.  
Irving (1994) sought to prove when participants have ties in their preference lists, 
that super and strongly stable solutions can be found in polynomial time if they exist; a 
super stable solution can be found in O(n2) time and a strongly stable solution can be 
found in O(n4) time. Further work by Manlove (1999) and Iwama, Manlove,  
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Miyazaki and Morita (1999) examine the computational complexity of finding strong or 
super stable matches in marriage problems when ties are permitted in preference lists. 
The work by Irving (1994), Manlove (1999) and Iwama et al. (1999) all focus 
primarily on the computational complexity of finding strong or super stable solutions, 
however none of them discuss the likelihood of finding such solutions. Irving, Manlove 
and Scott (2000) examine the likelihood of obtaining super stable solutions under various 
parameters, including the number of agents involved, lengths of preference lists and the 
number, position and sizes of the ties. They state, “the probability of a super-stable 
matching existing decreases as the size of the instance increases, and also decreases as 
the number and length of the ties increase. However, it was found that the probability of a 
super-stable matching existing is likely to be much higher if the ties occur on one side 
only; for example in the hospitals’ lists and not in the residents’ lists” (p. 270). 
Irving, who has been an author of a number of previously mentioned papers that 
examine matching with preference list ties, was a design consultant for the Scottish 
PRHO Allocations Scheme (a medical student matching scheme), which first operated 
with a two-sided matching algorithm in 1999–2000. In this application, hospitals are 
permitted to express ties in their preferences lists, although medical students may not 
express ties. Interestingly, despite Irving’s work on strong and stable matches, the 
algorithm used for the Scottish scheme did not involve a strong or super stable match. 
Rather, the approach taken was to randomly break the hospitals’ ties and then use the 
student-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm, modified for circumstances that require students 
to undertake both a surgical and a medical residency period. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
if the choice of approach was due to a low probability of obtaining a strong or super 
stable match or for other reasons. However, Irving does note that a subsequent analysis of 
the medical match revealed that an additional three students could have been matched 
(484 rather than 481) if a different tie breaking was used. 
Gent and Prosser (2002) show that it is possible to use constraint programming to 
determine the smallest and largest number of matches in a stable matching with 
incomplete lists and indifference. However, unless the matching market is relatively 
small, the search cost (computing time) to determine the smallest and largest number of 
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matches increases significantly. Gent and Prosser did not examine any markets of 
dimension greater than 60, and primarily focused on markets of size 10. As market size 
increased from 10 to 60, and the number of preference list ties increased, it became too 
computationally time consuming to determine the largest and smallest number of stable 
matches.  
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2007) examine the tradeoff between incentives and 
efficiency in the context of the New York City high schools match, and show that random 
tie-breaking preserves the strategy proof nature of the mechanism with regards to the 
students in the student-proposing mechanism, but that the tie breaking introduces 
artificial constraints that harm the student welfare. Therefore, attaining a strategy proof 
outcome has a cost in terms of efficiency, where efficiency is measured by the number of 
students who can be matched to a school that they rank higher. By relaxing the 
requirement for a strategy-proof student optimal approach, Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and 
Roth  (2009) find that 6,854 students of the 63,795 students matched in the 2003-04 NYC 
high school match could have been matched to schools that they rank higher in their 
preferences. However, using data from the 2005–06 Boston Public School match, it was 
found that no Pareto improvements at all could be made for students. Abdulkadiroğlu, 
Pathak, Roth and Sonmez (2006) provide two reasons why the Boston school match is 
less likely to yield Pareto improvements; first, there were a significantly higher 
proportion of students receiving their first preferences in Boston as compared to NYC, 
and second, in Boston the magnitude of indifference is less than in NYC where some 
schools are indifferent between all applicants. 
Erdil and Ergin (2007) examine the inefficiency that is created when preference 
list ties are broken with a lottery. They propose a procedure called the stable 
improvement cycle, which in situations involving preference list ties, can match some 
students to schools ranked higher on their preference lists without harm to others in the 
process.  They also show that the stable improvement cycle is not a computationally hard 
process, unlike the processes used by Irving (1994), Manlove (1999) and Iwama et al. 
(1999). 
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6. Applications 
Having examined the different types of two-sided matching processes and some 
of the issues relating to these processes, it is worth examining some of the applications of 
two-sided matching. 
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is perhaps the most widely 
known example of a two-sided matching market. The NRMP is in fact an organization 
that conducts many matches; the largest being the match for first and second year medical 
residency positions, however 35 medical specialty fellowship matches are also operated. 
Two-sided matching is also used in a number of other medical matching markets, 
primarily within the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom. Two-
sided matching has also been used for the placement of personnel into articling positions 
in Canadian law firms and sororities (Mongell & Roth, 1991). 
There have also been a number of cases where two-side matching has been, or is 
in the process of being examined for use in a new situation. Barron and Várdy (2005) 
recommend the use of two-sided matching as the mechanism for matching participants in 
the International Monetary Fund’s Economist Program. Teo, Sethuraman and Tan (2001) 
propose using a stable matching process for allocating students to high schools in 
Singapore, a centralized matching process that did not produce stable outcomes. 
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) examine two-sided matching as a mechanism to 
match students to high schools in areas such as Boston, Seattle, Columbus and 
Minneapolis, where school choice (intra and inter-district choice) has been implemented. 
Hansen (2003) describes a proposal to use two-sided matching for adopting children in 
the U.S.A.  
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) provide a preliminary review of a relatively new, and 
the largest known, application of two-sided matching. Operating for the first time in 
2004, over 90,000 students applied to New York City public high schools using a 
centralized process based on two-sided matching. Students submitted rank-order 
preference lists of up to 12 schools, and schools independently determined their 
preferences for students. The authors compare the processes before and after the process 
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redesign and find that the redesign produced favorable results; more students received 
schools on their preference lists, and less students were administratively assigned. The 
similarity between the high school process and the NRMP is clear; in each, students have 
preferences for schools / hospitals, and schools / hospitals have preferences for students. 
However, there is also a difference between these two processes; while the NRMP is an 
impartial matchmaker that has no direct interest in the assignment outcome, the NYC 
Department of Education does have an interest in how students are matched. One manner 
in which the Department of Education imposes its interests is through constraints on 
schools. In the NYC match, schools classified in the Educational Option program may 
individually evaluate students for half of the school’s seats, but this is subject to 16% of 
seats being allocated to top performers in a standardized English Language Arts exam, 
68% of seats to middle performers and 16% of seats to bottom performers. The other half 
of the school’s seats are allocated by lottery, but again distributed in accordance with the 
standardized test scores.  
Another school system that redesigned its assignment mechanism is the Boston 
Public Schools system. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) highlight that the strategic 
manipulation of preferences was a significant concern with the matching process that was 
in use prior to 2006. The authors provided two potential assignment mechanisms to the 
Boston Public Schools; the two-sided matching deferred acceptance algorithm and the 
top trading cycles mechanism. In a process where schools have priorities for students, the 
top trading cycles mechanism allows students to trade their priorities; for example, 
student A might be a priority for school Y but prefers school Z, and under this 
mechanism student A could swap the priority with another student who has a priority at 
school Z. The deferred acceptance algorithm was chosen because of concerns that the top 
trading cycles mechanism would be less transparent, more difficult to explain to parents 
and could perpetuate the perceived need to game the system. The Boston Public Schools 
implemented the deferred acceptance process for the 2006–07 school year.  
While markets, such as the NYC Department of Education, have the potential for 
decisions to be aligned with the decision maker’s preferences, this concept has not been  
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fully developed. This research takes a new approach; it develops a two-sided matching 
process where the decision maker has preferences over outcomes, and examines the 
impact on issues such as stability and participant behavior. 
C. MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY 
The literature to be covered in this section of the paper is summarized in Table 3. 
Reference Relevant Concepts 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) Examined decision making for problems with multiple 
objectives 
Triantaphyllou (2000) Reviewed a variety of multi-criteria decision-making 
techniques 
Saaty (1980) Developed the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Belton and Gear (1983) Raised problem of rank-reversal in the original AHP and 
proposed a modified version 
Edwards (1977) Developed the Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique 
Edwards and Barron (1994) Proposed modifications to SMART to account for range 
sensitivity; SMART using Swings (SMARTS) and 
SMART Exploiting Ranks (SMARTER) 
Benayoun et al. (1966) Examined the ELECTRE decision-making technique 
León (1997) Provided support for additive functions 
Zahedi (1986) Reviewed applications of AHP 
Belton (1986) Examined limitations of the AHP 
Taylor et al. (1998) Applied the AHP to a university dean selection 
Stewart (1992) Discussed problem of range sensitivity 
Nitzsch and Weber (1993) Discussed problem of range sensitivity 
Barron and Barrett (1996) Developed case for the use of Rank Order Centroid 
weights 
Srivastava et al. (1995), 
Stillwell et al. (1981), 
Fischer (1995), 
Compared different techniques available for determining 
criteria weights 
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Borcherding et al. (1991),  
Weber and Borcherding 
(1993), 
Roberts and Goodwin (2002), 
Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen 
(2001) 
Table 3 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory Literature 
As outlined, two-sided matching is a process that relies on rank-ordered 
preferences to generate assignments. Typically these preferences are determined 
cognitively by individuals involved in the process, either as participants (e.g., students in 
the NRMP) or as representatives of organizations (e.g., hospital staff determining 
residency preferences on behalf of a hospital in the NRMP). However, in situations that 
involve very large numbers of personnel who must be evaluated according to multiple 
attributes, a structured process enables rapid and consistent preference rank ordering. In 
such a structured process, participants may be ranked according to the degree to which 
they satisfy stated attributes. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory refers to a class of decision-
making techniques that can support the evaluation and ranking of personnel as required 
for the two-sided matching algorithm.  
There are numerous multi-attribute utility theory techniques to consider, including 
the additive model proposed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), the Weighted Sum Model 
(WSM) and Weighted Product Model (WPM) outlined by Triantaphyllou (2000), the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) proposed by Saaty (1980), the revised version of the 
AHP proposed by Belton and Gear (1983), the Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique 
(SMART) proposed by Edwards (1977), a modification of SMART titled SMART using 
Swings (SMARTS) proposed by Edwards and Barron (1994), the SMART Exploiting 
Ranks (SMARTER) proposed by Edwards and Barron (1994), and the ELECTRE method 
proposed by Benayoun, Roy and Sussman (1966). With such a variety of techniques, not 
surprisingly Triantaphyllou (2000) states the paradox; “What decision making method 
should be used to choose the best decision-making method?” (p. 5).  
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1. Decision-Making Techniques  
A brief review of different decision-making techniques follows, but first it is 
important to clarify some terminology. 
Alternatives—These are the options from which the decision maker is selecting. 
For example, when purchasing a car, the alternatives are the different models of cars that 
are being considered. In school matching situations, which have been described 
previously, the individual students are the alternatives that the schools must assess and 
rank order. 
Attributes—An attribute is the means by which an alternative is assessed. Some 
literature uses the term criteria in place of attributes. In assessing the best car to purchase, 
attributes may include fuel efficiency and safety. In assessing students, attributes may 
include GPA and attendance rates. 
a. Additive Value Function 
From Keeney and Raiffa (1976), a value function may be expressed in an 
additive form if and only if the attributes are pairwise preferentially independent. They 
define that a “pair of attributes X and Y is preferentially independent of Z, if the 
conditional preferences in the (x,y) space given z´ do not depend on z´” (p. 101). They 
continue to show that, in a case that evaluates alternatives over multiple attributes, the 
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Where the weights υ are scaled from zero to one and the sum of the 
weights equals one. It is important to note that the component value functions are 
“normalized” so that the worst outcome on the ith attribute has a score of 0 and the best 
outcome on the ith attribute has a score of 1.  
In support of the additive functional form, León (1997) claims, “additive 
structures produce excellent approximations to nonadditive ones and that most weight 
elicitation procedures for nonadditive MAU models are difficult and technical” (p. 250). 
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However, Edwards and Barron (1994) claim there may be times when additive models 
“may be lousy even as approximations. Fortunately, an easy-to-use test will weed out 
almost all instances in which an additive model would be really bad. It consists of 
looking for instances in which, at one level of value attribute x, more of y is better than 
less, while at another level of x, less of y is better than more” (p. 315).  
b. Weighted Sum Model and Weighted Product Model 
Similar to the above process is the Weighted Sum Model (WSM), 
described by Triantaphyllou (2000) as “probably the most commonly used approach, 
especially in single dimensional problems” (p. 6). The only difference between the WSM 
and the additive value function is that the WSM does not use a normalization process to 
convert values on each attribute to 0-1 utility values, and therefore it can only be used 
when the dimensions of each attribute are the same (e.g., dollars). Therefore, the WSM 
may be regarded as a limited application of the additive value function. When attributes 
are not all the same dimension, Triantaphyllou (2000) proposes the Weighted Product 
Model (WPM), which uses ratios to avoid the problem of different dimensions. Using the 
WPM, pairs of alternatives are compared with a ratio for each attribute compared. For 
example, in comparing car A to car B (two of potentially many alternatives), the fuel 
efficiency of car A is compared to car B (say 10mpg : 20mpg = 0.5) and the safety of car 
A is compared to car B (say 4 star : 5 star = 0.8). Attribute weights are then applied to 
each attribute ratio. 
c. Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Saaty (1980) 
and has been used in a large number of applications as reviewed by Zahedi (1986). 
Calhoun (1989) states, “Although the AHP process is mathematically complicated, it 
yields useful results and is not difficult to apply” (p. 21). The AHP is a process that relies 
on the decision maker providing subjective pairwise comparisons of the alternatives 
against each attribute, with the comparisons being given numeric values on a scale of 1 to 
9 to indicate relative importance. There have been criticisms of the scales used to indicate 
relative importance, including Belton’s (1986) comment, “The limitation of the scale to 
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1–9 imposes unnatural restrictions on judgments” (p. 11). A Revised AHP was developed 
by Belton and Gear (1983) to deal with potential rank inconsistencies that could occur 
with the AHP.  
The number of comparisons required to undertake the process grows 
rapidly as the number of alternatives increases. For this reason, the AHP and Revised 
AHP are not appropriate for this research. Taylor, Ketcham and Hoffman (1998) show 









where T is the number of comparisons and n is the number of alternatives being 
evaluated. Therefore the number of comparisons grows rapidly even for modest sized 
problems, as demonstrated by Taylor et al. (1998) who applied the AHP to the selection 
of a college dean at Texas A&M University and found that the size of the problem, 
involving 33 candidates and four criteria, was excessive. With n = 33 (alternatives), the 
number of comparisons to be made for each attribute is 528. This number of comparisons 
must be made for each of the four attributes, resulting in a total of 2,112 comparisons. 
d. SMART, SMARTS and SMARTER 
Edwards (1977) developed the technique known as SMART (Simple 
Multi-Attribute Rating Technique) to provide an easy to use decision-making tool. There 
are three basic steps to determining attribute weights in SMART: first, attributes are 
ordered according to their importance; second, each attribute is assigned a relative weight 
according to its importance, usually with the least important attribute assigned a value of 
10 and the most important a value of 100; and third, the importance weights are 
normalized by dividing each weight by the sum of the weights.  
While this provides an easy process for weight determination, the concept 
of range sensitivity has been discussed by a number of authors including Stewart (1992) 
and Nitzsch and Weber (1993); they indicate that weights should not be based on 
importance alone, but should also be related to the range of outcomes for the criterion. 
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For example, in selecting a machine, the price attribute may be important to the decision 
maker, however if the price of available machines only varies from $20,000 to $20,100, 
there is little benefit in giving a high weight to price.  
Recognizing that SMART failed to take range sensitivity into 
consideration, Edwards and Barron (1994) proposed two new techniques known as 
SMARTS (SMART using Swing weights) and SMARTER (SMART Exploiting Ranks). 
Each of these new techniques overcomes the problem of range sensitivity that existed in 
SMART. The technique of SMARTS is perhaps the most rigorous and accurate in terms 
of eliciting attribute weights, however the weight elicitation process is time consuming. 
The weight elicitation involves questioning the decision maker to determine what 
tradeoffs he / she would be willing to make in one attribute for variations in another of 
the attributes. Consequently, Edwards and Barron (1994) recommend SMARTER, which 
is based on Rank Order Centroid (ROC) weights (to be described below), the case for 
which is developed by Barron and Barrett (1996). Using ROC weights, the decision 
maker need only determine an ordinal ranking of attributes, from which the weight of the 
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This approach appeals to situations where decision makers may be able to 
relatively easily define an ordinal ranking of attributes but have difficulty with 
determining weights, a situation of the type discussed by Steuer and Schuler (1978). 
Consequently, Edwards and Barron (1994) recommend SMARTER due to the greater 
ease of elicitation. Furthermore, in terms of relative accuracy of SMARTS and 
SMARTER, they recommend SMARTER because it eliminate the difficult judgmental 
steps involved in SMARTS, and claim that ROC weights provide around 98 to 99% of 
the utility obtainable by full elicitation of the weights. 
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e. ELECTRE 
ELECTRE is an outranking method developed by Roy (1968) that orders 
alternatives by determining which alternatives “outrank” others. Roy (1991) reviews 
different versions of ELECTRE; ELECTRE I, II, III, IV, TRI and IS. 
As stated by Triantaphyllou (2000), “The basic concept of the ELECTRE 
method is to deal with “outranking relations” by using pairwise comparisons among 
alternatives under each one of the criteria separately” (p. 13). The notation used for 
ELECTRE, aSb, indicates that alternative a is “at least as good as” b. Concordance and 
discordance indices are then used to measure, for each pair of alternatives, whether aSb. 
One of the desirable features of ELECTRE is that it is noncompensatory, meaning that a 
bad score on one criterion cannot compensate for a good score on another criterion. 
However, for situations with a large number of alternatives, the pairwise comparisons 
required by ELECTRE are a limitation in the same way that such comparisons are a 
limitation of the AHP. 
2. Determination of Weights 
For techniques, such as the AHP, SMART, SMARTS and SMARTER, 
determining weights is embedded in the process. However, for additive value functions, 
WSM and WPM, a functional form is provided but requires the decision maker to 
determine weights through other means. A variety of techniques have been reviewed and 
compared by different authors; Srivastava, Connolly and Beach (1995), Stillwell, Seaver 
and Edwards (1981), Fischer (1995), Borcherding, Eppel and von Winterfeldt (1991), 
Weber and Borcherding (1993) and Roberts and Goodwin (2002). An overview of the 
main weighting techniques follows. 
a. Direct Allocation 
Direct allocation is probably the simplest of the weighting schemes. As 
discussed by Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen (2001), in this process weights are allocated to  
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the attributes directly; for example, by dividing 100 points between the attributes. This 
approach however suffers from the range sensitivity principle discussed previously as 
part of the SMART review. 
b. Swing Weights 
Edwards and Barron (1994) provide a description of Swing weights, as it 
is one of the intermediate steps of the SMARTS technique. In Swing weighting, all 
criteria are shown along with the best and worst outcome for each criterion. The decision 
maker must first assume they are given an alternative with the worst outcome for each 
criterion. They then must specify the criterion for which a “swing” from worst to best 
outcome would produce the greatest improvement in overall satisfaction. The decision 
maker is again presented with an alternative that has all the worst outcomes, and must 
identify which criterion, other than the one already identified, they would most like to 
change from worst to best outcome.  This process is repeated until all criteria have been 
ranked. Once this phase is complete, a value of 100 is assigned to the first criterion (the 
one judged to have the largest swing importance), and all other criteria are expressed as a 
percentage of the first criterion. To do so, the decision maker is asked to indicate what 
weight, relative to the 100 assigned to the first criterion, they would provide to a swing 
from the worst to best outcome of the second most important criterion. This is repeated 
until all criteria are weighted on the scale 0–100. Once complete, the points are 
normalized to sum to one to provide criteria weights.  
By asking decision makers to compare the best and worst outcomes for 
each criterion, this procedure considers the range sensitivity principle. Pöyhönen and 
Hämäläinen (2001) identify that the process of eliciting Swing weights explicitly 
incorporates the attribute ranges, while Fischer (1995) found that the Swing method 
performs better than direct weighting in reflecting the ranges of alternatives.  
c. Rank Weights 
A variety of rank-based weighting schemes are available and discussed by 
Barron and Barrett (1996). These methods include Rank Order Centroid (ROC), Rank 
Sum (RS) Weights and Rank Reciprocal (RR) Weights. For these weighting techniques, 
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the decision maker specifies the order in which the attributes are ranked, and the 
procedures derive weights based upon the ordinal ranking of the attributes. After 
determining the number and ordering of attributes in a problem, the weights are applied 


































where i is the ith of n attributes.  
For example, a problem that is defined by five attributes would have 
weights for each method, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Rank ROC RS RR 
1 0.4567 0.3333 0.4379 
2 0.2567 0.2667 0.2190 
3 0.1567 0.2000 0.1460 
4 0.0900 0.1333 0.1095 
5 0.0400 0.0667 0.0876 
Table 4 Weights According to Rank Based Weighting Techniques 
Using probability density functions, Barron and Barrett (1996) explain that 
ROC provides the best estimation of weights when all that is known is the rank ordering 
of attributes. Additionally, in comparing the rank order methods, Srivastava et al. (1995) 
state a preference for ROC weights because they “have an appealing theoretical rationale, 
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are simple to calculate, and appear to perform better than earlier rank-based schemes in 
reproducing preference generated by full-scale multiattribute models” (p. 113).  
These procedures are quite simple in that the decision maker need only 
determine the ranking order of the attributes. As discussed by Barron and Barrett (1996), 
this can be valuable if the decision maker is “unavailable, unable, or unwilling to specify 
sufficiently precise weights; or … the decision-making group may be able to reach 
agreement only on a ranking of attribute weights” (p. 1516). 
d. Tradeoff Weights 
The tradeoff method proposed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) requires the 
decision maker to consider two attributes at a time and determine how much of one 
attribute they would be willing to tradeoff for a given change in another attribute, all 
other attributes held constant. While the tradeoff method has certain technical appeal, 
Borcherding et al. (1991) identify that it is difficult and time consuming. Furthermore, 
Edwards and Barron (1994) believe that due to the complexity of this method, it is likely 
to produce elicitation errors. Furthermore, as stated by Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen (2001), 
this method “is problematic in many decision making problems because the method 
assumes that the attributes are measured on a continuous scale” (p. 572). 
3. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory Summary 
A variety of decision-making techniques are available, each having their own 
strengths and weaknesses, and selection of a technique depends on the decision-making 
situation. Most decision-making techniques are used to select a single outcome from a 
variety of alternatives, however the approach used in this research is to use the decision-
making technique to provide an ordered set of alternatives, potentially including 
dominated alternatives, which will then be used as a preference list for a two-sided 
matching algorithm. 
In order to derive the ordered set of alternatives in this research, an additive value 
function will be used. Techniques, such as AHP and ELECTRE, which require pairwise 
comparisons, were eliminated due to the large number of comparisons required. Of the 
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remaining techniques, the additive value function is selected for its simplicity and ease of 
explanation and understanding. Weights for the additive value function will be 
determined from the Rank Order Centroid technique due to the simplicity and ease of 
elicitation. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The issue and importance of market design was discussed at the outset. This 
research examines the design of a personnel allocation process within a large hierarchical 
organization. While the inefficiencies that may exist in open personnel markets are likely 
to be readily apparent (e.g., market unraveling and declining participation rates), 
inefficiencies in large hierarchical organizations are not likely to be as apparent. Through 
experimentation with human subjects, the first research question examines the 
inefficiencies that may exist in an organization where assignments are conducted in the 
absence of decision support, situations typical of large hierarchical organizations. An 
examination of these inefficiencies will establish the requirement for redesign of the 
personnel assignment process in such organizations. 
As was examined in the introduction, two-sided matching algorithms have 
features that are desirable for a variety of applications, and have been successfully 
applied in various markets. However, two-sided matching algorithms have not been 
applied to applications of the type explored in this research; large hierarchical 
organizations where considerable indifference may occur and system level attributes can 
be incorporated. The effect of these issues on two-sided matching outcomes is examined 
through computational experimentation in the second and third research questions. This 
chapter addresses the research design for each of the research questions in turn. 
A. HUMAN DECISION-MAKING QUALITY IN ASSIGNMENT 
PROCESSES 
The inefficiencies in a hierarchical organization’s personnel assignment process 
may not be directly apparent. Short (2000) used survey responses from U.S. Navy 
detailers (those who conduct the assignments) and U.S. enlisted Sailors to examine the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the extant assignment process. Concerns were raised from 
both the Sailor and detailer perspective. Sailors expect to be treated fairly, but expressed 
distrust of detailers and the process. Meanwhile, detailers responded that the process was 
inefficient, complicated, burdensome, and were frustrated by Sailors’ unrealistic 
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expectations. While such concerns were identified, survey work has limitations 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Results may be limited by sampling, how respondents feel their 
responses will be used and the degree of anonymity perceived. Furthermore, survey work 
is not able to indicate the quality of detailers’ assignment decisions.   
This research uses human subjects in experiments that incorporate induced value 
theory (Smith, 1976) to examine how human assignment decision making is affected by 
changes in the size and complexity of the assignment problem. Experimental methods are 
the accepted methodology used in other studies of information overload effects (see 
Jacoby et al., 1974; Henry, 1980; Casey, 1980; Keller & Staelin, 1987; Larichev et al., 
1988), and the use of induced value theory enhances internal validity (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1963). A full factorial experimental design (Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 1978) is 
used. 
1. Information Load 
As outlined previously, consumer behavior research typically defines information 
load by the number of objects to be considered, and the number of attributes that identify 
each object. The subject then evaluates the attributes against his / her own preferences for 
each attribute, and selects a single object that maximizes his / her utility. This may be 
represented in Figure 1, where three objects X, Y and Z (e.g., different brands of laundry 
detergent as used by Jacoby, Speller & Kohn, 1974) are represented by three 
characteristics A, B and C (e.g., price, quality and phosphorous content). The decision 
maker, who is the experimental subject, has preferences for the three characteristics and 
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Figure 1. Representation of Consumer Decision  
As shown in Figure 2, an assignment application has some similarities to a 
consumer decision; for example, personnel have various characteristics (e.g., skills 
attained, years of experience and specialization). However, in the assignment context, the 
decision maker is not making choices based upon his / her own preferences for the 
characteristics, but rather upon each position’s preferences for the characteristics. The 
decision maker must consider each position’s preferences for the characteristics, and 
determine the most suitable person available for each position. However, multiple 
assignments are required and tradeoffs may be necessary, because a person may be 
regarded as most suitable by more than one position. An additional consideration not 
shown is the preferences that the personnel have for positions. Therefore, while an 
assignment context has similarities to a consumer decision, assignment decisions are 
considerably more complex.  
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 Characteristics 
Personnel X Z Y 
A C B A C B A C B 
Positions Q S R 




Figure 2. Representation of Assignment Decision 
In the assignment experiments to be conducted in this research, subjects will be 
provided with information that is similar to what would be available in the assignment 
decision-making context for a large organization; a list of personnel and positions to be 
assigned, the characteristics of the personnel, the position’s preferences for the various 
characteristics, and each person’s preferences for positions. 
As previously outlined, various processes are available for allocating weights to 
the attributes (characteristics) in a multi-attribute decision-making process. The results of 
such processes are that some attributes are likely to have a higher weighting than others, 
reflecting greater importance. To test whether subjects appropriately consider attributes 
of different importance, this research conceptually divides the attributes between primary 
and secondary attributes; primary attributes are the most important and are given greater 
weights, while secondary attributes are given less weight. Therefore, the secondary 
attributes are relevant and are to be taken into account where possible, but not to 
excessive detriment of the primary attributes. This leads to a situation of complexity 
similar to that used by Henry (1980) who defined complexity by the number of brands, 
number of attributes per brand and the scaling employed by each attribute (here the 
weighting of the attributes is analogous to Henry’s scaling).  
From related research on consumer behavior, it is expected that the subjects will 
suffer from information overload as the size of the market and the number of attributes 
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increase; however, it is unclear how this will manifest itself in the assignment decision 
makers’ behavior. It is possible that human decision makers may ignore the less 
important secondary attributes (to ease the information load), or may attempt to 
assimilate the secondary attributes but in doing so increase the information load and 
consequently make poorer quality assignments. It is of course possible that different 
people employ different strategies.  
The aim of this research is to confirm the existence of information overload in an 
assignment context, and examine how different subjects respond to information load. 
Assuming that information overload exists, the research will explore strategies that 
decision makers use to overcome it. The effects of assignment problem size and 
complexity will be examined.  
2. Design 
Of interest in this experiment is the performance of subjects as the complexity and 
size of the assignment problem increases. These two factors of interest, complexity and 
size, are the two factors to be controlled in the experiment, which will make use of a full-
factorial design (Box et al., 1978). In such a design, each combination of factor levels is 
tested. A full-factorial design is appropriate where a limited number of factors of interest 
are used with limited levels for each factor. The advantage of a full-factorial design is its 
ability to uncover interaction effects (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  
Trochim (1999) states that the randomized block design is “research design’s 
equivalent to stratified random sampling” (p. 207). Blocking is used where the sample is 
divided into subgroups that have similar characteristics. This ensures that the variability 
within blocks is less than the overall sample. A classic example of blocking is the 
experiment on durability of different materials in boy’s shoes (Box et al., 1978). In some 
experimental work, such as the analysis of crops (Murphy, Samaranayake, Honig, 
Lawson & Murphy, 2005), blocking leads to differences during the implementation of an 
experiment. However, as indicated by Trochim (1999), blocking need not affect anything 
done with research participants; rather, blocking can be “a strategy for grouping people in 
your data analysis in order to reduce noise – it is an analysis strategy” (p. 207). In the 
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experiments to be conducted here, each person will complete all the factorial 
combinations of assignments. Given the differences in individual cognitive skills, 
blocking at the individual level will be used during analysis to “reduce the noise” of 
individual cognitive abilities. This will allow a clearer examination of the relative effects 
of increasing market size and complexity on decision quality. 
The number of position attributes to be considered in an assignment round is a 
measure of complexity. Klingman and Phillips (1984) and Liang and Buclatin (1988) 
establish that, in the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy, the number of attributes to be 
considered varies between three and an upper limit of nine to 15 attributes. The lower 
limit of three attributes will be used in these experiments, however nine to 15 attributes is 
considered too many for subjects to assimilate in the time period available for 
experimental work. With such considerations in mind, the number of attributes for 
subjects to consider will be established at two control levels; three and five attributes. If, 
as is anticipated, the subjects have difficulty producing better assignments as more 
relevant data is provided (i.e., an increase in the attributes from three to five), it can be 
induced that subject performance would not be any better if the number of attributes 
increased further, say to the maximum number of attributes described by Klingman and 
Phillips or Liang and Buclatin. 
Koh’s (2002) study of the U.S. Navy enlisted detailing (the personnel assignment 
processes) reveals that, in each two-week requisition cycle, detailers (those who do the 
assigning) must consider approximately 45 Sailors. This volume of personnel and 
positions is too excessive for subjects to consider in the relatively short time frame 
available for an experiment, so a smaller number of assignments will be included in the 
experiments. The number of assignments will be set at levels of 5, 10 and 15; levels that 
will allow comparison of the effects of increasing numbers of assignments, while still 
allowing subjects to complete the experiment in a reasonable time period.  
As indicated by Koh (2002), detailers typically have more positions available for 
consideration than there are personnel to be assigned; in the U.S. Navy enlisted detailing 
process, a ratio of 45 Sailors to 60 positions is typical. The experiments in this research 
use a similar ratio: for the case of five personnel to be assigned, an additional position 
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(i.e., six positions) will be provided for assignment. For consistency, the same ratio of six 
positions for every five personnel to be assigned will be used in the larger instances. 
Therefore, the three assignment levels analyzed in the experiments will be 5, 10 and 15 
personnel, and 6, 12 and 18 positions. As indicated in Table 5, the assignment problems 
have three levels for size and two levels for attributes, providing a 3 x 2 combination, or 
six instances to be used in the experiment.  
  attributes 
  3 5 
Assignment Size, 
Number of Personnel to 
be Assigned 
5 A B 
10 C D 
15 E F 
Table 5 Assignment Instances to be Examined. 
In prior information overload studies, particularly in the consumer behavior 
domain, a particular brand is assumed to be the best outcome regardless of the number of 
alternatives and attributes presented. However, one of the difficulties with examining an 
assignment situation is comparing results between experiments. While position utility can 
be measured on a 0-1 scale, which facilitates comparison between subjects, this does not 
allow for comparing different instances since the average utility value differs between 
each instance as the problem specification changes. To maintain a common reference 
point for instances of each size, the characteristics of the three primary attributes will 
remain unchanged as the number of position attributes increases from three to five.  
For example, in instance C of Table 5, the positions have three equally weighted 
primary attributes to be considered. Instance D comprises the same 10 personnel and 12 
positions (same in terms of each person’s characteristics and preferences for positions, 
and each position’s primary attributes), but each position has two additional secondary 
attributes. The two secondary attributes will have significantly smaller weights such that, 
if the decision maker generates assignments with the position attributes foremost (i.e., 
with each person’s preferences being subordinate), the outcome of instance D with 
respect to the primary attributes should be no worse than the outcome from instance C. If 
  58 
the additional attributes lead the decision maker to return an outcome that is significantly 
worse in terms of the three primary attributes, then it may be concluded that the 
additional information has caused information overload for the decision maker. To 
prevent the subjects from recognizing that the primary attributes are identical for a given 
instance size, the ordering in which subjects are presented scenarios will ensure that a 
given instance size is not immediately repeated (e.g., not Scenario A followed by B).  
The order in which subjects are presented scenarios will also be varied to examine 
for learning effects. That is, different groups will receive the scenarios in different orders. 
Three groups of subjects will allow for controlling for learning effects; the first group of 
subjects will be presented the scenarios in the order A, C, E, B, D, F, the second group 
will be provided the scenarios in the order E, C, A, F, D, B (i.e., starting with same 
number of attributes but larger scenario size first), and the third group will be provided 
the scenarios in the order B, D, F, A, C, E (i.e., starting with the same size scenario as the 
first group, but with more attributes first). These orderings are designed to account for 
learning effects, and also are designed such that the subjects should have forgotten the 
original specification and the results that they gave before they repeat a market size. 
Subjects will be randomly assigned to each of the groups. 
Of interest in the experiments is the difference between quality of assignments 
when three attributes are presented versus five attributes, and whether such an effect is 
influenced by the number of assignments to be made. Henry (1980) demonstrated that 
individuals have different abilities with regard to decision making. Given the difference 
in abilities, blocking will be used to compare the results of individuals under each of the 
assignment instances.  
Friedman and Sunder (1994) state the principle of induced value theory; “that 
proper use of a reward medium allows an experimenter to induce prespecified 
characteristics in experimental subjects, and the subjects’ innate characteristics become 
largely irrelevant” (p. 12). To induce behavior concordant with the experiment design, 
payments are made to the subjects according to their behavior. However, there is the 
potential that, if professionals are presented with familiar information, they will behave 
according to the business norms rather than according to the induced value. For example, 
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Friedman and Sunder (1994) provide the example of experiments with traders from the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange who were provided extensive instructions on how to behave 
in the experiments, but then proceeded to behave by the Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
rules. Therefore, it is important to consider how information should be presented to 
subjects; familiar conditions and terms provide “cognitive handles” for subjects to grasp 
and therefore eliminate some of the information load that may be imposed by abstract or 
unfamiliar conditions and terms; however, this familiarity may cause problems with 
induced value theory, because the subjects may behave as they would expect in the real 
world rather than as directed in the experiment.  
In this series of experiments, there is a conflict between internal and external 
validity, and it is necessary to develop a balance between these. Unfamiliar terms would 
provide the greatest internal validity, since we could conclude that subjects are not 
participating according to business norms, but rather according to the experiment design. 
However, completely unfamiliar terms would provide low external validity because 
decision makers in the real world do not typically make decisions based upon unfamiliar 
attributes. Therefore, unfamiliar terms would be likely to introduce an additional 
cognitive load that is not normally experienced by decision makers.  
The subjects in the experiments are military officers who are undertaking 
master’s-level education. In an attempt to balance internal and external validity, attribute 
descriptions have been selected to provide familiarity for the subject participants, while 
the values used to describe the attributes are more generic to avoid familiarity that may 
undermine the internal validity of the experiment. Table 6 outlines the attributes and 
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 Attributes Possible Values 
Primary Attributes Rank O-2, O-3, O-4, O-5 
Branch Infantry, Artillery, Armor, Engineer 
Primary Skill A, B, C, D 
Secondary Attributes Secondary Skill Q, R, S, T 
Location North, South, East, West 
Table 6 Position Attributes 
While the five attribute descriptions provided in Table 6 are not the only attributes 
that may be considered when determining assignments, the attributes were chosen 
because they are significant and meaningful to experimental subjects (external validity). 
Four possible values of each attribute are provided, as this allows the positions to be 
sufficiently distinct, yet allows overlap so that no individual assignment stands out as 
being clearly the best.  
Subjects are provided with a description of each person and position in terms of 
the attributes outlined in Table 6, and the subject must match position requirements with 
personnel characteristics as best as possible, while also considering each person’s 
preferences. Attribute utility values indicate which of the possible attribute characteristics 
is the most desirable for a position; a utility value of 1.0 indicates the most desirable 
attribute value and a value of 0.0 indicates the least desirable attribute value. Weights 
indicate the relative importance of each attribute, with the sum of the weights totaling to 
1.0. The overall suitability of a person for a position may therefore be determined from 
the sum of the attribute utility values multiplied by the attribute weights. When only the 
three primary attributes are presented to the subjects, each attribute is weighted equally 
(i.e., 0.33 for each criterion). When all five attributes are presented to the subjects, the 
attribute weights become 0.26 for each of the three primary attributes and 0.11 for each 
of the secondary attributes. These lower weights to the secondary attributes ensure that a 
perfect match between a position and person on both the secondary attributes does not 
“outscore” a match on any of the primary attributes. Consequently, a subject should not 
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reduce the primary attribute utility to improve the secondary attribute utility, unless they 
consider it warranted due to a corresponding improvement in the personnel ranking.  
Table 7 illustrates the information provided to subjects for market instance A. 
 
Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105
Rank O-3 O-3 O-4 O-3 O-2
Branch Engineers Armor Infantry Artillery Artillery
Primary Skill A D B A C
Preferences 101 102 103 104 105
1st 2 2 3 2 5
2nd 4 6 6 4 1




Table 7 Information Provided for Market Instance A 
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As an example, Position 3 evaluates person 104 with a utility value of 0.50, 
derived from the Rank score (0.33 x 0.5) + Branch score (0.33 x 1.0) + Primary Skill 
score (0.33 x 0.0). It is also noted that person 104 does not rank Position 3 as a 
preference. 
As will be noted at the top of Table 7, the position attributes are ordered Rank, 
Branch and Primary Skill. Subjects will randomly be provided the attributes in different 
orders. Therefore, if subjects weight the attributes in a manner other than specified for the 
experiment, this will help determine whether it reflects the ordering or the attribute names 
that lead to the different weights. 
3. Experiment Setting 
In a real-world assignment setting, the decision maker has a finite amount of time 
to make a given number of assignments, and the decision maker chooses whether to 
consider all available attributes in the time available, or only the most important 
attributes. To imitate this real-world situation, regardless of the number of attributes to be 
considered, subjects are provided with a fixed time period per assignment decision; 45 
seconds per person to be assigned. The time of 45 seconds per assignment was selected 
from pilot experiments as a time that should allow subjects to complete the assignments, 
yet provide some time pressure. Therefore, for the market instances involving 5, 10 and 
15 personnel, the subjects have 3:45, 7:30 and 11:15 minutes respectively to make the 
assignments. Subjects cannot move onto the next part of the experiment until the 
designated time has elapsed. 
Subjects accrue points during the experiments, with the number of points accrued 
contingent on how well they maximize the average utility of each position and the 
personnel preferences. For each assignment instance, points are awarded in two parts. 
The first part is based on the extent to which each position is assigned the type of person 
sought, and is the average utility of the positions multiplied by 200 points. The second 
part of the payment is based on the extent to which each person achieves one of his or her 
preferred positions, and is the inverse of the average person’s preference rank multiplied 
by 100 points. The greater number of points is accorded to the position requirements for 
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two reasons; firstly, most military assignment markets operate in a manner such that the 
service is given priority, and secondly because it requires greater cognitive effort to 
maximize the position utility as compared to the personnel preferences that are already 
provided as rank-ordered lists.  
The experiments are to be conducted in a classroom setting, with details being 
provided to subjects in an envelope package and assignments to be completed on paper. 
The experiments involve approximately 90 military, master’s degree students 
participating as subjects in the experiments. The subjects are likely to have between five 
to twenty years of military service. Such personnel have had experience in the assignment 
process, most commonly indirectly as a person being assigned; however, the subjects 
may include personnel who have performed the role of detailer. Questionnaires will be 
used to determine existing differences in experience, with this information potentially 
being used to identify different blocking groups during the analysis phase.  
Using military personnel as subjects provides external validity with regards to a 
military assignment process, because it is similar military personnel that make 
assignment decisions. However, it is not clear the extent to which the results may 
generalize to other hierarchical organizations where personnel of different characteristics 
generate the assignments. Furthermore, the military personnel participating in these 
experiments are relatively homogenous; they are required to achieve certain levels on 
standardized military entry tests, they have undertaken similar military training, are likely 
to have had similar types of experience, and are from a common culture. Such a 
homogeneous background could lead to less variability of responses than may actually 
occur in other hierarchical organizations where the assignment decision makers are less 
homogeneous. A follow up comparative study in a different organizational setting would 
be beneficial.  
A copy of the experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. 
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B. PREFERENCE LIST INDIFFERENCE IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING 
The benefits of two-sided matching have been demonstrated in a number of 
external labor assignment processes (e.g., the NRMP), however, such processes have not 
been applied to the internal labor assignment practices of hierarchical organizations. 
Consequently, there are issues not yet explored that are relevant to implementing two-
sided matching within hierarchical organizations.  
In an external labor assignment situation that uses two-sided matching, it is 
important that the matching authority act without bias, and merely facilitate the 
assignment process based upon submitted preferences. Any bias on the part of the 
matching authority against participants from either side of the process may result in 
dissatisfaction and potential process boycotts by some participants. For example, Roth 
and Peranson (1999) state that in the 1990s, the NRMP “began to suffer a crisis of 
confidence concerning whether the matching algorithm was unreasonably favorable to 
employers at the expense of applicants” (p. 748). This concern centered over the use of 
the program versus the applicant-proposing algorithm, and reflected the stakes that are 
involved for the medical applicants; for the medical applicants, entry to a highly 
respected residency program could lead to greater opportunities in the early career stages. 
Such concerns motivated a NRMP redesign, and help explain why existing two-sided 
matching applications require participants to submit strict preferences.  
Strict preferences and a single algorithmic approach such as the applicant-
proposing algorithm ensure that a single assignment outcome is returned (Roth & 
Sotomayor, 1990), and so the matching authority simply implements the algorithm 
without making any decisions. However, if preference list ties are permitted, multiple 
alternative outcomes are possible, with each outcome being more highly regarded by 
some participants, and less regarded by others. Therefore, if participants were permitted 
to express ties in their preference lists, the matching authority would be required to 
choose one of the alternative outcomes. If participants had knowledge of the different 
possible outcomes, those who were aggrieved by the manner in which the ties were 
broken would have reason to complain to the matching authority and dispute the 
outcome. 
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While processes such as the NRMP require strict preferences to avoid disputes, 
the reasons for this requirement do not necessarily extend to hierarchical organizations. 
Subordination exists in hierarchies (Williamson, 1975), and so a matching authority 
within a hierarchical organization may permit preference list indifference without 
concern that disputes regarding selection of one alternative over another will undermine 
the assignment process. It is perhaps for this reason that two-sided matching with 
indifference can work in a school district scenario; the schools and students are 
subordinate to the school board / department of education, and so it is reasonable for the 
board / department to choose which outcome offers the greatest overall welfare.  
The effect of preference list ties on efficiency has been explored by 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) and Erdil and Ergin (2007), but only with respect to 
preference rank efficiency. That is, beginning with a stable match determined from 
random tie breaking, they use the stable improvements cycle to find the student optimal 
stable match. However, this is a student optimal stable match with respect to the initial tie 
breaking, and it should be considered that other tie breaking processes could produce 
different outcomes with a different number of participants matched. This research 
examines the different results that can occur when different tie breaking mechanisms are 
used. In particular, whether different tie breaking approaches could yield greater 
efficiency in terms of the number of agents matched, and whether different approaches to 
tie breaking may improve efficiency in terms of both number of participants matched and 
the preferences to which they are matched.  
1. The Likelihood of Preference List Indifference in Large Hierarchical 
Organizations 
As new applications for two-sided matching continue to appear, and as theory and 
practice continue to inform each other, the effect of preference list indifference is 
attracting greater interest. Recent research dealing with the effects of preference list 
indifference from a primarily theoretical viewpoint include Erdil (2006), Erdil and Ergin 
(2006), and Erdil and Ergin (2007). From a practical perspective, recent research on the 
effects of preference list indifference include Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005),  
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Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2006) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009). This literature has focused 
primarily on many-to-one matching markets, with the increase in interest related to the 
growing use of two-sided matching to allocate spaces in schools.  
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) view preference list indifference as indicating a lack 
of information available to a participant, and that if more information, possibly including 
new dimensions, was available, then the participants could differentiate between 
alternatives. However, there may be situations where such additional information is not 
forthcoming or it is unreasonable to seek new dimensions to differentiate.  
In a large two-sided matching process, such as the New York City Department of 
Education where schools are required to rank-order students, the schools only have 
limited information dimensions to differentiate students. Furthermore, unlike the NRMP, 
it is not feasible for each school to interview each student to determine a preference 
ranking. In the Boston Public School assignment process, Erdil and Ergin (2007) outline 
that the school preferences are determined centrally based on four indifference categories 
for each school. In order of priority, schools rank students according to the following 
categories: 1) students who have siblings at the school and are in the school’s walk zone, 
2) students who have siblings at the school, 3) students within the school’s walk zone, 
and 4) all other students. It is clear that in such a case there will be considerable 
indifference in the schools’ preferences. While the school rankings in the New York City 
high school match are determined differently, considerable indifference also exists; in 
fact, Abdulkadiroğlu (2009) outlines that some schools have preference lists that are 
completely indifferent between all student applicants. 
Similarly, military organizations are sufficiently large that widespread interviews 
are not feasible, and some positions tend to be relatively generic; for example, numerous 
people may be equally qualified (in terms of measurable and recordable attributes) for a 
staff position within a headquarters, and such positions would therefore have high levels 
of indifference in their preference lists. On the other side of the application, there are 
potentially a number of similarly defined positions to which a person would be equally 
willing to be assigned, and therefore would like to express this as indifference in their 
preference lists. 
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Due to the likely existence of preference list indifference in certain organizations, 
and because of its relevance to hierarchical organizations, the next part of this research 
examines the effect of preference list indifference on two-sided matching outcomes. 
While two-sided matching literature (Roth & Sotomayor, 1990) shows that different 
results are obtainable with preference list indifference, the extent and frequency of such 
variation has not been empirically examined. Therefore, this research examines how the 
outcome properties vary under different indifference conditions. The outcome properties 
of interest are the number of participants assigned and the “quality” of the assignments.  
Computational experimentation is used to examine the effects of preference list 
indifference because it allows examination of the effects of different market 
characteristics and their interaction effects, and it enhances internal validity. 
2. Simulation Model 
An agent-based model will be used to demonstrate the effects of preference list 
indifference in a two-sided matching process. The model is developed in a Microsoft 
Access database where the tables store data on the agents’ characteristics and 
preferences, and a Visual Basic program is developed to determine assignments based 
upon agent preferences. Further detail on the model is provided later. The assignment 
algorithm is modeled on the instability-chaining algorithm presented by Roth and 
Peranson (1999), which allows for complexities such as married couples. While such 
complexities are not involved in this part of the research, they are relevant for the final 
section of research that models assignments within a hierarchical organization, and so for 
ease of simulation development, a single program based upon the instability-chaining 
algorithm is used. In the case of an application without complexities, this algorithm 
produces the same results as the Gale and Shapley (1962) deferred-acceptance algorithm. 
Two classes of agents are used in the model, personnel and positions, with each 
agent behaving independently of other agents in its own class. The conceptual model for 
the behavior of agents in this research is homophily, described by Hinds, Caley, 
Krackhardt and Wholey (2000) as “the tendency for people to be attracted to others who 
have similar attitudes, beliefs and personal characteristics” (p. 228). The concept is used 
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in this model to determine whether an agent of one class will be attracted to an agent of 
the other class. In friendship determination, homophily arises from multidimensional 
factors; for example, age, gender, education, social class and beliefs (McPherson and 
Smith-Lovin, 1987). Similarly, in a situation such as the NRMP, the extent to which a 
medical student and residency program will be “attracted” to each other may be a 
reflection of multidimensional factors; for example, a high reputation program seeks high 
performing students and vice versa, and a rural based program seeks students willing to 
work in rural areas and vice versa. Homophily based on geographic location is used by 
Erdil and Ergin (2007) to generate school and student preferences, on the basis that, “If a 
student has a high priority at a school because she is in the walk zone of that school, then 
she would in turn be more likely to favor that school because of its locational proximity” 
(p. 12).  
While the attraction of agents may be multidimensional, certain dimensions may 
dominate. Roth and Peranson (1999) find from historical NRMP data that preferences 
tend to be highly correlated, indicating, ”similar programs tend to agree which are the 
most desirable applicants, and applicants tend to agree which are the most desirable 
programs.” (p. 767). While their analysis does not indicate specifically what dimension 
the programs and applicants agree upon (quality, measured by hospital reputation and 
student grades, may be a reasonable assumption), it does indicate that there exists a 
dominant dimension upon which preferences are determined. The model used for this 
research uses homophilous attraction based upon a single dimension. While additional 
dimensions could be used, the intent is to determine the limits of expected outcomes, not 
specific outcomes for specific organizations, and therefore a single dimension is 
considered sufficient.  
Each agent in the model, both personnel and positions, is assigned a “quality” 
score (the name of the dimension is unimportant) on the interval zero to one; those with a 
score closer to zero are considered lower quality, while those with a score closer to one 
are considered higher quality. Based upon homophilous attraction, agents from each class 
seek agents of the other class that are alike in terms of the quality score. In this model, 
position agents have perfect knowledge of the quality scores of personnel agents. 
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Consequently, each position is able to determine a list of personnel, ordered from those 
who are most alike the position (and so most able to satisfy the position’s requirements) 
to those least alike the position (and so least able to satisfy the position’s requirements). 
This resembles the situation in a hierarchical assignment situation where the organization 
determines attributes against which the personnel are assessed, rates the personnel against 
those attributes, and is able to determine an ordered list of the personnel who are most 
suited to each position. The personnel agents in this model have knowledge of the 
positions that identify them as suitable, and the personnel are able to determine which 
positions they would prefer to be assigned to. 
Figure 3 demonstrates some sample agents and indicates the manner by which an 
agent’s preferences are determined. For example, person Z ranks Positions B, C  
and D in his / her preference ranking because those positions are sufficiently close to 
person Z in terms of the quality score. Further details on the determination of agents’ 
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Figure 3. Example of Agents and Homophily 
The focus of the simulation is determining the upper bounds of how preference 
list indifference affects two-sided matching assignments, without addressing the detailed 
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characteristics of any single application. This approach favors internal over external 
validity; it establishes the limits on outcomes likely to be achieved, without specifying 
the exact outcomes likely to be achieved in a specific application. 
3. Model Parameters 
To examine the effects of preference list indifference on matching applications of 
varying specifications, a computational experimentation approach is used. Nissen and 
Buettner (2004) discuss the advantages of computational experimentation; namely that it 
bridges the gap between laboratory and field research by mitigating the weaknesses of 
each. However, they warn that computational experimentation has its own limitations, 
and is best used as a complement rather than a replacement for laboratory and field 
research.  
For the purposes of this experimentation, the assignment environment is designed 
according to four key parameters; the number of agents, the preference list length that 
agents submit, the extent to which agents’ preferences are correlated and the extent to 
which indifference exists in each agent’s preferences. The reason for selecting these 
factors and an explanation of the factors follows. 
Number of Agents (n). Roth and Peranson (1999) find that the number of 
participants in the process is one of the important determinants of the number of stable 
matches. They state that while the number of participants increases, there remains a limit 
to the number of positions to which a person can interview and hence submit as 
preferences. Consequently, as assignment problem size grows, the number of possible 
stable matches remains small. Given the importance of assignment problem size in 
establishing limits on the number of stable matches when preferences are strict, it is an 
important variable to consider when preferences may include indifference. The number of 
agents to be generated within the process is specified by the parameter n, with a 
symmetrical process (i.e., n workers and n positions) being used. Such a specification is 
valid given that the majority of two-sided matching processes are relatively symmetrical.  
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Each of the n person and position agents is allocated a random score that signals 
the quality of the agent to agents of the other type. The quality scores are measured on the 
interval 0 ≤ quality < 1, with the values having no significance other than to identify 
which agents are most alike and those which are least alike.  
Preference Correlation (C). As discussed previously, preferences tend to be 
correlated; agents seek assignment with agents of similar quality. This parameter allows 
investigation of whether the strength of correlation has an effect on assignment outcomes. 
Based upon the quality score that each agent is allocated, the preference correlation 
parameter indicates how similar two agents (a person and position) must be in order to 
consider ranking each other. If agents only consider other agents who are very similar in 
terms of quality scores, the preferences are regarded as highly correlated.  
The correlation parameter is a single value for the entire market (i.e., not unique 
for each agent). It is a value measured on the interval 0 ≤ C ≤ 1 to reflect the difference in 
quality scores that each agent is willing to consider. A correlation factor close to zero 
indicates that agents would only consider other agents that are very similar in terms of 
their quality score, while a correlation factor close to one indicates that agents are less 
discriminating when considering other agents. A correlation factor of one would indicate 
completely random preferences. Figure 4 demonstrates two different correlation 
parameters that a market may have. When the personnel and positions are ordered 
according to their quality scores, a Low C value indicates that a person will only consider 
positions that are similar in terms of quality scores. Similarly, a High C value indicates 
that a person is more willing to consider positions less like him / herself. 
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0 1 
0 1 Position Quality 
Personnel Quality 
Low C High C 
 
Figure 4. Demonstration of Preference Correlation Parameter 
Positions strictly order personnel who are within the region of consideration 
(defined by C) based on the difference in quality scores; a position prefers personnel who 
are closer in quality scores. Personnel randomly order position agents that are within each 
person’s region of consideration (defined by C). An additional consideration for the 
personnel ranking is that a person will only rank a position if the position has ranked the 
person. For positions, the use of strict ordering based on quality scores is not unrealistic if 
preference rankings are determined in a hierarchical situation by an algorithmic approach. 
However, even if personnel are generally attracted towards those positions which are 
alike, there is likely to be a degree of randomization that reflects a variety of factors that 
are different for each person.  
The use of homophily that is bounded by a correlation demonstrates how 
outcomes vary as preferences vary from being highly correlated at one extreme (low C 
value), to totally random at the other extreme (C=1). Within the computational 
experimentation, varying the correlation parameter indicates the effect of stronger or 
weaker homophily. 
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The effects of different values of the correlation parameter are demonstrated in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6.  In these figures, each point represents an assignment, with the x 
and y-coordinates given by the position’s and person’s quality scores respectively. Figure 
5 is a plot of potential agent assignments in a completely random market (C = 1), while 
Figure 6 plots potential assignments in a market with high correlation (say C = 0.1).  
 
 















Figure 5. Low Correlation 
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Figure 6. High Correlation 
Maximum Preferences (L).  It is known that a relationship exists between the 
length of preference lists submitted and the number of participants who are matched; 
reviewing the 1996–2006 results, the NRMP reports that “matched applicants and filled 
programs consistently have longer ROLs (Rank Order Lists) than unmatched applicants 
and unfilled programs.”  In existing two-sided matching markets, upper limits are set on 
the number of preferences that participants may submit, however not all participants 
submit preference lists up to the maximum length allowed. Of interest to this research 
question is the impact that preference list length has on assignment outcomes when 
preference list indifference is allowed. How preferences are determined for each agent 
has been described above, and is based upon agents’ quality scores, preference 
correlation and a random factor. 
In the simulation, positions determine their preferences first, and rank list a 
maximum of L personnel in their preference list, provided that L or more personnel exist 
within the quality region bounded by the position’s preference correlation factor. If fewer 
than L personnel exist in the position’s quality region, all personnel within the quality 
region will be rank ordered. After establishing all position preferences, personnel 
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preferences are determined, such that personnel only rank positions if they have already 
been ranked by the position, and the positions are within the person’s preference 
correlation zone. 
Degree of Indifference (DOI). This parameter is used to examine different market 
characteristics. If a spectrum is considered such that preferences are strictly ordered at 
one end and preferences are completely indifferent at the other end, this parameter 
indicates where the simulated market falls along that spectrum. When generating an 
agent’s preferences, the DOI parameter determines whether a preference (with the 
exception of first ranked preferences) is considered indifferently to the previous 
preference. The DOI is defined on the interval 0 ≤ DOI < 1. An initial strict preference 
ordering is randomly generated; for each worker and position preference (except the 
first), a random number p is generated (defined 0 ≤ p < 1). If p < DOI then the preference 
is ranked indifferently to the previous listed preference, otherwise it is considered strictly 
less desirable than the previous preference. If DOI = 0 then all preferences are strictly 
ordered (no indifference); if DOI = 1 then all preferences are completely indifferent. A 
similar process for generating preferences was used by Gent and Prosser (2002). 
4. Model Development 
The model is built within a Microsoft Access database, where VBA generates the 
agents and their preferences according to the parameters already described. Information 
about the agents is stored in the database tables and VBA programming subsequently 
generates assignments based upon the stored agent preferences. 
The form shown in Figure 7 is created in the Access database to input the 
parameters which specify a scenario. 
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Figure 7. Screenshot of Form for Creating a Scenario to Investigate Indifference 
Once the simulation is started from Figure 7, the Visual Basic code creates and 
populates a table with the quality values for each person and position up to the number n 
indicated. These quality values are generated through a random number generator. Figure 
8 shows an example of the table containing position quality values. 
 
Figure 8. Example of Randomly Generated Position Quality Values 
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Once the position and personnel quality values have been stored in the appropriate 
tables, the Visual Basic code then constructs the position preference lists. All personnel 
whose quality values are within the range ± (1/2 x C) from each position’s quality value 
are placed into an interim list which is ordered based on differences between each 
position’s and person’s quality scores. If this interim list is larger than the designated 
maximum position preference list length (L), then only the first L personnel from the 
interim list are selected and placed into the final position preference list, otherwise all 
personnel from the interim list are placed into the final position preference list. The 
Visual Basic code then proceeds down each position’s strictly ordered preference list, and 
for each preference (except a position’s first preference) a random number p is generated 
(defined 0 ≤ p < 1). If p < DOI then the preference is ranked indifferently to the previous 
listed preference, otherwise it is considered strictly less desirable than the previous 
preference. This produces a preference list for the positions, a section of which is shown 
in Figure 9, where Rank is the strictly ordered preference list and Rank2 is the preference 
list with indifference. 
 
Figure 9. Example of Position Preference List 
Once the position preferences have been determined as outlined above, the 
personnel preferences are determined in a similar manner but with two key differences. 
The first difference is that a position is only placed on a person’s interim list if the 
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position has already ranked the person. The second difference is that the preference list is 
not strictly ordered according to the difference in quality scores.  
Visual basic code was written to implement the two-sided matching algorithm 
based on preferences determined as outlined above. Assignments are calculated from the 
two-sided matching algorithm for a specified number of trials, with the indifferent 
preferences randomly reordered for each trial. The assigned personnel and positions are 
recorded for each trial to analyze the results at a later stage. An example of the table that 
records these results is shown in Figure 10.  Figure 10 illustrates the results from ten 
trials for two personnel (EMPLID 1 and 10), and shows the positions (identified by 
POSNNO) that were assigned to these personnel in each trial, along with how the 
personnel and positions ranked their partners. In this example, EMPLID 1 was assigned 
to the same position at every one of the ten trials. However EMPLID 10 was assigned to 
three different positions across the ten trials, depending on how tied preferences are 
ordered 
 
Figure 10. Example Results from Indifference Simulation 
5. Exploring Outcomes 
Computational experimentation is used to examine the effects of the four 
parameters on the number of agents matched and the quality of assignments. To examine 
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the individual and interaction effects of the four parameters described in the last section, 
a factorial design is used. The levels to be used for each of the variables in the 
experimental design are discussed below. 
It is not intended to examine how preference list indifference affects a specific 
assignment situation, such as a medical resident market, high school or military 
assignments. The intent is to examine how preference list indifference affects any 
generalized assignment situation. The four parameters incorporate small to large 
assignment situations (by varying n), situations where preference lists are short or long 
(by varying L), situations where agents may have very little or extensive indifference in 
their preferences (by varying DOI), and situations where agents may be more or less 
willing to be assigned to partners similar to themselves (by varying C).  
Number of Agents (n). There is a broad range in the size of two-sided matching 
processes; ranging from medical specialty processes such as thoracic surgery with 
approximately 200 applicants, to the New York City high schools with approximately 
94,000 students. The time demands for computational experimentation increase 
significantly as the number of agents increase beyond small to moderate sized situations. 
Therefore, scenarios will be used that vary the number of agents between 100 to 2,000 
agents, which represents realistic numbers of agents for small to moderately sized 
processes. While this parameter is at the lower range of values expected in actual 
applications, by varying the parameter between different levels it will be possible to 
examine the effect of changing market size. 
Maximum Preferences (L). In existing markets, and regardless of market size, 
applicants are typically restricted to between 5 and 20 ranked preferences, although many 
choose to submit shorter preferences. The preference list length that agents may submit in 
this experimental work is set between 5 and 20, as this represents a reasonable number of 
preferences based upon actual two-sided matching applications. 
Preference Correlation (C). To determine the correlation of preferences that 
occurs in actual two-sided matching markets would be difficult and largely unproductive 
for this research, given that the intent is to determine whether, and if so how, the 
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correlation affects market outcomes. For two scenarios that have differing numbers of 
agents, the number of agents located within the bounds of the correlation factor is larger 
for the scenario that has more agents. For example, given that agents have quality values 
randomly distributed between zero and one, a scenario with 100 agents would be likely to 
have 10 agents within a correlation bound of 0.1, whereas a scenario with 1,000 agents 
would be likely to have 100 agents within the same correlation bound. Therefore, 
preference correlation values will be set at levels according to the number of agents in the 
scenario. The correlation values will be set such that the number of agents within the 
correlation bound will be similar to the preference list lengths identified above (5 to 20). 
This will reveal how outcomes may vary as an assignment market moves from highly 
correlated preferences to increasingly random preferences.  
Degree of Indifference (DOI). There is no market data available to indicate the 
degree of indifference that participants may desire to express in existing applications. 
Therefore, values of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 will be used to measure the effects of preferences 
that progress from being relatively strict towards increasing indifference. 
Within the computational setting, a variety of simulated markets will be generated 
according to the described parameters. For each scenario defined, multiple outcomes are 
possible because, depending upon how the tied preferences are broken, each different 
ordering of ties can lead to a different outcome. While the ideal situation would be to 
algorithmically determine the different outcomes that are possible for a given scenario, 
no known algorithm provides this information, and Irving (2000) claims that it is unlikely 
that any such algorithm can be found. Furthermore, a brute force method of examining 
every possible alternative is not feasible since the number of possible combinations of 
preference orderings can be very large for even moderately sized markets. For example, 
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Position Initial Strict Preference Rank Indifferent Preference Rank 
p1 1 1 
p2 2 1 
p3 3 3 
p4 4 3 
p5 5 3 
p6 6 6 
p7 7 6 
Table 8 Example Participant Preference List 
In Table 8, the total number of possible reorderings of that one participant’s 
preferences is 24 (2! x 3! x 2!), each of which may yield a different outcome depending 
on how other participants reorder their indifferent preferences. Even in a small market 
with indifference, the number of combinations can be very large due to the factorial 
nature of the problem. Therefore, in a larger market with extensive preference lists and 
indifference, it is infeasible to run the assignment algorithm for every possible way that 
ties can be broken.  
Consequently, a statistical approach is used. For a given scenario, multiple trials 
will be conducted with tied preferences to be broken randomly in each trial. Once tied 
preferences are randomly broken in a trial, the preferences are treated as being strictly 
ordered, and a two-sided matching algorithm applied. This determines a weakly-stable 
match for the random preference ordering. The outcome properties (number and quality 
of assignments) of the trial are recorded before the process is repeated with a new random 
breaking of the originally tied preferences. While such an approach cannot guarantee that 
all outcomes are explored, statistical techniques will enable limits on the characteristics 
to be determined with a degree of probability.  
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) discuss the impact of using multiple random tie-
breaking where lottery numbers are assigned to students at each school, versus single 
random tie breaking where each student is given a single lottery number to break ties at  
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every school. They indicate that the single tie-breaking process has superior welfare 
properties. The difference between the two processes will be examined in this 
experimentation. 
The algorithm to be used in this work is the worker-optimal instability chain 
algorithm. This algorithm was described by Roth and Peranson (1999), and has been used 
in the NRMP since 1998. This algorithm has been used because it generates a stable 
outcome when couples participate, and although couples are not considered in this 
section, the outcome of markets that include couples is of interest in the next research 
question. Therefore, for consistency, the instability chain algorithm is used throughout 
this research.  
C. DEVELOPING TWO-SIDED MATCHING IN A HIERARCHICAL 
ORGANIZATION 
This research has been divided into three parts. The first part of the research 
demonstrates the need for redesign of assignment processes in hierarchical organizations. 
The second part of the research lays some of the foundations that are necessary, by 
considering the effects of indifference and examining how to deal with  
indifference in two-sided matching algorithms. This third part of the research 
demonstrates how such assignment processes in hierarchical organizations may be 
redesigned.  
The New York City high school match has features that resemble the hierarchical 
organizations that will be outlined in this part of the research. In that high school match, 
the students are participants who are subordinate in the sense that they must abide by the 
organization’s rules and decisions, and they independently submit their preferences for 
the schools. The hierarchical organization consists of the schools and the Department of 
Education, both of which have interests in the final assignment of students to the schools. 
As outlined by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005), some schools have preferences for students 
based on scores, while other schools have preferences for students with good attendance 
records. The Department of Education also has preferences over the assignment of 
students, as evidenced by the constraints placed on schools; the Department requires 
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schools to have a distribution of students according to scores in standardized English 
Language Arts exams. Therefore, the preferences submitted by schools are not solely the 
preferences of the schools, but also include factors of interest to the Department of 
Education. 
In other hierarchical organizations, such as the military, the assignment process is 
similar to that outlined above. In the military context, the individual personnel have 
independent preferences for the positions to which they may be assigned. The 
hierarchical organization consists of the units (or commands) that are analogous to the 
schools, and the service headquarters which is analogous to the Department of Education, 
and each of these have preferences over the assignment of the personnel to the units. The 
units, who receive the personnel being assigned, have preferences for personnel of certain 
skills, rank, ability etc., while the service headquarters will have preferences over factors 
such as minimization of relocation costs. Consequently, it is reasonable that the 
preference lists of units be constructed in a manner that includes factors of relevance to 
the service, in the same way that New York City school preferences include constraints 
of relevance to the Department of Education. 
This part of the research will demonstrate that it is possible to construct 
preferences for the hierarchical organization with a multi-attribute utility function. A 
utility function will be developed to rank personnel according to the attributes of interest 
for the units and service. Through changes to the weights of the attributes, computational 
experimentation will examine the different results produced by the deferred acceptance 
algorithm as the weighting shifts from unit to service preferences, and various 
combinations in between. For reasons previously outlined, dealing with indifference will 
undoubtedly be important. 
Multi-attribute utility functions lend themselves to determining the preference 
rank ordering of personnel for hierarchical organizations, such as military units and 
schools. Features of such organizations that make the multi-attribute utility functions an 
appealing option include: the large size of the organizations, which makes it infeasible for 
military units or schools to know, interview or evaluate each person individually; the 
requirement to combine system level attributes with the attributes relevant to the units or 
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schools; and the central decision maker’s requirement to apply attributes consistently to 
all participants without bias. While using multi-attribute utility functions to determine 
preference lists has appeal in situations that have the above features, such an approach 
has not previously been used in two-sided matching applications. Therefore, it is 
desirable to learn the effects on assignment outcomes if preferences are determined from 
multi-attribute utility functions.  
Computational experimentation is used to examine how preferences derived from 
utility functions will affect two-sided matching assignment outcomes. The advantage of 
this approach is the ability to change the variables and the weightings applied, and 
examine the different outcomes returned by the assignment process. 
The process developed for this part of the research is similar to that used for the 
decision-making experimental work described previously; military personnel are to be 
assigned to individual positions. The personnel in these experiments have preferences 
over the positions to which they wish to be assigned, and for the positions, utility 
functions are used to rank order the available personnel based on attributes of interest to 
the units and the service. Each position’s rank ordered list becomes the preference list for 
the purpose of the two-sided matching.  
Unique preferences lists are to be determined for each individual position within 
the organization, and so this is considered a one-to-one two-sided matching process. That 
is, the personnel and positions are the two groups of agents within the process, and each 
person can be matched to one and only one position, and each position can be matched to 
one and only one person. In this respect, this is different to the previously outlined 
schools matching which are constructed as many-to-one processes. In the schools 
matching process, the seats within the schools are identical and it does not matter which 
student is assigned to which seat at a school. 
1. Agent Specification 
The personnel in this process are described by six characteristics, of which three 
are of interest to the units and three are of interest to the Service. The three characteristics 
of interest to the units are Rank, Branch and Skills. Units are interested in such 
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characteristics because they define some of the key attributes necessary for satisfactory 
work performance in the unit. Although the terminology may be different, such 
characteristics are not dissimilar to the way positions are advertised in other contexts; for 
example, an academic position may be advertised according to the desired level (assistant 
professor, associate professor, etc., being analogous to rank), the desired academic stream 
(mathematics, physics, etc., being analogous to branch), and the desired specialization 
(statistics, graph theory, etc., mathematics specializations being analogous to military 
skills).  
The three characteristics of interest to the Service in this process are Career 
Development, Location and Performance. The Service is interested in career development 
because the effective development of personnel through different types of assignments is 
what prepares a person for higher appointments within an organization. Militaries are not 
the only organizations using varying assignments for personnel career development; 
Kohonen (2005) details the career development aspects of international assignments in 
multi-national organizations. Organizations such as militaries are also interested in 
location considerations when making assignments, because each person who is required 
to geographically relocate for a new assignment is an additional organizational cost, and 
given budget constraints, ceteris paribus, the organization would prefer to minimize 
relocation costs. While each unit would ideally like to receive the highest performing 
personnel, from a Service perspective it is preferable that the highest performing 
personnel are assigned to positions that require personnel of such talent; for example, 
positions that are representational in nature or involve training functions may require 
higher performing personnel as compared to some other types of positions. 
These experiments utilize actual data for Australian Army personnel and positions 
to the maximum extent possible, thereby increasing the external validity of the research. 
Data is not available for all attributes of personnel and positions; consequently, in some 
cases it has been necessary to randomly assign characteristics to the personnel and 
positions based on distributions (this will be explicitly identified where it occurs).  
The purpose of these experiments is to demonstrate how assignment outcomes 
vary when a hierarchical organization’s preferences are constructed using multi-attribute 
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utility functions. Using the entire population of Australian Army personnel and positions 
would be time consuming and unnecessary for the purpose of these experiments. 
Therefore, a segment of the population has been selected for use; the experiments are 
based on personnel and positions of rank E06 (SGT), E08 (WO2) and E09 (WO1) (the 
E07 (SSGT) rank is no longer used in the Australian Army). The total number of 
personnel and positions in these ranks is 5,370 and 5,991. The majority of assignments 
for the Australian Army occur in January of each year, and most personnel complete 
three year assignments. Therefore, one third of all personnel and positions at these ranks 
are assumed to be available for assignment. Data was randomly removed so that one third 
of personnel and positions remain for these experiments. A total of 1,790 personnel and 
1,997 positions remain for assigning in these experiments. 
The distribution of the personnel and positions by rank, branch and skill is shown 
in Appendix B; these are actual distributions of personnel and positions, however the 
names of branches and skills have been de-identified for security reasons. As can be 
observed in Appendix B, multiple skills can belong to a branch, but no skill can belong to 
more than one branch. Every person is identifiable by a specific rank, branch and skill. 
While every position is identifiable by a specific rank, the branch and skill specification 
of positions is different: some positions require a person of a particular branch and skill; 
some positions are not skill specific but require a person from a specific branch; some 
positions are not skill specific but require a person from a select group of branches 
(identified by position branches 161, 162 and 163 in Appendix B); some positions are not 
specific to any skill or branch (identified by position branch 151 in Appendix B).  
Actual data on the location of all personnel and positions was obtained, and to 
simplify the experiments, the many locations were grouped into localities (regions). The 
primary purpose of this simplification was to facilitate determining each person agent’s 
preferences; as will be described in further detail later, personnel preferences were not 
available, and so these are constructed using other information and some assumptions. A 
summary of the number of personnel and positions by rank and locality is provided in 
Appendix B. 
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Career development is one of the Service attributes used to construct positions’ 
utility values. The rationale is that each position provides a different experience, and each 
person requires particular types of experiences to be developed through their career. 
While career development is an explicitly stated consideration for assignments in the 
Australian Army, the career development which each position provides is tacit 
knowledge. Therefore, as a simplification, it is assumed that a position provides and a 
person requires one of four types of career development: experience in a regimental 
environment, experience in a headquarters, experience with the Reserves, and experience 
in a training role. All units are classified according to one of these four types of career 
development, and it is assumed that all positions within each unit provide that type of 
career development. Personnel agents are randomly assigned career development 
requirements based on the position career development distribution. A summary of the 
number of personnel and positions by rank and career development is provided at 
Appendix B. 
Performance reporting data for personnel is not available due to privacy issues. 
Therefore, using a uniform distribution, each person agent is randomly assigned a value 
from one to four, to indicate a performance quartile to which each person belongs. 
Similarly, each position is randomly allocated to a performance quartile to indicate 
whether the position requires a high performing person, or whether a lower performing 
person is acceptable.  
A table is used to store the six attributes (rank, branch, skill, location, career 
development and performance) for all 1,790 personnel agents, and a separate table is used 
to store the same six attributes for the 1,990 position agents. Extracts from these tables 
are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. 
PERS 
ID 




200001 E08 103 218 QLD NORTH REGT 3 
200070 E06 102 211 QLD NORTH REGT 2 
200072 E06 115 227 VIC MELB REGT 0 
200100 E08 103 228 VIC MELB HQ 1 
200104 E09 106 222 QLD SOUTH REGT 0 
200106 E08 105 243 NSW SYD REGT 3 
Table 9 Sample Personnel Data  
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POSN 
ID 





100001 E09 106 208 NSW OTHER HQ 0 
100007 E06 104 202 ACT HQ 3 
100008 E09 151  Any OVERSEAS HQ 3 
100012 E06 106 208 OVERSEAS HQ 1 
100020 E08 103 228 NT DARWIN REGT 1 
100045 E08 102 211 QLD SOUTH REGT 3 
Table 10 Sample Position Data 
2. Generating Preferences for Positions 
This section outlines how the positions’ preference lists will be determined from a 
utility function based on the six attributes. This is a necessary step for the purpose of 
these experiments. It also demonstrates how hierarchical organizations may use multi-
attribute utility functions to construct preference lists based on attributes of interest to the 
organization as a whole, as well as elements of the organization. In these experiments, the 
Service (the Australian Army) represents the organization, while units represent the 
organization elements; this is similar to the Department of Education and the schools in a 
school assignment context.  
Based on the review of available multi-attribute utility theory techniques, an 
additive utility function is used to generate the position preferences. An additive 
functional form is appropriate because the attributes to be used in the utility function  
are preferentially independent. Furthermore, as outlined in the literature review, the 
additive functional form is simpler to use and easier to explain than many other more 
complicated forms, yet provides quite good results.  
The positions’ preferences are generated according to the combined utility of the 
unit and Service attributes. When implemented, a decision maker will need to set such 
weights to provide the appropriate balance between unit and Service requirements. In 
these experiments the weights will be varied to determine how different weights affect 
the assignment outcomes.  
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The utility function for determining the position preferences is: 
Ut = (Wr x Ur) + (Wb x Ub) + (Ws x Us) + (Wl x Ul) + (Wcd x Ucd) + (Wp x Up) 
Where, U is the utility, W is the weight, and the subscripts t, r, b, s, l, cd and p 
indicate total, rank, branch, skill, location, career development and performance 
respectively. For each position, the person with the highest Ut value is the position’s first 
ranked preference, and subsequent preferences are in order of Ut. Details for calculating 
each of the attribute utilities follows. 
a. Rank Utility 
The rank utility table shown in Table 11 was constructed to identify the 
rank utility that a position assigns to a person. This table is not based on any existing 
processes, but was developed to demonstrate how such a process could operate. The table 
identifies that the rank utility value will be one (ideal situation) if a person and position 
are of the same rank. Further, personnel whose rank is one below that of a position (rank 
utility of 0.6) are preferred to personnel whose rank is one above that of a position (utility 
of 0.3). The rank utility value is zero for personnel whose rank is two above or below that 
of a position. No veto rules have been included because the scenarios only involve three 
consecutive ranks and it is considered that a person from any of these ranks is at least 
acceptable for positions of these ranks. However, if the process involved assignment of 
positions and personnel whose ranks were more varied, a veto rule could be included to 
prevent personnel being assigned to positions if the rank difference between the two is 
considered excessive. 
E06 E08 E09
E06 1 0.3 0
E08 0.6 1 0.3









Table 11 Rank Utility Table 
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b. Branch Utility 
The branch utility table shown in Table 12 was constructed to identify the 
branch utility that a position assigns to a person. Branches 101 to 118 are those that 
personnel can belong to (e.g., Infantry, Artillery and Engineers). Branches 151 and above 
are “position only” branches. Positions that belong to branch 151 can accept personnel of 
any branch. Positions that belong to branches 161, 162 or 163 can accept personnel from 
a limited number of branches; for example, some positions belong to an “Any Health” 
branch, which can accept any personnel who belong to the branches Medical, Dental or 
Nursing. 
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
101 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
102 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
103 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
104 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
105 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
106 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
107 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
108 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
109 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
110 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
111 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
112 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
113 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
114 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
115 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
116 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1
117 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
118 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
151 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
161 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
162 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1











Table 12 Branch Utility Table 
A veto rule has been included such that if a position records a negative 
branch utility for a person, then the person will not be included as one of the position’s 
preferences. 
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c. Skill Utility 
A skill utility value of one is recorded where the skill of a person and 
position match; otherwise a skill utility value of zero is recorded. Although possible, no 
veto rule has been included because a veto already exists at the branch level.  
d. Locality Utility 
The locality utility is used to minimize the number of geographic moves 
required. A locality utility value of one is recorded where the locality of a person and 
position match; otherwise a locality value of zero is recorded. Other options such as 
calculating the cost of moving between different locations would be possible but have not 
been included for these experiments.  
e. Career Development Utility 
The career development utility is used to maximize the number of 
assignments that provide personnel with their ideal career development. A career 
development utility value of one is recorded where the career development that a position 
provides matches what a person requires; otherwise a career development value of zero is 
recorded. 
f. Performance Utility 
The performance utility is used to provide the best possible alignment 
between the performance of personnel and the performance requirements of positions. 
Table 13 shows the performance utility values developed for these experiments. Decision 
makers may choose to use performance quality gradations other than the quartiles shown 
here and similarly may choose to use utility values different to those shown in Table 13. 
    Personnel Quality 
    0 1 2 3 
Position 
Quality 
0 1 0.5 0.25 0 
1 0.5 1 0.5 0.25 
2 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 
3 0 0.25 0.5 1 
Table 13 Performance Utility Table 
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3. Simulating the Preferences for Personnel 
In an actual assignment situation, personnel would submit their list of preferred 
positions to a central department within the hierarchical organization, just as medical 
students submit their preferences to the NRMP and students submit their preferences to 
the agency responsible for the schools match. In this experimentation, it is necessary to 
simulate personal preferences.  
The first consideration with respect to the personnel preferences is that personnel 
will only rank positions for which they have been included on the positions’ preference 
lists. In existing markets, such as the NRMP, participating students are unaware of how 
or if they are ranked by the residency programs. However, in a hierarchical organization 
it is feasible that personnel within the organization could be informed of whether they are 
suitable and ranked by the units within the organization. In fact, in very large 
organizations such as militaries, it may be preferable that the personnel are informed of 
how highly they are ranked by the positions. Such information need not necessarily be 
overly specific (to the extent of specific rankings), but could provide indicative feedback 
as to whether a person is highly, moderately or poorly ranked by a position. Such 
feedback would assist with managing the expectations of personnel within the 
organization. Furthermore, in situations where personnel do not meet essential position 
requirements, the feedback would prevent personnel wasting their preferences on 
positions to which they cannot be assigned.  
This simulation attempts to generate each person’s preferences in a manner that 
may reflect how people behave. While Butler and Molina (2002) indicate factors that 
motivate personnel within the U.S. Navy Aviation Support Equipment Technician 
community, broader data is limited regarding the factors that influence personnel 
selecting their preferred positions. In the model, there are six known characteristics of the 
personnel and positions, and each person’s inclination towards each of the six position 
characteristics will be used to generate the personnel preferences. In a manner similar to 
the utility function that generates position preferences, personnel preferences will also be 
generated from a utility function.  
  93 
Different factors motivate different people, and the strength or intensity of the 
motivation may differ between people. Some people may be strongly motivated by the 
desire to work in a particular location, and for them other considerations are minor. Other 
people may be motivated by a strong desire to succeed in their employment, and so will 
seek work that enhances their career (career development assignments). Others may seek 
work in a domain where they feel comfortable and familiar, for example within their 
branch and particular skills area. Therefore, the model should simulate that different 
personnel are motivated by different factors.  
A utility function is created for each person to determine the order in which each 
person will rank the available positions. The utility function will be based on the six 
personnel and position characteristics, with the concept of homophily continued here. 
The model assumes that personnel seek to be assigned to positions that are most alike 
themselves with regards to five of the six simulation characteristics, these being rank, 
branch, skills, career development and performance. With respect to location, each 
person has preferences for the different locations, and a person does not necessarily seek 
to remain in their current location (even though from a Service perspective it is desired 
that personnel remain in their current location). 
The utility function used to generate personnel preferences is given by: 
Ut = (Wr x Ur) + (We x (Ub + Us)) + (Wl x Ul) + (Wcd x Ucd) + (Wp x Up) 
where, U is the utility, W is the weight, and the subscripts t, r, e, b, s, l, cd and p indicate 
total, rank, employment, branch, skill, location, career development and performance 
respectively. The component utility values are outlined further below. 
a. Rank Utility 
The personnel utility values are based on the same utility table used for 
position rank utility. This reflects that personnel will mostly seek positions of the same 
rank, but in some cases may identify positions of different ranks in their preference lists. 
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b. Employment Utility 
The employment utility is determined from consideration of each 
position’s branch and skill. The approach of combining branch and skill is used because 
some positions are not specific to any particular skill set, therefore it is less appropriate to 
use a skill utility and apply a separate weight to the skill. The personnel branch utility is 
based on the position branch utility table previously provided. Personnel record a skill 
utility value of one for positions whose skill matches the person’s skill, or for positions 
that are not specific to any skill set; otherwise, a skill utility value of zero is recorded.  
c. Locality Utility 
Whereas the organization’s preferences are structured in a manner that 
seeks to minimize the number of geographic moves, the personnel do not necessarily seek 
to remain in their current location. In the Australian Army, personnel can choose to 
submit an Electronic Preferences and Restrictions (EPAR) form to identify to their career 
manager any preferences or restrictions that should be taken into account when 
assignments are determined. Personnel can identify up to three desired locations in the 
EPAR. While the EPAR information is considered confidential, nonidentifiable data was 
released for the purpose of this research.  Table 14 shows the percentage of personnel 
who seek each locality as a first, second or third preference, and is based on 11,354 
EPAR forms submitted from 1 January 2005 to 1 October 2010.  
Locality Preference 1 Preference 2 Preference 3 
ACT 6.0% 5.5% 6.0% 
NSW OTHER 7.1% 7.0% 10.6% 
NSW SYD 14.9% 15.0% 10.9% 
NT DARWIN 7.9% 6.4% 7.4% 
OVERSEAS 3.8% 3.9% 6.2% 
QLD NORTH 16.0% 13.5% 14.5% 
QLD SOUTH 25.3% 28.0% 19.7% 
SA ADELAIDE 3.8% 4.6% 4.6% 
TAS 0.9% 1.2% 1.8% 
VIC MELB 5.8% 6.7% 7.3% 
VIC OTHER 2.3% 2.7% 4.0% 
WA OTHER 0.5% 0.5% 0.9% 
WA PERTH 5.9% 5.0% 6.0% 
Table 14 Locality Preferences 
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Personnel agents are randomly allocated three locality preferences 
according to the preference distribution in Table 14. The same locality is not identified 
more than once for any person agent.  
A locality utility value of 1.0 is recorded if a position’s locality is the same 
as a person’s first preference, a locality utility value of 0.5 is recorded if a position’s 
locality is the same as a person’s second preference, and a locality utility value of 0.25 is 
recorded if a position’s locality is the same as a person’s third preference; otherwise a 
locality utility value of zero is recorded. 
d. Career Development Utility 
A career development utility value of one is recorded where the career 
development that a position provides matches what a person requires; otherwise a career 
development value of zero is recorded. 
e. Performance Utility 
Continuing the model of homophilous attraction, personnel self-select to 
those positions that are most alike in performance requirements. The personnel 
performance utility is determined using the same performance utility table used for 
calculation of position performance utility.  
f. Determining Attribute Weights 
Weights are used to indicate the extent to which personnel are motivated 
by each of the attributes (rank, employment, locality, career development and 
performance); however, not all personnel will be motivated to the same extent by each of 
the attributes. Personnel primarily seek assignment to positions of the same rank; 
therefore, the rank is the primary attribute for every person. The remaining four attributes 
are then randomly ordered for each person to indicate attribute priorities. Based on each 
person’s ordering of attributes, weights are applied to the attributes using Rank Order 
Centroid weights (outlined earlier). Table 15 shows the Rank Order Centroid weights for 
five attributes. 
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Rank First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Weight 0.4566 0.2567 0.1567 0.09 0.04 
Table 15 Rank Order Centroid Weights for Five Attributes 
4. Exploring Outcomes 
A series of computational experiments is to be conducted. The data for these 
experiments primarily utilizes actual Australian Army data, supplemented where 
necessary with data based on assumptions. The preferences required for two-sided 
matching are generated from utility values, with weights able to be varied to apply 
different importance to the various attributes. The aim is to investigate how assignment 
outcomes are affected by varying the attribute weights; specifically, how the number of 
participants matched and the utility of matched personnel and positions changes. Further, 
for the matched positions, the experiments will examine how well the service and unit 
attributes are satisfied as the weights are adjusted.  
Data for the agents and their preferences are stored in Microsoft Access tables. 
Visual Basic code is used to implement the two-sided matching algorithm and generate 
the assignments. 
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IV. DECISION-MAKING ABILITY IN ASSIGNMENT 
PROCESSES 
In Chapter II, a number of studies on the effects of information overload were 
reviewed. While the existence of information overload is generally no longer debated, 
mixed results have been encountered in previous studies. Some authors (Keller & Staelin, 
1987) state that too much information will lead to information overload. Others (Hahn, 
Lawson & Lee, 1992) suggest that information overload is only encountered under time 
pressure.   
While information overload has been explored in a variety of contexts including 
consumer behavior, bankruptcy prediction, finance and management, no previous 
research has explored decision maker outcomes and the effects of information overload in 
assignment scenarios. That is, a situation where a decision maker must match elements of 
one group with elements from another group. Such assignment scenarios are more 
complex because multiple decisions are required. For example, it is not a matter of 
simply selecting the best product from a list as in the case of consumer decision making 
(e.g., Jacoby, Speller & Berning, 1974). Instead, preferences or attributes from each 
group require consideration, and each individual assignment will limit the subsequent 
options by removing the matched pair from further consideration. While matched pairs 
could potentially be reconsidered if the decision maker finds a better alternative as they 
progress through the process, it is unclear whether the decision maker would 
systematically review decisions to see if different alternatives are available.  
Chapter III, Section A outlined the design of experiments to examine human 
decision making in assignment processes. Scenarios involving assigning personnel to 
positions were created. Each person and position was given unique characteristics, with 
homophily forming the basis for optimal assignments. That is, the subjects were required 
to match the personnel and positions so that, to the maximum extent possible, the 
characteristics of each matched pair are aligned. The personnel and position options were 
designed so that no matches clearly dominated all others, and tradeoffs would be 
necessary.  
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This chapter will examine the results of the experiments, and explore the 
following issues: how “quality” varies as assignment scenario complexity increases, the 
different tradeoffs that participants make, the learning effect that participants exhibit, 
how well subjects self-assess their performance, and a comparison of results to optimal 
outcomes. 
A. MEASURING COMPLEXITY 
In these assignment decision-making experiments, the complexity of each 
scenario is related to both the number of personnel to be assigned and the number of 
attributes to be considered. This is similar to the study by Henry (1980) who examined 
information processing accuracy in consumer behavior, where complexity was defined as 
the interplay between the number of brands, number of attributes per brand and the 
scaling employed by each attribute. 
Assignment quality is scored in two parts: how well within an assigned pair the 
person’s preferences are met; and how well the position’s attributes are satisfied (with the 
position seeking a person that exhibits characteristics closest to its requirements - 
homophilous attraction). Further detail is provided in Chapter III, Section A3. 
B. RESULTS 
1. Subject Demographics 
A total of 81 subjects participated in the experiments. These subjects were from 
three master’s-level classes of approximately equal size, with 28, 27 and 26 subjects in 
the classes. Participation in the experiments was voluntary for all subjects. There was no 
apparent systematic distribution of subjects between classes, and so the distribution of 
subjects was considered random. All subjects within a class completed the scenarios in 
the same order, but the order in which scenarios were presented differed between classes. 
Participants in the experiments were all military officers between rank of O-2 to 
O-5, and were between 24 and 44 years of age, with an average age of 33 years. The 
participants had between 2 and 24 years of commissioned service, with a median length 
of service of 12 years. 69 of the subjects were male with the remaining 12 being female. 
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2. Excluded Data 
There were a total of 25 subjects with some form of anomaly in their responses. 
These subjects with anomalies were spread across the three classes. For 18 of the 25 
subjects with anomalies, the anomalies were minor and only affected one of their 
assignment scenarios. These anomalies occurred where two personnel were assigned to 
the same position (e.g., person 103 and 107 both being matched to position 9). These may 
be considered oversight errors, and would likely be recognized and rectified if time 
allowed; Hahn et al. (1992) claim that information overload is created by time pressure. 
Six of the cases were in assignment contexts involving 10 personnel, and the remaining 
eleven were in contexts involving 15 personnel. None of the assignment contexts 
involving 5 personnel were affected. This in itself provides an early confirmation that the 
subjects experienced greater problems with scenarios that assigned more personnel. That 
is, as complexity increases, so too does the error rate.  
The common mistake performed by the 18 subjects described above was that two 
personnel were assigned to the same position, a situation that was not allowed. To resolve 
these anomalies and maximize the number of usable results, a standard rule was used to 
resolve the anomalies. Of the two personnel who were incorrectly assigned, the highest 
numbered person was rematched to their next available preference, and if none of their 
preferences were available, they were matched to the most suitable available position 
(suitable from the position’s perspective).  
Seven subjects had errors that were more complex and could not be resolved in a 
standard manner as described above. These errors involved multiple personnel and 
positions in an assignment scenario, or in some cases, there were numerous personnel left 
unmatched in an assignment scenario such that a complete response could not be 
determined. Four of these subjects had complex errors in only one assignment scenario. 
The other three subjects had complex errors across almost all of the assignment instances. 
The errors associated with these subjects indicate either a complete misunderstanding of 
the assignment process or an inability to complete the tasks in the allocated times. All 
results for these seven subjects were excluded from analysis.  
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After the seven subjects were excluded, there were 74 subjects with usable data 
remaining. The number of subjects by group were 26 (two excluded), 24 (three excluded) 
and 24 (two excluded).  
3. Overview of Results 
As previously described, subjects were presented six scenarios, with each scenario 
representing a different number of personnel to assign and attributes to consider. Table 16 
shows the scenario naming convention, which will be used in this analysis. To examine 
issues such as learning effects, which will be examined later, the classes were provided 
the scenarios in different orders; Class 1 in the order A, C, E, B, D, F, Class 2 in the order 
E, C, A, F, D, B and Class 3 in the order B, D, F, A, C, E. 
  Attributes 
  3 5 
Assignment Size, 
Number of Personnel to 
be Assigned 
5 A B 
10 C D 
15 E F 
Table 16  Assignment Scenarios 
As previously outlined, points were awarded to subjects according to how well 
they satisfied the positions’ requirements and the personnel preferences in each scenario. 
For each scenario, the average preference ranking of the assigned personnel is calculated, 
as is the average utility of assigned positions. These are converted to points: the 
personnel points are calculated by taking the inverse of the average preference rank 
(inverse because a lower rank is preferred), and multiplying by 100; the position points 
are calculated by multiplying the average position utility by 200. The different 
multiplicative factors were used so that the position requirements should factor foremost 
in the assignment considerations, in the same way that military assignments put the 
service needs ahead of the individual (Arnhart, 2007).  
A summary of each subject’s points in each scenario is provided at Appendix C. 
  101 
The first issue to examine is whether subjects earned points in accordance with 
the experimental design. That is, whether subjects earned more points from satisfying the 
position attributes as opposed to the personnel preferences. The position points and 
personnel points that each subject earned from each scenario are summed across the six 
scenarios to provide total position and total personnel points for each subject. The results 
for each subject are displayed in Figure 11, ordered within each class group from best to 
worst overall outcome. Also shown are the total points that each subject achieved, that is, 
the sum of all position and personnel points from all six scenarios. The dotted lines 
indicate the optimal solution. As can be observed from the diagram, Class 1 covered 
subjects 1 to 26, Class 2 included subjects 27 to 50, and Class 3 involved subjects 51 to 
74. Across all subjects, the average personnel score was 292.4 points, and the average 
position score was 740.4. Therefore, in accordance with the experiment design, positions 
points were approximately twice the level of the personnel points, reflecting the design 
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Subjects' Points Summed for all Scenarios - Compared to Optimal Solution
Personnel Points Position Points Total Points  
Figure 11. Summary of Results by Subject 
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Overall, Class 2 performed better than the other two classes in terms of total 
points achieved across all scenarios. Class 2 had the highest average and median total 
points of all three classes, with Class 1 ranked second overall and Class 3 third in terms 
of these metrics. Further, only three subjects from Class 2 achieved less than 1,000 
overall points, whereas there were nine from Class 1 in this situation and thirteen from 
Class 3. The reason for this variation between classes is not clear, however two 
possibilities are suggested: first, that this relates to the order in which results were 
presented to the classes (this will be examined further later); second, that the classes were 
not randomly distributed in terms of abilities. The results will primarily be analyzed 
within the classes to minimize the effect of any differences between classes. 
Figure 11 provides some interesting initial insights before further analysis of the 
results is undertaken. The variability in the personnel points is greater than in the position 
points, with personnel points ranging between 150 to 405 (a range of 255, or 61% of the 
personnel points at the optimal solution), and position points ranging between 639 to 802 
(a range of 173, or 22% of the position points at the optimal solution). In part this may 
reflect the experimental design, where position points were afforded more weight than 
personnel points. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the subjects would focus 
on position requirements and therefore position points would generally be closer to an 
“optimal” outcome than personnel points.  
Across all classes, the average total position points attained by the subjects was 
740, representing 93% of the optimal solution, while the average total personnel points 
was 292, representing 70% of the optimal solution. The highest performing subjects 
achieved results that were close to the optimal outcomes for both personnel and positions. 
However, for the lowest performing subjects the reduction in personnel points was 
relatively greater than the reduction in position points; for example, the 10 lowest 
performing subjects had an average total position points of 672 (85% of the optimal) and 
an average total personnel points of 203 (49% of the optimal). This suggests that, even 
though the subjects were aware that it was important to consider both the position and 
personnel outcomes, the subjects may have been overly focused on one aspect of the 
situation (meeting the position requirements) to the detriment of the other (meeting the 
  103 
personnel requirements). Such a situation is likely to occur in real life decision-making 
scenarios; that is, the decision maker may become too focused on one aspect of the 
decision-making process to the detriment of other elements. This highlights the need for 
decision support in complex assignment processes, because without it, decision makers 
may not appropriately consider each of the attributes.  
This section has provided a broad overview of the results. The next section will 
examine results achieved by each class in each scenario. This includes a review of 
learning effects. 
4. Comparing Results Between Classes 
The results of experiments of the type undertaken here can be expected to 
demonstrate signs of learning effects (Kagel & Roth, 1995). That is, as subjects undertake 
more assignment decision-making scenarios, they gain experience and enhance their 
decision-making techniques. These learning effects provide a number of problems for 
analysis, with Friedman and Sunder (1994) stating that “no valid statistical correction 
presently is available” (p. 98). Therefore, in the analysis undertaken here it is necessary 
to compare results for classes who are at similar stages of the learning process; that is, 
classes that have undertaken a similar number of scenarios. 
There are various ways to compare the scenario results between classes, including 
a comparison of median points, maximum points, points range and inter-quartile range to 
name some. To examine the learning effects, it is useful to compare how each class 
performed on a particular scenario, noting that the classes undertook the scenarios in 
different orders. Box and Whisker plots are used to compare these key statistics from 
each scenario. Figure 12 to Figure 17 show the results for each of the six scenarios 
examined with each plot showing the results for all three subject pools. For comparative 
purposes, the optimal outcome for each scenario is shown by the dotted red line on each 
plot.  
The points plotted on the y-axis are each subjects combined personnel and 
position points from each scenario. Using these combined scores, the box and whisker 
plots present, by class, the range and quartiles for the subjects within each class. 
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While some subjects performed well on the first assignment scenario they were 
presented, it is clear the majority of subjects were learning the process and developing 
their strategies for at least the first scenario they were presented. This is seen by 
comparing the results of classes who were undertaking their first scenario and comparing 
to classes who had already completed some scenarios. A description of the results from 
each scenario is outlined below. 
a. Scenario A 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order First Third Fourth 
Table 17 Scenario A – Presentation Order by Class 
Classes 2 and 3 show similar results, and their results are distinctly better 
when compared to those of Class 1. For Classes 2 and 3, there are identical outcomes in 
terms of lower quartile Q1, median, upper quartile Q3 and maximum outcomes. Only the 
minimum points for Classes 2 and 3 differ. By comparison, with the exception of the 
maximum points, all these key statistics for Class 1 are lower than for Classes 2 and 3. 
Further, the range and inter-quartile range for Class 1 is higher than for Classes 2 and 3.  
The similarity of results between Classes 2 and 3, and their difference from Class 1 
supports the prediction of learning effects; that is, subjects will perform better after they 
have had experience with other scenarios.  
This scenario is expected to be the simplest of the scenarios presented, 
given that it involves the least number of attributes to consider and least number of 
personnel to assign. Yet despite the apparent simplicity, there are subjects in Classes 2 
and 3 (who undertook this scenario as their third and fourth scenario respectively) who 
achieved lower outcomes than some people from Class 1 (who undertook this as their 
first scenario). This is likely to be a result of different cognitive abilities; Henry (1980) 
demonstrated that information processing accuracy is related to cognitive abilities. 
Therefore, with a distribution of cognitive abilities between classes, it is hypothesized 
that the subjects from Class 1 who had higher cognitive abilities were able to achieve 
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superior results than subjects from Classes 2 and 3 who had lower cognitive abilities, 
despite the learning effect advantage for those in Classes 2 and 3. Ideally, information 
about the cognitive abilities of the subjects would be used to confirm this hypothesis, 
however permission to use such information was not sought at the time, nor were tests 





















Figure 12. Results for Scenario A: 5 Personnel, 3 Attributes 
b. Scenario B 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order Fourth Sixth First 
Table 18 Scenario B – Presentation Order by Class 
In Scenario B, the performance from the three classes is generally as 
expected based on the order in which they completed the scenarios. Class 2, who was 
completing its sixth scenario and had the benefit of most learning opportunity, showed 
the best performance in terms of key statistics. This was followed by Class 1 who was 
completing its fourth scenario. The differences in outcomes between Classes 1 and 3 are 
perhaps not as great as would be expected based on learning opportunities. While the top 
50% of subjects in Class 1 clearly achieved better results than the top 50% of Class 3, the 
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bottom 50% of subjects from each class show similar statistics. Further, the inter-quartile 
range for Class 1 is larger than for Class 3, although it is not clear why this would be the 
case. Generally it would be expected that the range and inter-quartile range would 
decrease as experience increases. With greater experience it is expected that the results 
would improve and converge towards an optimal outcome, while those completing the 

















Figure 13. Results for Scenario B: 5 Personnel, 5 Attributes 
c. Scenario C 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order Second Second Fifth 
Table 19 Scenario C – Presentation Order by Class 
As hypothesized, Class 3 (who are undertaking its fifth scenario) 
outperformed Class 1 (completing its second scenario) on every statistic shown except 
the maximum points. Also as expected, the inter-quartile range for Class 3 is lower than 
Class 1. However, the results for Class 2 (completing its second scenario) are not as 
expected when compared to Class 3. Class 2 outperforms Class 3 in most respects; higher 
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maximum, median and Q1 quartile, and a smaller inter-quartile range. The only key 
statistic where Class 2 has a lower performance than Class 3 is the minimum points. The 
reason for this is not clear; however, across the various scenarios, Class 2 consistently 
performs well. This is seen in Scenario C by the performance of Class 2 compared to 
Class 1, with both of these classes completing their second scenario. The relatively strong 
performance of Class 2 compared to Classes 1 and 3 may indicate an uneven spread of 





















Figure 14. Results for Scenario C: 10 Personnel, 3 Attributes 
d. Scenario D 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order Fifth Fifth Second 
Table 20 Scenario D – Presentation Order by Class 
Classes 1 and 2 each completed Scenario D as their fifth scenario. 
Following the comparison of these two classes in Scenario C, once again Class 2 
outperforms Class 1 in every respect in Scenario D, apart from the two classes having the 
same minimum points. This again lends support to the likelihood that Class 2 may have 
an above average spread of cognitive abilities when compared to the other classes.  
  108 
As hypothesized, with the exception of the maximum points the key 
statistics for Class 3 (undertaking its second scenario) are lower than Classes 1 and 2. The 





















Figure 15. Results for Scenario D: 10 personnel, 5 Attributes 
e. Scenario E 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order Third First Sixth 
Table 21 Scenario E – Presentation Order by Class 
The results for Scenario E are entirely as expected based on the order in 
which the classes performed this scenario. That is, the results for Class 2 (undertaking its 
first scenario) are dominated by Class 1 (undertaking its third scenario), and the results 
for Class 1 in turn are dominated by Class 3 (undertaking its sixth scenario). As expected, 
the inter-quartile range also decreases with experience. 
















Figure 16.  Results for Scenario E: 15 personnel, 3 Attributes 
f. Scenario F 
Class  1 2 3 
Presentation Order Sixth Fourth Third 
Table 22 Scenario F – Presentation Order by Class 
As expected, Class 1 (undertaking its sixth scenario) achieves higher 
results for each of the key statistics when compared to Class 3 (undertaking its third 
scenario). Unexpectedly the inter-quartile range for Class 3 is marginally smaller than for 
Class 1, although the inter-quartile range is at a much lower level for Class 3 when 
compared to Class 1. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, Class 2 (undertaking their fourth scenario) 
achieves a higher Q1, median and Q3, and has a lower inter-quartile range when 
compared to Class 1. Once again, this suggests that the cognitive abilities in Class 2 were 
above those of the other classes. 
 
















Figure 17. Results for Scenario F: 15 Personnel, 5 Attributes 
g. Summary of Class Results 
The results indicate that there may not have been an even spread of 
abilities between classes. Class 2 achieved the best results in terms of highest median 
points, quartile Q1 and Q3 points, and lowest inter-quartile range for every scenario 
except for Scenario E, which was the first scenario undertaken by Class 2. If repeating 
the experiments, it would be advantageous to gather additional information regarding 
individual cognitive abilities. This may include seeking information such as GPA or 
grades for particular subjects.   
It was hypothesized that the range and inter-quartile range would decrease 
with experience, holding complexity as a constant. It was also hypothesized that the 
range and inter-quartile range would increase with more complex scenarios, holding 
experience levels constant. The results do not provide conclusive support for or against 
these hypotheses. Further experiments would be required to examine these hypotheses. In 
conducting further experiments it would be advantageous to randomize the order in 
which the personnel and positions appear in each scenario. In the experiments conducted 
here, although the classes received the scenarios in different orders, the layout of 
personnel and positions within each scenario was identical. That is, person 101 appeared 
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on the left of the page, followed by person 102, then 103 and so on. It appears that the 
layout of the information may have led the subjects to a certain range of outcomes and 
reduced the variability between outcomes.  
Based on an analysis of the results, a number of subjects developed a 
simple heuristic whereby they worked left to right through the information presented on 
the experiment paperwork. Every person in the experiments needed to be assigned to a 
position, although not every position needed to be assigned to a person given that there 
were more positions than personnel. On this basis, an analysis of each person’s 
assignment against their listed preferences was undertaken. Across each of the 74 
subjects, a count was taken to determine the number of times each person was assigned to 
a position that was not one of the person’s preferences. In the U.S. military, a person is 
considered to be “slammed” if they are assigned to a position that they do not wish to be 
assigned to. This terminology is used here. 
Figure 18 to Figure 23 show the number of subjects who slammed each 
person in the assignment scenarios. A feature of these figures is that personnel who were 
listed first (reading left to right) were less likely to be slammed, while personnel who 
were listed last were more likely to be slammed. It is only in Scenario B where this does 
not appear so clearly, although the number of subjects who slammed personnel in the 5 
personnel scenarios was less than for the 10 or 15 personnel scenarios (vertical scales are 
held constant for ease of reference). No personnel are slammed at the optimal solutions. 
 




































































Figure 19. Number of times Personnel Slammed in Scenario B: 5 Personnel, 5 
Attributes 



































































Figure 21. Number of times Personnel Slammed in Scenario D: 10 Personnel, 5 
Attributes 
 



































































Figure 23. Number of times Personnel Slammed in Scenario F: 15 Personnel, 5 
Attributes 
The observation that some subjects developed a heuristic whereby they 
assigned personnel according to the order in which the personnel were presented has 
important ramifications. In real life situations, the decision outcome could be influenced 
by the order in which a decision maker is presented the information, even if the decision 
maker is provided with all of the information simultaneously (as opposed to the 
information being trickle-fed). Further experiments would be necessary to eliminate the 
possibility that these observations are related to the design of the scenarios. The same 
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experimental scenarios could be used, but with the information within scenarios being 
presented in different orders for different groups of subjects.   
5. Trading Off Between Personnel and Positions 
Some subjects performed well for both personnel and positions, however other 
subjects achieved a poor tradeoff. That is, they could have achieved more personnel 
points with minimal impact on the position points, and vice versa.  
Figure 24 to Figure 29 show, for each scenario, the personnel and positions points 
that each subject achieved. The results for all subjects from all classes are shown on each 
figure. Each subject is represented on the figures by a single marker. In some scenarios, 
particularly Scenarios A and B, several subjects achieved the same outcomes, and 
therefore the number of markers on the figures is less than the number of subjects.  
In each of the scenarios, it is possible to see situations where there are two or 
more points aligned vertically. In these cases, the subjects who are lower on the y-axis 
(have lower position points) could have achieved a better average outcome for the 
positions without the average personnel outcome being worse; this does not guarantee 
that some individual personnel or positions in the scenario would not necessarily be 
worse off, but the average result would be better, and that reflects the incentives included 
in the experimental design. Similarly, it is possible to see situations where there are two 
or more points aligned horizontally in each of the scenarios. In these cases, the subjects 
who have the lower score on the x-axis (have lower personnel points) could have 
increased the personnel points without sacrificing the positions points; again, this is 
measured on average and does not guarantee that some individual personnel or positions 
would not have worse outcomes. Finally, the figures demonstrate that there are many 
dominated outcomes; that is, subjects who achieved lower position and personnel points 
when compared to other subjects’ outcomes. Subjects who have dominated outcomes 
could have achieved better average results for both the positions and people.  
If a linear trend line was drawn through each of the points in Figure 24 to Figure 
29, the slope in every case would be positive. A negative trend line would indicate that 
subjects were systematically trading off personnel points against position points; that is, 
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the increase in one of these would be at the expense of the other. However, the positive 
trend line demonstrates that the points achieved are more related to the subjects’ 
cognitive ability; those towards the lower left on the charts have achieved inferior results, 
while those who are towards the upper right have achieved superior results. The subjects 
represented in Figure 24 to Figure 29 are from classes who have different levels of 
experience with the experiments, and so some dominated outcomes may potentially 




Figure 24. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario A 
 
  117 
 
Figure 25. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario B 
 
 
Figure 26. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario C 
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Figure 27. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario D 
 
 
Figure 28. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario E 
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Figure 29. Personnel and Position Points – Scenario F 
The slope of a linear line of best fit was determined for each scenario and is 
presented in Table 23. In all cases, the slope of the lines is less than 1.0. This indicates 
that the potential improvement in personnel outcomes is greater than the potential 
improvement in position outcomes, on average across all subjects. This also confirms that 
the subjects have focused on the position points, but potentially excessively so. If the 
consideration of personnel and position points was balanced, the slope of the trend line 








Table 23 Slope of Line of Best Fit for Scenarios A to F 
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6. The Effect of More Attributes to Consider 
The experiments were designed to examine how assignment results would be 
affected by a modest increase in the number of attributes that decision makers must 
consider. Subjects made assignment decisions in scenarios that involved either three or 
five attributes, a number that is quite within the bounds of what could be expected in a 
military assignment situation; for example, Klingman and Phillips (1984) state that the 
U.S. Marine Corps assignments may consider from 3 to 15 attributes, while Liang and 
Buclatin (1988) state that U.S. Navy assignments may involve up to nine attributes. 
Therefore, the number of attributes in these experiments remains at a lower level of 
complexity compared to what might be experienced in a military assignment situation. 
Prior to undertaking the experiments, two issues were identified as being likely to 
cause difficulty in analyzing the effect of more attributes. The first issue relates to 
controlling for the learning effects. The subjects can be expected to improve their 
decision-making technique as they gain experience. For example, if a subject performs 
better for the 5-3 scenario (5 personnel – 3 attributes) after having earlier completed the 
5-5 scenario, it is necessary to determine whether the improvement is related to a change 
in complexity or the benefit of experience.  
The second issue to resolve is the ability to compare results between scenarios 
involving the same number of personnel to be assigned. That is, the results of the 5-3 
scenario must be compared to the 5-5 scenario. If the specification of the 5-5 scenario 
was completely unrelated to the 5-3 scenario, then there would be no way to directly 
compare results between the two scenarios. As a result, the scenarios with 5 attributes 
were designed so that the personnel preferences were identical, and the three primary 
attributes for the positions were the same. The only difference is that two secondary 
attributes were added to the five attribute scenarios, and these two secondary attributes 
were given weightings, the sum of which were less than any of the individual primary 
attributes. The assignment scenario designs are outlined in Appendix D. Effectively, 
removing the secondary attributes from the scenarios with five attributes makes the 
scenarios identical to the three attribute scenario (for scenarios involving the same 
number of personnel). This makes the situation akin to a person simplifying the five 
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attribute scenario by ignoring or removing the secondary attributes. This design makes it 
possible to determine what outcome each subject could have achieved for the five 
attribute scenarios if they had used the identical assignments from the three attribute 
scenarios.  
To determine whether the subjects’ performance improved or worsened with the 
additional attributes, each subject’s three attribute scenario assignments were applied to 
the five attribute scenarios. If the results that a subject achieved from a five attribute 
scenario are better than the results determined from applying the related three attribute 
assignments to the five attribute scenario, then the subject has performed better under the 
additional complexity of the five attribute scenario. Otherwise, the subject would have 
been better off ignoring the two secondary attributes for the five attribute scenario and 
treating the scenario the same as they did for the three attribute scenario. To account for 
learning effects, results are grouped by class in Table 24. The number of subjects in each 
situation is indicated in the table. 






Class 1 Better outcome with -5 scenario 20 18 18 
Worse outcome with -5 scenario 6 8 8 
Class 2 Better outcome with -5 scenario 17 17 21 
Worse outcome with -5 scenario 7 7 3 
Class 3 Better outcome with -5 scenario 11 10 8 
Worse outcome with -5 scenario 13 14 16 
Table 24 The Effect of More attributes on Scenario Outcomes 
To explain how the results of Table 24 were determined, consider the following 
example. A subject achieved 165 points (positions and personnel points combined) for 
the 5-3 scenario. The same subject achieved 137 points for the 5-5 scenario, however the 
points for the 5-5 scenario are not directly comparable to the 5-3 scenario because the 5-5 
scenario involves additional attributes and different weighting. Therefore, it is not 
possible to determine whether or not the subject has achieved a better outcome in the 5-5 
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scenario. So, the subject’s assignment decisions from the 5-3 scenario are applied to the 
5-5 scenario. This produces an adjusted 5-5 scenario result of 145 points. That is, if the 
subject had applied the assignments from the 5-3 scenario to the 5-5 scenario, the 
outcome would have been better than they actually achieved in the 5-5 scenario (145 
points compared to 137 points). This person is recorded as one of the subjects having a 
worse outcome with the 5-5 scenario in Table 24.  
Table 24 shows that the majority of subjects from Classes 1 and 2 achieved better 
outcomes with the scenarios involving five attributes than they would have if their 
assignments from the three attribute scenarios were used. Both these classes completed 
the scenarios with three attributes before they undertook the scenarios involving five 
attributes. Therefore, they had the advantage of developing their decision-making 
strategies initially and could then apply these to the scenarios with five attributes. 
Consequently, the improved outcomes for the scenarios with five attributes could 
potentially be related to the learning effects. Despite the benefit of the learning effects, 
there was a small group of subjects whose results were worse with the five attribute 
scenarios. That is, they would have achieved better outcomes for the five attribute 
scenarios if they had simply used the assignments they made for the three attribute 
scenarios. For this group of people, the increased complexity apparently negated any 
benefit that they may have attained from practice and developing a decision-making 
strategy during the three attribute scenarios. 
The situation was different for Class 3 where a smaller proportion of subjects 
achieved better outcomes for the five attribute scenarios. This likely reflects that Class 3 
was presented with the five attribute scenarios first; these subjects were still learning their 
decision-making strategies while they were completing the more difficult five attribute 
scenarios. Despite this, there were still a number of subjects who managed to achieve 
superior results for the five attribute scenarios, even though they were potentially still 
developing their decision-making strategies.  
The learning effects explains why a greater proportion of Class 3 achieved worse 
outcomes for the five attribute scenarios as compared to Classes 1 and 2, but it does not 
explain why some people in Class 3 would have achieved better results for the five 
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attribute scenarios. It is likely that this is because the five attribute scenarios resolved 
some indifference / ties that were harder to resolve in the three attribute scenarios. 
Therefore, when making the assignments for the three attribute scenarios, the subjects 
faced decisions that could have gone one way or the other, but when those results were 
applied to the five attribute scenarios, it made more sense to make the decisions 
differently. 
The data from Table 24 was also examined at the individual level. For Classes 1 
and 2, there was no consistency in terms of subjects who performed worse with the five 
attribute scenarios. That is, one subject may have achieved a worse outcome for the 5-5 
scenario, but may have achieved a better outcome for the 10-5 scenario (when compared 
to the situation if the relevant three attribute scenario assignments were applied to the five 
attribute scenarios). However, for Class 3, six of the subjects returned worse outcomes 
for all of their five attribute scenarios. 
The analysis shown here demonstrates that some subjects managed to handle the 
additional complexity of five attributes, however not all subjects accommodated 
complexity. The number of attribute examined in these experiments is at the lower end of 
the spectrum of what might be considered in military assignment processes. Therefore, 
unless decision makers are screened to ensure that they have the skills required to 
produce quality assignment decisions, there is a high risk that their assignment decisions 
may be sub-optimal absent decision support tools. This risk is likely to increase as the 
number of attributes (complexity) increases. 
7. The Effect of More Personnel to Assign 
When examining the effect of more attributes the scenarios were designed so that 
the five attribute scenarios were an extension of the three attribute scenarios; that is, the 
preferences and primary attributes were identical, but then secondary attributes were 
added to the five attribute scenarios. This enabled a comparison between scenarios that 
involved the same number of assigned personnel, e.g., a comparison between the 10-3 
and 10-5 scenario. However, no similar method was found to enable a direct comparison  
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of scenarios involving different numbers of personnel to assign. Therefore a different 
method is required to examine how the assignment outcomes are affected by increasing 
the number of assigned personnel. 
In some decision-making studies, decisions can be assessed as correct / incorrect. 
These studies then relate the probability of making correct decisions to the quantity of 
information presented, where quantity may be related to the number of items to consider 
or the amount of information that is available about each item. For example, Casey 
(1980) examined the effects of information load on bank loan officers assessing the risk 
of customers going bankrupt. In this study, information was available to identify whether 
the customers actually did / did not go bankrupt, although these outcomes were clearly 
not made known to the subjects during the experiment. By presenting more cases or more 
information per case, it is possible to relate the probability of correct assessments to the 
quantity of information presented.  
In experiments of the type conducted in this research, each scenario is 
independent and cannot be compared directly to another scenario. That is, the points 
obtained in a five-person assignment scenario cannot be compared to the points obtained 
in 10-person assignment scenario. The experiment design is such that it may only be 
possible to achieve 180 points in a scenario with five personnel, but it may be possible to 
achieve 200 points in a scenario with 10 personnel. This does not necessarily mean that a 
subject has achieved a better outcome with the 10 personnel scenario, but rather it may be 
possible to better satisfy the position requirements and the personnel preferences. As a 
result, there is no simple comparison of points.  
One approach to examining the relationship between decision-making quality and 
the number of personnel assigned is to compare the results achieved by the subjects to the 
optimal results. It is hypothesized that subjects would achieve outcomes relatively closer 
to the optimal at lower numbers of personnel to be considered, but the results would 
diverge as the scenario assignment size increases. Once again, learning effects need to be 
considered. Friedman and Sunder (1994) suggest that an extreme manner of controlling 
for learning effects is to discount all trials except for the last or next-to-last, but they also 
refer to other research that suggests that learning effects will take the form of an 
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exponential decay towards a behavioral equilibrium. As a result, in this analysis learning 
effects will be controlled by ignoring any results from a class that was performing one of 
its first three scenarios. It will be important to acknowledge that some learning effects are 
likely to continue beyond this point, but this process should exclude the most significant 
effects. Additionally, only scenarios involving the same number of attributes will be 
compared. That is, the 5-3, 10-3 and 15-3 scenarios will be compared as a group, and the 
5-5, 10-5 and 15-5 scenarios will be compared as a group.  
Once the results have been limited as outlined above, the results from the three 
attribute scenarios are limited to Class 3 (Class 3 performed all three attribute scenarios 
as their fourth to sixth scenarios), and the results from the five attribute scenarios are 
limited to Classes 1 and 2 (Classes 1 and 2 performed all five attribute scenarios as their 
fourth to sixth scenarios). Table 25 shows the median points from each class expressed as 
a percentage of the optimal points from the same scenarios. Results are read down the 
columns to examine the effect of increasing numbers of personnel. 
 
 3 Attributes (Class 3) 5 Attributes (Class 1) 5 Attributes (Class 2) 
5 Personnel 95% 92% 98% 
10 Personnel 91% 88% 91% 
15 Personnel 89% 89% 94% 
Table 25 Class Median Points as Percent of Optimal Result 
The results from Class 3 performing the three attribute scenarios are as 
hypothesized. That is, relative to the optimal results, Class 3 performed best with the least 
number of personnel to be assigned, and progressively achieved relatively worse 
outcomes as the number personnel to assign increased. However, the results from Classes 
1 and 2 were not entirely as expected; both achieved the best outcomes for the scenarios 
with 5 personnel, but for both classes the results from the scenarios with 15 personnel 
were better than the scenarios with 10 personnel.  
A limitation to the approach of comparing subject results to the optimal outcomes 
is that in the scenarios that involve fewer personnel there may be less  
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opportunity to deviate from the optimal outcome. As the number of personnel involved 
increases, the number of potentially different outcomes will increase, and therefore so 
will the potential for greater variability.  
The results here are not sufficient to support or reject the hypothesis. Further work 
involving a larger number of subjects would be required to further test the hypothesis. 
Also, the experiments would need to be designed so that the information presented to the 
subjects appears in a random manner to ensure that the presentation order does not affect 
the results. 
8. Subject Responses 
a. Self-Assessment of Performance 
Immediately after completing the experiments the subjects answered a 
series of questions about their decision-making strategies and provided a self-assessment 
of their performance. These questions were asked before the subjects received any 
feedback on their own performance or the performance of others in the class. One 
question asked was, “Based on overall points that you earned, please indicate how well 
you believe you performed in relation to the other members of your class.” Subjects were 
then asked to place themselves into quartile ranges. Of the 74 subjects with usable results, 
69 responded to this question. 
If subjects had perfect information about their own outcomes and that of 
the other participants, there would be an even distribution between the quartile ranges; 
that is, 25% of subjects would provide a self-assessment that they were in the top 
quartile, 25% would provide a self-assessment that they were in the next quartile, and so 
on. The aggregated results across all three classes are shown in Table 26 (quartile 1 
represents the top quartile). As it turns out, the subjects had inflated opinions of their own 
assignment decision-making abilities; only 13% (9 of 69) of subjects felt that they would 
be in the bottom 50% of participants, and only 3% (2 of 69) felt that they would be in the 
bottom quartile. While 27 subjects (39%) correctly assessed their actual quartile, 34 
(49%) believed that they would be in a higher quartile than their actual performance, and 
only 8 (12%) believed that they would be in a lower quartile than they actually were. 
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Table 27 to Table 29 show the results by individual class. The numbers in these tables 
represent the number of subjects fitting within each quartile. The diagonal boxes from top 
left to bottom right are subjects who correctly assessed their performance. Subjects 
falling in the boxes to the right of the diagonal are the subjects who assessed their 
performance as worse than actual. Correspondingly, subjects to the left of the diagonal 
are the subjects who assessed their performance as better than actual. 
 
    Self assessed quartile 









1 12 5 0 0 
2 5 10 2 0 
3 5 8 4 1 
4 2 13 1 1 
Table 26 Comparison of Self-Assessed Performance v Actual Performance – All Classes 
 
    Self assessed quartile 









1 5 1 0 0 
2 2 3 1 0 
3 2 4 1 0 
4 1 4 1 1 
Table 27 Comparison of Self-Assessed Performance v Actual Performance – Class 1 
 
    Self assessed quartile 









1 5 0 0 0 
2 3 3 0 0 
3 3 2 0 1 
4 1 4 0 0 
Table 28 Comparison of Self-Assessed Performance v Actual Performance – Class 2 
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    Self assessed quartile 









1 2 4 0 0 
2 0 4 1 0 
3 0 2 3 0 
4 0 5 0 0 
Table 29 Comparison of Self-Assessed Performance v Actual Performance – Class 3 
The results for individual classes were not substantially different to the 
aggregate, although the top actual quartile from Class 3 were the group most likely to 
believe their performance was worse than actual.  
Analyzing the responses reveals that decision makers are likely to over-
estimate their performance. Of the 35 subjects who were in the bottom 50% of actual 
outcomes, 28 (80%) self-assessed that they would be in the top 50% of outcomes. The 
results of these experiments confirm the findings of Kagel and Roth (1995) who 
identified that subjects tend to be overconfident. 
Without feedback regarding the quality of assignments, decision makers 
are unlikely to recognize the quality of their decisions. The overconfidence that decision 
makers generally feel may contribute to their resistance towards introducing decision 
support systems.  Therefore, the choice regarding whether or not a decision support 
system should be introduced should not be left entirely to the existing decision makers; in 
the absence of feedback, they are likely to believe that their current processes are 
producing outcomes that are better than actual.  
b. Decision-Making Strategies 
The subjects were also asked about their decision-making strategies and 
their perception of which scenarios were more complex. Regarding decision-making 
strategies, the subjects were asked whether they focused primarily on position 
requirements, personnel preferences, or attempted to balance the two; for ease of 
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reference, these will be referred to as Strategy Groups 1, 2 and 3. The percentage of 
subjects identifying themselves in each of the strategy groups is shown in Table 30. 
 
Response Response Rate 
Strategy Group 1 - I focused primarily on position requirements 22% (18 / 81) 
Strategy Group 2 - I focused primarily on personnel preferences  12% (10 / 81) 
Strategy Group 3 - I tried to balance the position requirements and 
personnel preferences 
64% (52 / 81) 
Other. Please state. 1%   (  1 / 81) 
Table 30 Decision Making Strategies 
The majority of subjects were in Strategy Group 3, and this strategy is 
theoretically what would most likely produce the best possible outcome. However, 34% 
of subjects focused primarily on either the position requirements or the personnel 
preferences (Strategy Groups 1 and 2). It is not possible to verify why the subjects would 
select a strategy that does not balance all the requirements and would be less likely to 
produce the optimal outcome. However, it is likely that these subjects did so to simplify 
the process. The works of Simon (1955) and Arthur (1994) show that rational behavior is 
likely to breakdown in certain circumstances, and it is possible that some, but not all 
subjects sought strategies that would reduce the information load. Henry (1980) claims 
that as individuals approach their cognitive limits they will attempt to limit stress by 
simplifying the problem, and this includes reducing the number of attributes being 
considered. 
The subjects’ performance from each strategy group is examined in Table 
31 to Table 33. The results from the three groups have been separated to determine if 
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 Minimum Median Maximum 
Personnel Points 150.4 244.5 350.4 
Position Points 656.6 726.9 796.4 
Total Points 806.4 968.5 1138.9 
Table 31 Aggregate Points Across all Scenarios – Strategy Group 1 (n = 18) 
 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Personnel Points 277.5 346.3 385.8 
Position Points 698.0 748.8 802.4 
Total Points 982.8 1102.9 1175.1 
Table 32 Aggregate Points Across all Scenarios – Strategy Group 2 (n = 10) 
 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Personnel Points 183.7 303.9 405.3 
Position Points 639.8 753.2 799.8 
Total Points 858.8 1057.9 1190.8 
Table 33 Aggregate Points Across all Scenarios – Strategy Group 3 (n = 52) 
The results from Table 31 to Table 33 show that the subjects in Strategy 
Group 2, those who focused primarily on personnel preferences, achieved the best 
median personnel points, although the highest maximum personnel points was achieved 
within Strategy Group 3. Counter-intuitively, Strategy Group 1, which focused primarily 
on position requirements, achieved the worst outcomes in terms of position points 
achieved; in fact, this group had the worst outcomes for personnel, position and total 
points. It is not clear why the subjects who focused primarily on position requirements 
did not achieve superior results in terms of position points. The best overall outcome, 
measured in terms of the maximum total points, was achieved from Strategy Group 3, 
although the median total points of this group was lower than Strategy Group 2.  
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Therefore, while it is possible to conclude that Strategy Group 1 had the poorest overall 
performance, it is not possible to make any conclusive assertions regarding the 
superiority of outcomes from Strategy Groups 2 or 3. 
A limitation of this review is that some subjects may actually have used 
different decision-making strategies for different scenarios. For example, they may have 
attempted to balance position requirements and personal preferences in some scenarios 
(potentially the simpler ones), but used simplifying strategies that focused on only 
position requirements or personal preferences in other scenarios (potentially the more 
complex scenarios).  
c. Feedback on Complexity 
Subjects were asked for their opinion on whether complexity was 
increased by increasing the personnel to assign, increasing the attributes, or a 
combination of the two. Specifically, subjects were asked, “How would you describe the 
difficulty in making the assignments?” Subjects were required to select one of the 
responses shown in Table 34. 
 
Response Response Rate 
All scenarios were of equal difficulty. 7%   (6 / 81) 
The scenarios with more personnel were more difficult. 15% (12 / 81) 
The scenarios with more attributes were more difficult. 28% (23 / 81) 
The combination of more attributes and more personnel made 
the problem more difficult. 
46% (37 / 81) 
Other. 4%   (3 / 81) 
Table 34 Subjects Responses to Question Regarding Scenario Complexity 
A literature review of information overload in various disciplines by 
Eppler and Mengis (2004) showed that, up to a certain point, decision-making 
performance improved with increases in the amount of information that the decision 
maker has available, but that beyond that point, the performance decreases. Keller and 
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Staelin (1987) defined information load in the consumer context as being a factor of the 
dimensions of quality and quantity of information. In this context, quality may be 
considered to be similar to the number of attributes, because more attributes provides 
more information and hence the opportunity for better quality assignments. Quantity of 
information in this context is measured by the number of personnel to assign. Therefore, 
using Keller and Staelin’s definition of information load as being the combination of 
quality and quantity of information, 89% of subjects in this experiment agree that 
increasing information load, through more attributes to consider and / or more personnel 
to assign, makes the assignment process more difficult.  
Two of the three subjects who responded with “Other” provided 
statements that the assignments were easier with more attributes. Interestingly, one of 
these subjects achieved the highest total points of all 81 subjects, although the other 
subject was ranked 44th in terms of total points achieved. Jacoby, Speller and Kohn 
(1974) found in consumer research that there is an inverted U curve phenomenon, and the 
ability of subjects to select a detergent that best satisfied their needs was poorest at the 
low and high levels of total information, while subjects provided with intermediate levels 
of information made the best quality decisions. There is the potential, particularly in the 
case of the subject who achieved the highest total points, that this subject was operating 
at a point on the U curve where he / she did not experience any information overload 
effects, while other subjects were over-whelmed by the amount of information. Certainly 
different people will have different strategies and different cognitive abilities when it 
comes to assignment decision making. With regards to strategies, Houser et al. (2004) 
classified subjects in decision-making experiments into three types, the “near-rational,” 
the “fatalist,” and the “confused.” With regards to cognitive abilities, Henry (1980) 
developed a linear regression equation of the relationship between information processing 
accuracy (dependent variable) and the independent variables of complexity and 
individual processing ability. Henry found that the coefficient for information processing 
ability was positive and statistically significant. Therefore, it is logical to expect that 
different people will operate at different places on the U curve for different information 
loads.  
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An additional but indirect means of assessing subjects’ thoughts on 
complexity is obtained by examining their self-assessment of performance compared to 
an “optimal” outcome. Included in the questions that the subjects were asked was the 
following: 
“For the experiments that you have participated in, there is an optimal 
outcome in accordance with the points scheme described. In the boxes 
below, please indicate how close you believe you came to the optimal 
assignment outcomes? Use the following scale 
1 = Within 0 – 20% of the optimal 
2 = Within 20 – 40% of the optimal 
3 = Within 40 – 60% of the optimal 
4 = Below 40% of the optimal.” 
The subjects were asked to indicate their performance for each of the 
scenarios in accordance with the assessment outlined above. The results show that as the 
scenarios became more complex the subjects expressed decreasing confidence in the 
ability to achieve results close to the optimal outcome. The average assessment from all 
subjects is shown against the scenarios in Figure 30. 
 























Figure 30. Self Assessment of Performance (Average Quintile) Compared to Optimal 
Outcome for Each Scenario 
Figure 30 reveals that the subjects were more confident of performing 
closer to an optimal outcome in the less complex scenarios than they were for the more 
complex scenarios. This lends support to the hypothesis that assigning more personnel 
using more attributes increases complexity. 
C. SUMMARY 
This research has examined decision making in the context of assigning military 
personnel to positions. The effects of information load have been examined in other 
contexts; Eppler and Mengis (2004) reviewed 97 articles across a variety of disciplines. 
They found that the performance of a decision maker “correlates positively with the 
amount of information he or she receives—up to a certain point. With additional 
information beyond this point, the individual’s performance will rapidly decline” (p. 
326). However, previous studies have generally involved situations where decision 
makers have been required to select the best outcome(s) from a list of options / 
alternatives. The assignment scenarios examined in this research are potentially more 
complex because the decision makers are required to assign members of one list 
(personnel) to members of another list (positions), and the members of each list have 
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preferences / requirements. Further, each assignment made by the decision maker limits 
the range of remaining choices available. While the decision makers can change 
assignments within a scenario if they see the opportunity, it is unclear whether they 
would recognize these opportunities, particularly when under time pressure.  
This research has not only examined how decision makers may perform in 
situations where military personnel are assigned to positions, it elicited information from 
the subjects in relation to their decision-making strategies, their views on the complexity 
of the scenarios, and a self-assessment of their performance.  
The variation in results achieved by the subjects was high, even for scenarios 
where subjects had the benefit of experience from a number of previous scenarios. This 
variation demonstrates that the quality of assignments depends heavily on the decision 
makers abilities. Such variability was observed in these experiments even though the 
subjects were all students studying at the master’s level. In situations where the decision 
makers may be less homogenous and have a greater range of abilities, even greater 
variability in the results could be expected.  
Compared to the experiments conducted here, the equivalent real life assignment 
decisions have the potential to affect careers of military personnel, and can in turn have 
an impact on personnel retention. Given the high stakes involved, the military should 
expect better outcomes and improved consistency, rather than allowing decisions to 
depend on the abilities of the person making the decisions. In the absence of applying 
selection criteria to identify and screen decision makers, and in the absence of decision 
support, there is a high risk that assignment decision quality will suffer. This risk could 
be reduced by carefully selecting and screening the decision makers, although this would 
not guarantee the results. Only introducing a decision support system would eliminate 
this variability.  
In accordance with the experiment design, and in accordance with real life 
military assignment situations, the subjects provided greater focus on the positions. This 
was demonstrated by higher points being achieved for the positions than the personnel. 
What was observed was that, compared to the personnel points, the position points 
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showed less variability and were closer to the optimal outcomes. In many cases, 
improved personnel outcomes could be achieved with no negative impact on position 
outcomes. 
When comparing their performance to that of others, the subjects showed that 
they were likely to overestimate their performance. Extending this over-confidence to 
real life assignment situations, the decision makers may be less inclined to recognize the 
need for decision support if they overestimate their performance. 
The experiments conducted here affirm the need for decision support in military 
personnel—position assignment scenarios. Two-sided matching has desirable properties 
for application to such a decision support system; in particular, it is much less prone to 
gaming than other techniques that are available. However, two-sided matching has not 
been applied to assignment processes in hierarchical organizations. Further, there is likely 
to be significant preference indifference, and the effect of indifference on two-sided 
matching outcomes has not been analyzed. The next chapter will examine how preference 
list indifference will affect two-sided matching assignments. 
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V. THE EFFECT OF PREFERENCE LIST INDIFFERENCE ON 
TWO-SIDED MATCHING OUTCOMES 
Chapter I highlighted a variety of matching algorithms for assigning personnel to 
positions. The approach selected for this research is two-sided matching. This approach 
was selected because of two unique characteristics: firstly, under certain conditions, it is a 
dominant behavior for participants on at least one side of the market to truthfully reveal 
their preferences, precluding gaming behavior and leading to more accurate assignments; 
secondly, the assignments produced will be stable.  
Two-sided matching originated in medical residency matching markets (Roth & 
Sotomayor, 1990), but more recently has been applied to matching students to high 
schools (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005, 2006). In the medical residency markets, hospitals 
typically use interviews to determine which graduating medical students are preferable 
and will be placed on the hospital preference lists. However, in the much larger school 
matching markets, such as the New York City high schools, where in excess of 90,000 
students are being matched to schools, it is not feasible for the schools to interview and 
rank each student that applies to the school. As a result, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) 
identify considerations, such as GPA, behavior and attendance records, that may be 
considered. With such a large number of students, limited attributes, and discrete 
attributes with limited degrees of gradation, this must inevitably lead to indifference in 
the schools’ preference lists. However, preference lists are treated as being strictly 
ordered based on a random lottery process; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) explain that 
every student is given a lottery number to break ties. In the New York City High School 
Match, Erdil and Ergin (2007) found that 10.5% of the matched students could have been 
matched with schools higher on their preference lists without hurting others, after 
incorporating the considerable indifference school preferences. 
Due to the large number of personnel involved in a military context, it is likely 
that preference lists would need to be determined based on rules or attributes, just as they 
are for schools. For the same reason that indifference can be expected in school 
preference lists, the preference lists for military positions can be expected to exhibit 
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indifference; military assignment contexts involve a large number of personnel and 
positions (Liang & Buclatin, 1988), there are a limited number of attributes by which the 
positions can assess personnel (Klingman & Phillips, 1984), and the attributes have a 
limited number of levels (for example, rank levels or the possession of a skill set). 
Therefore, the position preference lists are quite likely to exhibit indifference. The 
personnel preferences are also likely to have indifference because there will be groups of 
positions, which are almost, if not exactly, identical. Where indifference exists, existing 
research and applications state that preference ties should be randomly broken, with the 
resultant preferences treated as being strictly ordered. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) 
advocate a fixed tie breaking rule and existing two-sided matching applications typically 
require participants to submit strict preferences. However, breaking the ties in different 
ways will have an impact on the results.  In particular, different tie breakings will lead to 
different outcomes in terms of the number of agents assigned, and the average rank of 
assigned agents will be different; this was demonstrated for the NYC High School Match 
by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009). 
To examine how different tie breaking mechanisms will affect the assignment 
results, a random set of person and position agents will be created and given “quality” 
values. These agents could be considered students and schools, residents and hospitals or 
any other set of agents who have preferences and are assigned to one another, however 
for consistency with the remainder of this research, they will be referred to as personnel 
and positions. Based on homophilous attraction, the person and position agents have 
preferences for each other, although the strength of this attraction is defined by the 
“Preference Correlation” parameter (C). A low C value indicates that position agents will 
only identify the person agents who are the closest in quality values on their preference 
lists (and vice versa for person agents ranking positions). As the value of C increases, the 
position agents are increasingly willing to accept personnel whose quality values are less 
like their own. After determining an initial strict ordering of each agent’s preference lists, 
based on quality values and the preference correlation parameter (C), the “Degree of 
Indifference” parameter (DOI) specifies the extent to which ties will exist within the 
personnel and position agents’ preferences. 
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The second research question that was outlined in Chapter I was, “What effect 
does preference list indifference have on a two-sided matching outcome, and how can a 
decision maker use this to produce better outcomes?” 
In an experimental study of matching in situations with incomplete preferences 
and preference ties, Gent and Prosser (2002) generate random instances defined by three 
variables; n is the number of men and women, p1 is the probability of incompleteness and 
p2 is the probability of ties. In the experimental work undertaken here, four variables are 
used to generically define an instance; these are the number of agents involved (n), the 
length of their preference lists (L), the correlation of the attraction between the sets of 
agents (C) and the Degree of Indifference (DOI), which identifies the probability of 
preference list ties. The agents who are included in the preference lists are determined by 
homophilous attraction and the preference correlation (C), such that a position’s 
preference list will only include those persons whose quality score is within the range +/- 
C of the position’s own quality score. For assignment scenarios defined by these four 
parameters, multiple assignment trials will be conducted, with tied preferences randomly 
reordered at each trial. The assignments from each trial are captured in the database and 
subsequently analyzed to determine the effect of the four parameters on two key variables 
of interest; the number of agents matched (noting that two-sided matching does not 
guarantee all agents will be matched if preference lists are not complete), and the average 
rank of matched agents. The outcomes of this research will demonstrate, for a variety of 
scenarios defined by the four parameters, the range of outcomes that are possible in terms 
of number of agents assigned and the average rank of assigned agents. This research will 
help decision makers understand how assignment outcomes will vary as indifference 
increases.  









n Represents the number of agents involved in the scenario. 
L Represents the maximum length of the agents preference lists. 
C Represents the extent to which agents preferences are correlated. A 
low C value means that position agents only identify those person 
agents who are most alike them (a C value of zero would indicate that 
a position will only accept a person who has exactly the same quality 
score). As the value of C increases the position agents are 
increasingly willing to accept person agents who are less alike. 
DOI Represents the extent to which indifference exists in agents’ 
preference lists. A DOI of zero indicates strictly ordered preference 
lists, while a DOI of one indicates complete indifference. DOI can be 
set at any value in between zero and one. 
Number of 
Agents Assigned 
The number of agents who are assigned from a trial. 
Assignment 
Quality 
The average preference rank of agents who are assigned at a trial. 
Table 35 Parameters and Variables of Interest 
In these experiments, the key focus is on determining how indifference, measured 
by DOI, influences assignment outcomes; in particular, the number of agents assigned 
and the assignment quality. The other three parameters, n, L and C, specify different 
scenarios in which two-sided matching may be used to make assignments. 
This chapter examines the impact of preference list indifference on two-sided 
matching results in a context that is not specific to any particular application. The intent 
is to demonstrate how preference list indifference affects a generalized assignment  
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situation. The next chapter will extend the work and examine how two-sided matching 
can be applied to a specific situation; a military assignment context that includes 
preference list indifference. 
This research will define a variety of scenarios at different settings of the four 
descriptive parameters. Before doing so, however, the next section examines the 
outcomes from five scenarios that are defined identically in terms of the parameters. Even 
though the parameters are defined identically, there is random variation resulting from 
random quality scores and random preference ties (even though DOI is held constant, 
variability in preference ties occurs because a preference is considered indifferent to the 
previous preference if a random number, which is unique for each agent and preference, 
is less than the DOI).  
A. THE EFFECTS OF PREFERENCE LIST INDIFFERENCE 
The following definitions are used in this chapter: 
Scenario. A scenario refers to the generation of a set of agents and their 
preferences, using the parameters n, L, C and DOI. Due to the random generation of 
agents’ quality scores and their tied preferences, the agents’ preferences will differ even 
if scenarios are defined by identical parameter values. 
Trial. A trial refers to the assignments generated from a single random tie-
breaking of preferences. Multiple trials are conducted for each scenario to determine the 
results from breaking preference ties in different ways.  
For the next section, 1,000 trials were conducted for five identically defined 
scenarios. The results are used to provide some initial insights into the different outcomes 
possible when preference list ties are randomly broken in different ways.  
Five scenarios were created using the same parameter settings (n = 500, L = 10, C 
= 0.3 and DOI = 0.3), and for each of these scenarios, 1,000 assignment trials were 
conducted. The number of agents matched at each trial and the average rank of assigned 
personnel and position agents were recorded. The frequency and range of the variables of 
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interest is examined. The results from this section will help identify how much variability 
in results is related to the parameters and how much is attributable to random variation.  
1. Number of Agents Assigned 
A different assignment outcome is possible in each of the 1,000 assignment trials. 
Each assignment outcome can assign a different number of agents, and the average rank 
of assigned agents can vary. For the five identically defined scenarios (n = 500, L = 10, C 
= 0.3 and DOI = 0.3), the number of assigned agents at each of the 1,000 trials was 
recorded. Figure 31 shows the results for the 1,000 trials of the five scenarios; each line 
represents the outcomes from a scenario with the x-axis showing the number of agents 
assigned, and the y-axis showing the frequency with which the numbers of agents 
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The results in Figure 31 show a distribution of outcomes that resembles a normal 
distribution. The number of agents assigned varies across a range, with outcomes at the 
low and high end of the range occurring infrequently, and outcomes near the middle of 
the range occurring most frequently.   
In Scenario 3, depending upon which random tie breaking was used, the number 
of assigned agents varied between 474 and 490. In this scenario, only one of the 1,000 
trials resulted in 490 agents being assigned. Therefore, had a single random tie breaking 
rule been applied, it is very unlikely that it would have assigned 490 agents, and in fact, 
based on the 1,000 trials conducted, there is a 99.9% chance that a single random tie 
breaking would have produced a result that had fewer than 490 agents assigned. 
Compared to the standard approach in existing two-sided matching applications, where 
agents are assigned after preference list ties are randomly broken, examining alternate tie 
breaking can clearly produce outcomes that assign more agents. 
One thousand trials does not guarantee that the highest number of stable 
assignments for Scenario 3 is 490; it is possible that the number could be higher, although 
based on the probability distribution it is unlikely to be substantially higher, particularly 
given that the absolute upper bound is 500 agents assigned (the scenario involved 500 
personnel and position agents). A later section will examine how many trials are 
necessary to confidently obtain a “good” outcome; that is, is it necessary to undertake 
substantially more than 1,000 trials, or is it possible to obtain a “good” outcome with less 
than 1,000 trials. 
While Scenario 3 had the highest range in the number of agents assigned, the 
other scenarios were not dissimilar. As shown in Figure 31, the minimum number of 
assigned agents from the five scenarios varied between 471 and 474, representing a range 
of 0.6% of the number of agents, while the maximum number of assigned agents varied 
between 483 and 490, a range of 1.4% of the number of agents. For later sections, to 
attribute the difference in results to the variables of interest, the variability in outcomes 
should be greater than that exhibited here for identically defined scenarios.  
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2. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents 
At each of the 1,000 trials for a scenario, the preference rank at which each 
personnel and position agent is assigned is recorded, and these are averaged across all 
assigned personnel agents and position agents for each trial. As a result, in addition to 
determining the number of agents assigned (as outlined in the last section), it is possible 
to determine the average rank of both personnel agents and position agents for each of the 
1,000 trials. It is preferable, from an overall perspective, to find a solution that assigns the 
highest number of agents at the lowest preference ranking. 
Figure 32 shows the average personnel and position rank from each of the 1,000 
trials conducted for Scenario 3. The average rank for each agent in each trial is summed 
to provide a combined person and position rank for each trial. The combined personnel 
and position ranks are shown on the y-axis against the number of agents assigned on the 
x-axis. Dominant outcomes are those that have more agents assigned at lower preference 
ranks. The tradeoff between assigning an additional pair of agents but at an increased 
average preference rank is an issue of the decision maker in the relevant assignment 
context. For example, Figure 32 shows that it is possible to assign 489 agents at a 
combined personnel and position preference ranking of 5.538; alternatively it is possible 
to assign 490 agents at an average preference ranking of 5.557.  
To place the average preference rank (the y-axis in Figure 32) in context, for two 
trials that have a difference of 0.1 in the average preference rank, the trial with the 
average preference rank that is 0.1 lower has approximately 49 person or position agents 
(approximately 10% of the total) assigned to partners that are their next preferred partner; 
for example, 49 person or position agents being assigned to their second ranked 
preference instead of their third ranked preference.  
A decision maker would logically select from any of the nondominated outcomes 
shown in Figure 32. At the extremes, this would involve selecting between an outcome 
that has 474 agents assigned at a combined average preference rank of 5.325 and an 
outcome that has 490 agents assigned at a combined average preference rank of 5.557. 
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The “price” of assigning an additional 16 agents is that approximately 114 agents would 
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Scenario 3 - Results from 1,000 Trials:
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Figure 32. Preference Ranking of Assigned Agents – 1,000 Trials of Scenario 3 
From the many random tie breakings and the associated assignments, there are 
some outcomes where the average ranking of assigned agents is such that the assignments 
favor personnel, some favor the positions and some provide a more equitable outcome 
between personnel and positions. To examine whether identically defined scenarios will 
produce similar results from the perspective of assignment quality, the best personnel and 
position preference ranks from the 1,000 trials for each scenario are presented in Figure 
33. 
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Figure 33. Best Average Person and Position Preference Ranking for Each Scenario 
For both personnel and positions, the best average preference ranking was 
achieved in Scenario 4 (average person preference rank = 2.121, average position 
preference rank = 2.650). The scenario where the best average preference ranking was 
highest was Scenario 3 (average person preference rank = 2.200, average position 
preference rank = 2.882). The range between the best Scenario 3 and 4 personnel 
preference ranks is 3.7% of the Scenario 4 average person preference rank, while the 
corresponding range for position preferences is 8.8%. Therefore, even for scenarios that 
are defined identically in terms of the four parameters, there is variability in the outcomes 
due to random differences in the quality scores and preference ties. In the later section, 
which examines the effect of varying n, L and C, controls are used to minimize the 
variability in the scenario specification.  
3. Determining the Required Number of Trials 
It was demonstrated in the previous section, which involved 1,000 trials for each 
scenario, that the number of agents assigned resembles a normal distribution. By 
assuming 1,000 trials, it is statistically likely that significantly better outcomes will be 
achieved, in terms of number of agents assigned and quality of assignments, compared to 
the outcome if only a single random ordering of preferences was used. That is, it is 
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extremely unlikely that the first random tie breaking would deliver the highest possible 
number of agents assigned. Furthermore, a single trial would only present a decision 
maker with a single outcome. Multiple trials will provide the decision maker with 
options, and allow tradeoff between an outcome that assigns more agents and an outcome 
with fewer agents assigned but at a better preference ranking. 
A new scenario was generated using the same base-line parameters as used in the 
previous section (n = 500, L = 10, C = 0.3 and DOI = 0.3). 25,000 trials were conducted 
to estimate the number of trials necessary to place suitable bounds on the range of agents 
assigned and assignment quality. The goal of this research is not to determine the 
absolute best possible outcome; if that was the case then alternative approaches would be 
used. Rather, the intent is to demonstrate the effect of preference list indifference and the 
extent to which different outcomes are possible. By understanding this it will be possible 
to use preference indifference to an advantage rather than conducting a single trial that 
randomly breaks preference list ties. 
Figure 34 shows the number of agents assigned from the first 1,000, 5,000, 10,000 
and then all 25,000 trials of the base-line scenario. The frequency distribution once again 
resembles a normal distribution, with 481 assigned agents being the modal outcome.  The 
format of Figure 34 is modified in Figure 35, so that the y-axis shows the percentage of 
trials (from the first 1,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 25,000 trials of the scenario) that have the 
number of assigned agents indicated on the x-axis. 
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Figure 35. Percentage of Trials Showing Number of Agents Assigned 
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In Figure 35, there is very little difference between the distribution achieved in the 
first 1,000 trials compared to 5,000, 10,000, or 25,000 trials. Therefore, 1,000 trials is 
considered sufficient to demonstrate the effect of preference list indifference and the 
extent to which different outcomes are possible. 
Table 36 shows the outcomes for the first 1,000 trials and the full 25,000 trials, 
with the frequency of each outcome shown together with the probability of achieving 
each outcome. As shown, increasing from 1,000 to 25,000 trials increases the range of 
assigned agents by three (reducing the lower end of the distribution by one and increasing 
the upper end of the distribution by two).  
 First 1,000 Trials 25,000 Trials 
Number of 
Agents Assigned 
Frequency Probability Frequency Probability 
473 0 0.000% 3 0.012% 
474 1 0.100% 13 0.052% 
475 3 0.300% 63 0.252% 
476 10 1.000% 224 0.896% 
477 22 2.200% 643 2.572% 
478 65 6.500% 1528 6.112% 
479 114 11.400% 2792 11.168% 
480 157 15.700% 4039 16.156% 
481 200 20.000% 4859 19.436% 
482 189 18.900% 4480 17.920% 
483 116 11.600% 3238 12.952% 
484 74 7.400% 1921 7.684% 
485 38 3.800% 805 3.220% 
486 10 1.000% 305 1.220% 
487 1 0.100% 75 0.300% 
488 0 0.000% 11 0.044% 
489 0 0.000% 1 0.004% 
Table 36 Results from 25,000 Trials – Frequency of Number of Agents Assigned 
Figure 36 shows how the best preference ranking at each number of assigned 
agents for the first 1,000 trials compared to the full 25,000 trials. While better assignment 
quality (improved preference ranks for assigned agents) was found after 25,000 trials, the 
pattern from first 1,000 trials is similar to that found after 25,000 trials. 
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Figure 36. Best Preference Rankings of Assigned Agents – 1,000 Trials v 25,000 
Trials 
Comparing the number of assigned agents and the assignment quality between 
1,000 trials and 25,000 trials demonstrates that sufficiently similar outcome patterns are 
present in the first 1,000 trials. As a result, subsequent analysis will be based on 1,000 
trials for each scenario. While this will not show the best outcomes possible, it will show 
the pattern of outcomes that occur under different indifference scenarios with sufficient 
fidelity. 
B. THE EFFECT OF PREFERENCE LIST INDIFFERENCE ON 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCENARIOS 
This section examines how preference list indifference interacts with the other 
parameters to influence the assignment variables of interest; the number of agents 
assigned and the average preference rank. The effect of DOI and, in turn, the parameters 
n, L and C are examined.  
1. Preference List Indifference and Number of Agents 
To examine the effect of preference list indifference on scenarios involving 
differing numbers of agents, scenarios were created where the parameters for the number 
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of agents (n) and degree of indifference (DOI) were varied, holding other parameters 
constant. For these scenarios, preference list length (L) was held constant at 10 
preferences and the preference correlation (C) was held constant at 0.25. The exact level 
at which these parameters were set is not critical, however, they were set to a level that is 
“mid-range” compared to the range over which they vary in later sections of this 
research. Twelve scenarios were created; these involved 100, 500, 1,000 and 2,000 agents 
to be assigned; at each n, the degree of indifference (DOI) in the preference lists was set 
at three levels; 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. There were 1,000 trials (random ordering of tied 
preferences) conducted for each scenario.  
If a new and completely unique set of agents and preferences was created for 
every scenario, the random variation in agents and their preferences would potentially be 
too great to draw any conclusions about the relationship between parameters and 
outcomes. This would jeopardize the experiment’s internal validity. Therefore, for each 
setting of parameter n, a set of agents was created and this set of agents remained 
constant across each setting of parameter DOI. Where each set of agents is created, a 
“reference set” of strictly ordered preferences is created for each agent. This “reference 
set” of strictly ordered preference was not used during the assignment process, but rather 
was used solely as the starting point for determining each agent’s tied preferences. Using 
the “reference set” of strictly ordered preferences as a starting point, tied preferences 
were determined based on the DOI settings; a macro cycled through the “reference set” of 
preferences of each agent and for each preference (except the first one) a random number 
was generated; if the random number was less than the DOI setting then the preference 
was considered tied with the previous preference in the “reference set.” Once the 
assignment process was underway, the tied preferences were randomly broken to produce 
a strict set of preferences for each assignment set. The use of a single set of agents and a 
constant “reference set” of preferences enhances the internal validity of the experiments 
and ensures that, at each scenario size, the variability relates only to the preference list 
ties and is not related to other factors, such as the distribution of agent quality scores or 
which agents are included in the preference lists. 
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The results show that as the DOI increases, so too does the range of the number of 
observed assignments. At one extreme, there is a single outcome if there is no 
indifference; as preference list indifference increases, then so too does the maximum 
number of possible outcomes.  
Figure 37 to Figure 40 show the frequency distribution of the number of agents 
assigned for each scenario size. In each figure, a separate line identifies the results for a 
different DOI. The frequency distributions resemble normal distribution curves; 
statistically, any single random breaking of preference list ties is likely to produce an 
outcome where the number of agents assigned is close to the mean number of 
assignments and is unlikely to produce an outcome where the number of agents assigned 
is far from the mean. As the DOI increases, the peak of the distribution decreases and the 
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Figure 37. Frequency of Number of Assignments – n = 2,000 
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Figure 39. Frequency of Number of Assignments – n = 500 
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Figure 40. Frequency of Number of Assignments – n = 100 
Presenting the same results in a different format, Figure 41 shows that, holding 
DOI constant, the range in the number of agents who are assigned increases as the 
number of agents in the scenario increases, where range is the difference between the 
minimum and maximum observed assignments. Alternatively, holding the number of 
agents constant, increasing the DOI increases the range in the number of agents assigned. 
In Figure 42, the range in the number of agents assigned is expressed as a percentage of 
the number of agents in the scenario. Although the range in the number of agents 
assigned increases as the size of the scenario increases (as shown in Figure 41), as a 
percentage of the number of agents involved the range decreases as the number of agents 
increases. For example, from 1,000 trials of the scenario involving a DOI of 0.3 and with 
n of 500, the number of agents assigned ranged from 479 to 491 (seen in Figure 39) a 
spread of 2.6% of the agents involved. For the same DOI but with 2,000 agents, the 
agents assigned ranged from 1,909 to 1,936 (seen in Figure 37), a spread of 1.4% of the 
number of agents involved.  






















































































Figure 42. Effect of DOI on Range of Agents Assigned as Percentage of Number of 
Agents 
2. Preference List Indifference and Preference List Length 
To examine the effect of restrictions on preference list length and how it is 
affected by preference list indifference, scenarios were created varying the parameters for 
preference list length (L) and degree of indifference (DOI). For these scenarios, the 
number of agents (n) was held constant at 1,000 personnel and position agents and the 
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preference correlation (C) was held constant at 0.5. The preference correlation factor was 
set at a value high enough to ensure sufficient personnel agents within a quality distance 
of 0.5 from each position (and vice versa). If C was set too low, the number of agents 
within a range of ±C of an agent may be less than the parameter setting L in the scenario, 
and the results would be related to the variable C and not the variable of interest, L. 
Scenarios were created with preference list lengths (L) of 5, 10 and 20. For each setting 
of parameter L, the degree of indifference (DOI) in the preference lists was set at three 
levels; 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. With three settings of the variable L and three settings of the 
variable DOI, there were nine scenarios developed and 1,000 trials (random ordering of 
tied preferences) were conducted for each scenario.  
If a new and unique set of agents and preferences was created for every scenario, 
the random variation in agents and their quality scores would potentially confuse the 
experiments’ internal validity and preclude useful conclusions about the relationship 
between the parameters and outcomes. Given that all nine scenarios involved the same 
number of agents, a single set of 1,000 agents was created, with each agent’s quality 
score remaining unchanged for each scenario. This ensured that the quality distance 
between any person and position was the same for each scenario. Therefore, each 
position ranked the closest L personnel agents using the same initial strict ordering and 
differences in the tied preference lists were related solely to the setting of the variables L 
and DOI.  
If there is an equal number of personnel and position agents and preference lists 
are complete, that is, every position agent identifies every person agent in their 
preference lists and vice versa, then there is a stable matching where every agent is 
assigned (Gale &  Shapley, 1962). However, when preference lists are incomplete, not all 
agents are assigned. As preference list length decreases, the number of agents assigned 
will also decrease, unless there is sufficient individuality of preferences (for example, if 
every position agent listed a single and unique person and that person listed the same 
position, then it would be possible for all agents to be assigned with incomplete 
preference list lengths, however such a situation is unlikely). 
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Figure 43 shows the results from all nine scenarios used to investigate the effect 
of preference lists length and DOI. Each line in the figure represents the outcomes from 
1,000 trials of the scenario and shows the number of times in the 1,000 trials that a given 
number of agents were assigned.  
The first observation on Figure 43 is the relationship between preference list 
length and the number of agents assigned. Regardless of the DOI, the number of agents 
assigned (whether measured by mean or mode) was lowest for L = 5 and highest for L = 
20, with the outcomes for L = 10 lying between. However, as seen later, the tradeoff for 
achieving a higher number of assigned agents is a reduction in the assignment quality, as 
measured by the average preference rank of the assigned agents. 
The second observation is that the spread of outcomes increases as DOI increases. 
That is, the range in the number of assigned agents increases regardless of the preference 
list length. This is seen further in Figure 44. At a DOI of 0.1, the range in the number of 
agents assigned varies between 9 and 11, whereas the range in the number of agents 
assigned varies between 15 and 25 at a DOI of 0.5. Holding DOI constant, greater 









































Number of Agents Assigned
Number of Agents Assigned - Frequency from 1,000 Trials
DOI = 0.1, L = 5
DOI = 0.1, L = 10
DOI = 0.1, L = 20
DOI = 0.3, L = 5
DOI = 0.3, L = 10
DOI = 0.3, L = 20
DOI = 0.5, L = 5
DOI = 0.5, L = 10
DOI = 0.5, L = 20
 
Figure 43. Effect of Preference List Length on Number of Agents Assigned 
























Figure 44. Effect of DOI and L on Range of Outcomes 
Not only does the preference list length affect the number of agents assigned, but 
it also affects the preference rank at which they are assigned. As the length of preference 
lists increases, more agents will be assigned, but as outlined below, the “cost” of doing so 
is that the average preference rank of agents who are assigned will also increase.  
For each of the 1,000 trials conducted for each scenario, the average personnel, 
position and total (combined personnel and position) preference rankings of assigned 
agents were determined. Figure 45 shows the average total rank for each of the 1,000 
trials (each point represents the outcome from a trial) for the scenario where L = 5 and 
DOI = 0.1. The other scenarios follow a similar pattern and are not reproduced here. To 
compare the preference ranks at each scenario, the nondominated outcomes for each 
number of assigned agents are used; that is, the lowest point in each column of points in 
Figure 45. 
The nondominated outcomes at each number of assigned agents are compared in 
Figure 46 to Figure 48. The vertical axis scale in these charts is held constant to allow for 
easier comparison and the range of the horizontal axis is also held constant (although the 
values of the scale on the horizontal axis differ). As the preference list length L increases, 
so too does the average preference rank of the assigned agents. 
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Figure 45. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents - 1,000 Trials for L = 5, 
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Figure 46. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents for L = 5 
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Figure 48. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents for L = 20 
There is a tradeoff for a decision maker to allow longer preference lists; longer 
preference lists will assign more agents because each agent has more potential partners, 
but some agents will be assigned at a higher (worse) average preference rank because the 
new potential partners that provide this flexibility have higher ranks. While restricting 
preference list length would lead to a better average result for those who are assigned 
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through the initial assignment process, more agents would need to be matched in a 
second round or matched through a manual administrative process, both of which would 
potentially add instability to the system. 
3. Preference List Indifference and Preference Correlation 
The preference correlation defines, in terms of quality scores, how similar the 
personnel and position agents need to be to one another to be ranked by each other. As C 
decreases, the strength of the homophilous attraction increases. To examine the effect of 
preference list indifference on scenarios involving different preference correlation, 
scenarios were created where the preference correlation (C) and degree of indifference 
(DOI) were varied while other parameters were held constant. For these scenarios, the 
number of agents (n) is held constant at 1,000 personnel and position agents (the same set 
of randomly generated agents used in the previous section is again used here) and the 
preference list length (L) is held constant at 100. The preference list length was set at a 
sufficiently high value to ensure that it will not shorten preference list length – rather, the 
preference correlation (C) will determine the number of preferences that each agent will 
identify. Depending on the random distribution of agents’ quality scores, some personnel 
agents will have many position agents within close proximity and other personnel agents 
will have few position agents in close proximity (and vice versa). 
To increase internal validity and ensure that differences in the outcomes relate to 
the variables of interest, C and DOI, a single set of 1,000 personnel and positions agents 
were used; this ensures that variability is not due to differences in the agents. To allow 
comparisons against the last section, which examined the effect of preference list length, 
the same agents used for those scenarios were again used for these scenarios. 
The variable C provides a cutoff at a distance +/- C from each agents quality score 
and all agents within that range may be ranked. Given that the quality scores are 
randomly distributed in the range 0 to 1, and given that there are 1,000 agents, the 
position agents would average 20 personnel agents within the bounds defined by C, for a 
C setting of 0.01 (+/- 0.01 x 1,000). However, some position agents could have more 
personnel agents within the limits defined by C and other position agents could have 
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fewer (the same applies to personnel agents identifying position agents). The variable C 
is set at the levels 0.0025, 0.005 and 0.01, because on average these correspond to 
preference list lengths of 5, 10 and 20 for the agents. The actual number of preferences 
that agents identify based on these C values is shown later. Given that different values for 
C will necessarily determine the preference list length for each agent (based on the 
number of agents within the range defined by +/- C), the results for varying C are 
expected to show some relationship to the results for varying L.  
For each setting of the parameter C, the degree of indifference (DOI) in the 
preference lists was set at three levels; 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. These are the same DOI settings 
used in the previous sections. With three settings of the variable C and three settings of 
the variable DOI, there are nine scenarios explored in this section. There were 1,000 trials 
(random ordering of tied preferences) conducted for each scenario.  
Figure 49 shows the results from all nine scenarios used to investigate the effect 
of preference list correlation and DOI. Each line in the figure represents the outcomes 
from the 1,000 trials of a scenario and shows the number of times from the 1,000 trials 
that a given number of agents were assigned. 
As demonstrated in the results presented in Figure 49, the preference correlation 
is the primary determinant of the number of agents assigned. As the preference 
correlation increases, that is as position agents are increasingly willing to consider 
personnel agents who are less alike in quality values (and vice versa), the number of 
assigned agents increases. This is akin to an increase in the preference list length; 
essentially, as C increases, position agents identify an increasing number of personnel 
agents (and vice versa).  
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Figure 49. Effect of Preference Correlation on Number of Agents Assigned 
As already explained, the variable C was set at the levels 0.0025, 0.005 and 0.01, 
which would, on average, correspond to agent preference list lengths of 5, 10 and 20; 
recall positions identify all personnel whose quality score is within +/- C in their 
preference list, and if quality scores were uniformly distributed, the number of personnel 
agents within this range would be 2C x n. However, due to random variation in the 
quality scores, some agents would have longer preference lists and others shorter. Figure 
51 shows the distribution of preference list lengths for position agents, where C = 0.01. 
Of the 1,000 agents, an equal number, 111 agents, had 19 and 20 preferences; 501 agents 
had 19 or less preferences and 499 had 20 or more preferences. Some position agents had 
as few as 6 preferences and others as many as 33.  


















The Number of Agents by Preference Lists Length
 
Figure 50. Preference List Length Frequency for C = 0.01 
The results in Figure 49 show a strong resemblance to the results in Figure 43, 
which is the equivalent chart showing the number of agents assigned at each of the 1,000 
trials as preference list length and indifference vary. The outcomes for C = 0.0025, C = 
0.005 and C = 0.01 resemble the outcomes for L = 5, 10 and 20, respectively. Therefore, 
in terms of effect on the number of agents assigned, the parameter C has virtually the 
same effect as setting parameter L to a corresponding level.  
In examining the interaction between degree of indifference and preference list 
length, the degree of indifference did not substantially influence the median number of 
agents assigned but it did increase the range in the number of assigned agents from the 
1,000 trials in each scenario. Similarly, from examining the relationship between degree 
of indifference and preference correlation, there was no evidence that the degree of 
indifference influenced the median number of assigned agents but it did lead to a larger 
spread in that outcome. This is seen in Figure 49 where the higher DOI leads to lower 
peaks but a broader spread at the base of the distribution. This is also demonstrated in 
Figure 51 where the range of assigned agents is shown, relative to the degree of 
indifference for different preference correlations; that is, the difference between the 
maximum and the minimum number of agents assigned from the 1,000 trials. As position 
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agents restrict their preferences to those personnel agents who are most similar (and vice 
versa), the range in the number of agents assigned from the 1,000 trials increases. This 
























Figure 51. Effect of DOI and C on Range of Outcomes 
While the number and range of assigned agents shows considerable similarity 
between corresponding scenarios defined by the variables L and C, the next issue to 
investigate is how the quality of assignments is influenced by C and DOI. The results 
shown in Figure 52 to Figure 54 are the nondominated outcomes at each number of 
assigned agents. Each point in these charts represents the sum of the average preference 
rank of assigned personnel agents and the average preference rank of all assigned 
position agents.  
The charts in Figure 52 to Figure 54 show a strong resemblance to the 
corresponding charts for differing preference list length. For example, the average 
preference ranking for the scenarios where C = 0.0025 was between 3 and 4, a similar 
outcome to the scenarios where L = 5. The effect of DOI showed a similar pattern too. 
That is, the lowest average preference rank was achieved in the scenarios where DOI = 
0.5 and the highest average preference rank was achieved in the scenarios where DOI = 
0.1. This is to be expected given that a higher degree of indifference will effectively 
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mean that an agent is more likely to be assigned at a lower preference rank. For example, 
consider a position agent who identifies six person agents as preferences and is 
indifferent between the fourth, fifth and sixth preferences. In such a case, when the 
preference ties are broken, it is immaterial (to the position) whether the position is 
assigned to its fourth, fifth or sixth preference because it would be identified as the fourth 
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Figure 53. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents for C = 0.005 
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Figure 54. Average Preference Rank of Assigned Agents for C = 0.01 
As shown in Figure 50, agents had different preference list lengths due to the 
random distribution of quality scores and the use of the preference correlation to limit 
preferences. It is possible to examine the relationship between an agent’s preference list 
length and the probability of the agent being assigned. Figure 55 shows the percentage of 
agents assigned according to their preference list length. The data is for the position 
agents at one trial of a scenario where C = 0.005 (the DOI is not relevant because the 
results are from a single trial). The variability at the lower number of preferences is due 
to the small number of agents who had such a low number of preferences. The same data 
is presented by number of agents at each preference list length in Figure 56. 
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Figure 56. Number of Position Agents by Preference List Length and Assignment 
Outcome 
The average preference list length for personnel and position agents who were 
matched was 10.20 and 10.18, respectively, while the average preference list length for 
person and position agents who were not matched was 7.43 and 7.57 respectively. Such 
results are comparable to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), which 
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reports that applicants matched in 2010 had an average Rank Order List (ROL) length of 
9.25 and unmatched applicants had an average ROL length of 4.50 
(http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/about_res/impact.html).  
C. SUMMARY 
The participants in some applications of two-sided matching are indifferent 
between some options and would ideally express this as tied preferences. However, 
existing applications of two-sided matching require participants to either submit strictly 
ordered preferences or, if preference ties are allowed, the ties are randomly broken.  Erdil 
and Ergin (2007) provide evidence that such an approach will not necessarily yield the 
best possible results and significant improvements may be possible. 
An agent based model was developed with two groups of agents; personnel and 
position agents. Each agent was randomly assigned a quality score and their preference 
for agents from the other group was based on homophilous attraction. Scenarios were 
defined by four parameters; the number of agents (n), the length of preference lists (L), 
the preference correlation (C) and the degree of indifference (DOI). The goal was to 
investigate how DOI interacted with the other parameters and the effect that this had on 
two key outcomes; the number of agents assigned and the average preference rank of 
assigned agents. For each scenario, multiple trials were conducted with tied preferences 
randomly broken at each trial. The number of agents assigned and their average 
preference rank varied according to how the tied preferences were broken. 
The results from many trials on each scenario (generally 1,000 trials per scenario) 
show that the frequency at which each number of agents was assigned resembles a 
normal distribution; for any given scenario most random tie breakings yield a similar 
number of agents assigned but some tie breakings can produce results further from the 
median outcome. The range between the lowest and highest number of assigned agents 
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increase in the range is not proportional to the number of agents involved in the scenario; 
as the number of agents increases, the range decreases if measured as a percentage of the 
number of agents involved. 
As preference list length increases the number of assigned agents increases but the 
average preference rank of those who are assigned decreases. Given that any unassigned 
agents would need to be assigned through a second round match or through an 
administrative process, the administrator of a two-sided matching application may wish 
to maximize the number of agents assigned in the initial round, although they should be 
aware of the “cost” of doing so in terms of average rank of the assigned agents.  
When preferences are defined by the preference correlation (C) and are not 
constrained by L, the results are similar to those obtained when preference list lengths are 
limited by L; this reflects that C still limits each agent’s preference list, although it is 
limited by the number of partner agents within a distance of the agent’s quality score, 
with the limit set by C and not the preference list length. For the scenarios examined here, 
the primary determinant of outcomes was the number of preferences that an agent lists 
and not necessarily whether the preferences are correlated; preference correlation 
effectively limits preference lists by limiting potential partners. Whether preferences 
were limited by L or C, preference indifference did not significantly affect the median 
outcome in the many trials explored. However, increasing DOI did lead to a broader 
range in the number of agents being assigned. The average preference rank of the 
assigned agents was lower at higher levels of indifference; this is the result of measuring 
the outcomes against the indifferent rank at which the agents were assigned; for example, 
if an agent’s 9th, 10th and 11th preferences are tied, when the ties are broken the rank for 
each of these preferences is counted as 9.  
Two-sided matching can be applied to situations that involve preference list 
indifference. If preference list ties are randomly broken and multiple assignment trials are 
explored, it is possible to identify a range of potential outcomes, each of which is at least 
weakly stable. In a hierarchical organization where the match administrator has an  
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interest in the assignment outcome, identifying a variety of alternative outcomes provides 
the administrator with options to select the outcome that best meets the organization’s 
requirements.  
Table 37 summarizes the key findings from the experiments that investigated 
preference list indifference. 
Factor Key Findings 
Number of 
trials 
Increasing the number of trials may increase the range of the number of 
agents assigned; that is, it may reveal new outcomes where it is possible to 
assign greater numbers of agents. Further, increasing the number of trials 
may reveal new assignment outcomes that dominate others in terms of 
average rank for assigned agents. 1,000 trials was found to be sufficient to 
reveal most outcomes for the types of scenarios conducted in this research. 
Number of 
agents 
As the number of agents increases, the range in the number of assigned 
agents increases in total numbers but decreases as a percentage of the 
number of agents. 
Preference 
list length 
Increasing preference list length leads to a higher number of assigned 
agents. The range of outcomes increases as preference list length increases. 




Similar effect to preference list length; a lower preference correlation 
effectively increases preference list length and so allows more agents to be 
assigned. Similar effect to preference list length; a lower preference 
correlation effectively increases the preference list length and so results in 
a higher average rank for assigned agents. 
Degree of 
Indifference 
The range in the number of assigned agents increases as the degree of 
indifference increases. The average preference rank of assigned agents 
decreases as the degree of indifference increases. 
Table 37 Summary of Key Findings from Preference List Indifference Experiments 
The next chapter examines two-sided matching as applied to military 
assignments; that is, the allocation of personnel to positions as part of a regular posting 
cycle. The approach of conducting multiple trials to explore a variety of outcomes under 
preference list indifference will be continued in the assignment scenarios examined in the 
next chapter. 
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VI. APPLYING TWO SIDED MATCHING IN A HIERARCHICAL 
ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I outlined potential processes for assigning personnel to positions. Two-
sided matching was selected because of two key desirable properties; it yields stable 
results, and the dominant strategy is for personnel to submit their true preferences (they 
cannot game the system) if implemented as a personnel-proposing algorithm. Chapter II  
outlined that two-sided matching has been used in a wide variety of applications, and 
during the last decade some large school districts in the U.S. have used this process to 
assign students to schools. These school assignment applications have features of 
hierarchical organizations with the individual schools being subordinate to the district 
education department.  
In applications, such as the New York City high school matching, the individual 
schools have preferences for the types of students they wish to accept, but the schools’ 
preferences must also conform to constraints imposed by the Department of Education 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). As an alternative to using constraints, this research 
demonstrates that multi-attribute utility functions can be utilized to generate preference 
lists in hierarchical organizations; this allows the preferences to include attributes that are 
of interest to both the organization and its subordinate elements. It is possible to give 
priority to different attributes by changing the weights in the multi-attribute utility 
function. This chapter demonstrates the use of such utility functions and examines how 
assignment outcomes vary in response to changing weights (priorities). The research is 
based on a military assignment situation where personnel are assigned to positions, and 
utilizes data on Australian Army personnel and positions. The military units and Service 
headquarters are analogous to the schools and education department. 
A. PROBLEM SPECIFICATION 
Personnel and positions are each identified by six attributes in the scenarios 
developed here: rank, branch, skill, location, career development and performance. The 
first three of these attributes are of interest to the units, because they define the attributes 
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a person should have to successfully fill a position within the unit, and therefore 
contribute to the unit’s role. The remaining attributes are of interest to the service because 
they contribute to broader organizational objectives; cost minimization through 
geographic stability, personnel development through a range of experiences, and 
maximization of organizational performance by matching the most demanding positions 
with the highest performing personnel.  
As outlined previously, the position preference rankings that are required for two-
sided matching are derived from a position utility function: 
Utotal = (Wrank x Urank) + (Wbranch x Ubranch) + (Wskill x Uskill)  
+ (Wlocation x Ulocation) + (Wcareer dev x Ucareer dev) + (Wperformance x Uperformance) 
where U represents Utility and W represent Weight. For each position, the person with 
the highest Utotal value is the position’s first ranked preference, and subsequent 
preferences are in order of Utotal. Changing the weights will result in positions rank 
ordering personnel differently, which in turn leads to different assignment outcomes from 
the two-sided matching.  
There are 1,790 personnel and 1,997 positions that require assignment in the 
problems specified here. This represents one third of Australian Army personnel and 
positions at the rank of E06, E08 and E09 (E07 rank is no longer used). Actual data for 
the rank, branch, skill and location of these personnel and positions is used. Performance 
quartiles are randomly assigned for both personnel and positions. The career development 
provided by positions is based on a categorization of units, and personnel are randomly 
assigned career development requirements, such that the percentage of personnel 
requiring each career development type matches the percentage of positions providing 
that career development type. The location preferences of personnel are randomly 
allocated, but distributed in accordance with preferences that have been submitted by 
personnel through an Electronic Preferences and Restrictions (EPAR) form.  
Position preference rankings are based on six attributes and calculated in 
accordance with the utility function outlined above. The 50 personnel with the highest 
utility values become each position’s preference list with the utility values determining 
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whether preferences are tied. A preference list length of 50 was selected after reviewing 
the utility function values; this provides sufficient preferences to ensure that a high 
percentage of agents are assigned, and avoids including personnel who meet too few of 
the positions’ attributes. A later section will show a modification from position 
preference list lengths of 50. Personnel preference lists are calculated after position 
preferences are determined, because personnel can only identify a position if the position 
has first identified the person amongst one of its preferences. Each person can list up to 
Lpers positions in their preference list, where Lpers is a variable for the experiments. 
A semi-random ordering of attributes is created for each person; for every person 
the rank attribute is first and the performance attribute is last, with the remaining 
attributes randomly ordered. Rank Order Centroid weights are applied to each person’s 
ranked attributes to provide each attribute’s weight. Each person’s attribute weights 
remain constant across all scenarios conducted here. The attributes and weights provide 
an initial ordered list of each person’s acceptable positions. However, the personnel 
preferences are updated for each scenario based on the position preferences; a person 
only includes a position as a preference if the position has first listed the person as a 
preference.  
Table 38 outlines the settings for the scenarios to be examined. These scenarios 
vary the balance of weights between unit and Service attributes; the weight provided to 
unit attributes is 75% for Scenarios 1 and 2, 60% for Scenarios 3 and 4, 45% for 
Scenarios 5 and 6, and 30% for Scenarios 7 and 8; weights are evenly spread across unit 
related attributes. 1,000 trials were conducted for each scenario with preference list ties 










Scenario Lpers Lposn Rank Branch Skill Location Career 
Dev 
Performance 
1 10 50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.05 
2 20 50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.05 
3 10 50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.10 
4 20 50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.10 
5 10 50 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.15 
6 20 50 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.15 
7 10 50 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.20 
8 20 50 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.20 
Table 38 Scenario Specifications 
The scenarios with a personnel preference list length of 10 are used because this is 
close to the number allowed in some of the main existing applications. For example, 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) identified that students in the New York City high schools 
match are permitted to submit preferences for 12 schools. To analyze the effect of 
personnel preference lists lengths, a second setting where Lpers equals 20 is used. 
The personnel proposing algorithm is used because it is a dominant strategy for 
personnel to submit truthful preferences. Although not explored in this research, further 
work could examine the difference in results between the personnel and position 
proposing algorithms. 
B. RESULTS 
1. Scenario 1 
In the last chapter, the Degree of Indifference (DOI) was used to define 
preference list indifference in a scenario. The personnel and positions’ attributes, together 
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with utility function weights, define the preferences in the scenarios explored in this 
chapter. However, it is still possible to identify the extent of indifference in these 
preferences by expressing a value that is comparable to the DOI. For all personnel agents, 
a count is made of the number of times that an agent’s (n+1)th  preference is indifferent to 
the same agent’s  nth preference (where n ≥ 1). The DOI is then calculated by dividing the 
count of indifferent preferences by the total number of preferences of all personnel 
agents; for the first scenario this provides a DOI of 0.35.  This can be interpreted as 
follows: for any personnel agent’s preference (with the exception of their first 
preference), there is a 35% chance that the preference is indifferent to the previously 
identified preference. The DOI for the positions in the first scenario is 0.75. The lower 
DOI for personnel occurs because personnel attribute weights are based on Rank Order 
Centroid weights, so no two attributes are weighted the same. In contrast, the higher DOI 
for positions occurs because some attributes have the same weights, and therefore more 
preferences are indifferent.  
Due to the indifference in the personnel and positions’ preference lists, the results 
observed in these scenarios show similar traits to those in the last chapter that explored 
preference list indifference. For example, Figure 57 shows the number of agents assigned 
at each of the 1,000 trials and the distribution pattern is similar to scenarios explored in 
the last chapter; that is, when tied preferences are randomly broken, only a small 
percentage of trials will produce outcomes where the number of assigned agents is near 
the lower or upper extremes. Only one of the 1,000 trials for Scenario 1 produced an 
outcome with 1,604 agents assigned, 90% of the number of personnel involved. 
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Figure 57. Frequency of Assignments – 1,000 Trials for Scenario 1 
Figure 58 shows the distribution of average preference rank for the assigned 
personnel. This distribution also shows similar patterns to the results of last chapter and 
demonstrates that there are many dominated outcomes. From the nondominated 
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Figure 58. Average Personnel Preference Rank – 1,000 Trials for Scenario 1 
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Trial 903 was the only trial to achieve the maximum 1,604 assigned agents in 
Scenario 1, and is therefore selected for further analysis. Figure 59 shows the indifferent 
preference rank at which each agent was assigned in trial 903; if an agent is indifferent 
between preferences 4, 5 and 6, this would be identified as the agent’s fourth preference. 
41% of personnel were assigned to their first preference, 68% were assigned to one of 
their top three preferences, and 83% were assigned to one of their top five preferences. 
 
Figure 59. Preference Rank of Assigned Personnel Agents - Scenario 1, Trial 903 
It is relevant to examine the personnel outcomes in terms of preference ranks 
achieved because the personnel submit their preferences as rank ordered lists. However, it 
is less relevant to examine position outcomes in terms of preference ranks achieved; the 
preference ranking is a requirement of the two-sided matching process, but how well 
assignments satisfy position requirements matters most. In a hierarchical organization 
where positions’ preferences are constructed from a multi-attribute utility function, the 
positions’ attributes are known, as is the utility of each assignment. Figure 60 shows the 
utility of assigned positions to show how well the positions’ requirements have been 
satisfied: 16% of positions were assigned to personnel that provide a utility exceeding 0.9 
(out of a theoretical maximum of 1.0), 67% were assigned with a utility exceeding 0.8, 
and 84% were assigned with a utility exceeding 0.7. 
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Figure 60. Utility of Assigned Position Agents – Scenario 1, Trial 903 
This research is designed to demonstrate the benefit of utility functions in creating 
rank ordered preference lists for two-sided matching. For such a process to be 
advantageous, assignments must be responsive to the weights; for example, as the skill 
attribute weight is increased, then an increasing percentage of assignments should satisfy 
positions’ skill requirements. This will be demonstrated in these scenarios by examining 
the percentage of assignments that satisfy each of the positions’ attributes.  
Figure 61 shows the results for trial 903 of Scenario 1. The three unit attributes 
have greater weight than the Service attributes and this is reflected in the assignments; 
99% of assignments meet the positions’ rank requirements, 100% meet the branch 
requirements and 90% meet the skill requirements (it was outlined previously that a veto 
rule was created for positions’ branch requirements; therefore, all assignments will meet 
the branch requirements). By contrast, the Service attributes were provided less weight in 
Scenario 1, resulting in 33% of assignments achieving geographic stability, 84% meeting 
the personnel career development needs, and 64% of assignments involving personnel 
and positions in the same performance quartile. 
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Figure 61. Percentage of Assignments that Satisfy Position Attributes – Scenario 1, 
Trial 903 
2. Scenario 2 
The specification of Scenario 2 is identical to Scenario 1 with the exception of the 
personnel preference list length, Lpers; the personnel preferences are limited to 10 
preferences at Scenario 1, whereas Scenario 2 permits 20 preferences.  
Trial 123 of Scenario 2 achieved the highest number of assigned agents with 
1,716 (96%) assignments; the best outcome from Scenario 1 was 1,604 (90%) 
assignments. Table 39 outlines how increasing the personnel preference list length affects 
the preference rank of assigned personnel. Increasing the personnel preference list length 
leads to more assignments; however, fewer personnel, both in numbers and percentage 
terms, are assigned to their most preferred positions. For example, 1,088 personnel 
(representing 68% of assigned agents) were matched to one of their top three preferences 
in Scenario 1, with this figure decreasing to 1,007 agents (representing 58% of assigned 
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Table 39 Personnel Assignments by Preference Rank – Scenario 1 and 2 
Increasing the personnel preference list length leads to an outcome that many 
personnel would agree is less desirable; however, the same reduction in satisfaction does 
not occur for the positions. This is explained by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), who show 
that in man-dominant one-to one marriage markets, if a man in the market extends his 
preference list to include more women, this cannot help the other men and cannot harm 
the women. Consider a marriage market where the men and women have already been 
partnered. If one of the men increases his preference list length, he cannot be matched to 
a woman he prefers because the man has already been rejected by all the women he 
prefers. But when the man proposes to a woman who is on his extended preference list, 
the woman will either reject the man (in which case no partnerships are affected), or will 
accept the man instead of her previous partner; if this occurs the woman achieves a 
preferred outcome (because she would only reject her previous partner if she prefers the 
new offer) and the woman’s original partner continues through his preference list in 
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search of a new woman. This potentially commences a chain of new proposals, which 
cannot help the men and cannot harm the women; men whose partnerships are broken are 
required to propose to less desirable women, and the women only accept new proposals if 
it they are from men higher on their preference list. 
The situation described above is only strictly true if there is no preference list 
indifference, or a single tie breaking rule is used if indifference exists. Preference list ties 
are broken in different ways in this research, and therefore there are some individual 
positions that will be worse off due to the extension of the personnel preference list 
lengths. However, Table 40 shows that increasing the personnel preference list length 
leads to improved results for the positions. 
Position 
Utility 
Number Assigned at Utility 
(Cumulative number in 
parentheses) 
Percentage of Agents Assigned at 
Utility 
(Cumulative % in parentheses) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
































Table 40 Position Assignments by Utility – Scenario 1 and 2 
Table 41 shows that the number of assignments where position attributes are 
satisfied also increases as the personnel preference list length is extended. However, the 
percentage of assignments that satisfy each position attribute is similar for each scenario.  
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 Number of Assignments 
Satisfying Position Attribute 
Percentage of Assignments 
Satisfying Position Attribute 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Rank 1,592 1,696 99% 99% 
Branch 1,604 1,716 100% 100% 
Skill 1,445 1,541 90% 90% 
Location 532 615 33% 36% 
Career Dev 1,354 1,398 84% 81% 
Performance 1,025 1,081 64% 63% 
Table 41 Achievement of Position Attributes – Scenario 1 and 2 
3. Analysis of Scenarios 1 to 8 
Table 42 shows the number of assignments achieved at each scenario. The odd 
numbered scenarios are those where Lpers equals 10, and the even numbered scenarios are 
those where Lpers equals 20. There is an increase in the number of assignments as the 
scenario weights shift from a primary focus on unit attributes to a primary focus on 
Service attributes, controlling for the different personnel preference list lengths. This 
appears to occur because the position preferences are increasingly correlated with the 
personnel preferences. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of 
Assignments 
1,604 1,716 1,621 1,727 1,640 1,739 1,679 1,759 
Percentage of 
Personnel 
90% 96% 91% 96% 92% 97% 94% 98% 
Table 42 Number of Assignments – Scenarios 1 to 8 
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Figure 62 and Figure 63 show the personnel preference ranks that were achieved 
for each of the eight scenarios, by number and percentage of assignments. These clearly 
show that the additional assignments achieved from the scenarios where Lpers equals 20 
were at the expense of fewer personnel receiving their highest ranked preferences, and 
more personnel being assigned to preferences ranked 6th or below. Decision makers must 
determine whether the higher number of assignments warrants the decrease in satisfaction 
that some personnel would experience. The decision maker would also need to balance 
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Figure 62. Number of Assignments by Personnel Preference Rank – Scenarios 1 to 8 
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Figure 63. Personnel Preference Rank by Percentage of Assignments – Scenarios 1 to 
8 
The impact of the additional preference list length is analyzed at the individual 
level. For this, the preference rank of the 1,604 individual personnel who were assigned 
at Scenario 1 (trial 903) is compared to their assigned preference rank at Scenario 2 (trial 
123). The comparison is shown in Table 43 where personnel whose assigned preference 
rank improved from Scenario 1 to 2 are recorded as positive values, Table 43 whereas 
personnel whose preference rank worsened are recorded as negative values. 40 personnel 
who were assigned at Scenario 1 were not assigned at Scenario 2.  
As outlined previously, in the case of strict preferences, increasing the personnel 
preference list length cannot help the personnel achieve a preferred outcome; however, 
where preference list indifference exists and ties are not broken in a consistent manner 
(e.g., personnel receive a lottery number that is used for all scenarios and trials), it is 
possible for some personnel to benefit from different random orderings. Consequently, 
128 personnel who were assigned at Scenario 1 achieved a better outcome at Scenario 2, 
but 333 personnel who were assigned at Scenario 1 achieved a worse outcome at 
Scenario 2 (this includes the 40 personnel who were matched at Scenario 1 but are not 
matched at Scenario 2). 1,140 personnel remained assigned to their same preference rank. 
These results show that when personnel preference lists are increased, random tie 
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breaking allows some personnel to achieve better assignments, but the majority will 
receive a worse assignment. The fact that more receive a worse outcome than a better 
outcome is reflective of the strict preference situation where all personnel would receive 
an outcome that is the same or worse. 










40 196 41 56 1,140 31 28 69 
Table 43 Effect of Increasing Lpers  on Personnel Assigned at Scenario 1 
There were 1,604 personnel assigned in Scenario 1 and 1,716 in Scenario 2, and 
40 individual personnel who were assigned in Scenario 1 but were not assigned in 
Scenario 2. Consequently, 152 personnel who were assigned in Scenario 2 were not 
assigned in Scenario 1. Table 44 shows the assignment preference ranks for these 152 
personnel in Scenario 2, demonstrating that the majority of newly assigned personnel 
were at relatively high (less desirable) preference ranks. However, provided that these 
personnel would prefer to be assigned to one of their preferences than not assigned at all, 
this still represents an improved outcome for these 152 personnel. 
Preference Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 or lower 
No. of Personnel 11 7 2 4 9 119 
Table 44 Preference Rank of Personnel Assigned at Scenario 2 but not at Scenario 1 
Having analyzed the effect of changing preference list lengths, the next issue to 
analyze is the effect of changing position attribute weights. One way to analyze how 
changing position attribute weights affects the positions is to look at the number of unit 
and Service attributes that are satisfied as the weights for these attributes change. For 
each scenario and unit weight setting, Table 45 and Table 46 show the number of 
assignments that satisfy the indicated number of unit attributes. By reading down the 
columns, these tables show that as the unit weight is decreased, there is a consistent 
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decrease in the number of assignments where all three unit attributes are satisfied, and an 
increase in the number of assignments where only one or two unit attributes are satisfied.  
 
 Number of Unit Attributes Satisfied 
Scenario Unit Weight 0 1 2 3 
1 0.75 0 2 167 1,435 
3 0.60 0 1 203 1,417 
5 0.45 0 8 262 1,370 
7 0.30 0 13 312 1,354 
Table 45 Number of Assignments Satisfying Unit Attributes – Lpers = 10 
 Number of Unit Attributes Satisfied 
Scenario Unit Weight 0 1 2 3 
2 0.75 0 5 185 1,526 
4 0.60 0 6 214 1,507 
6 0.45 0 16 299 1,424 
8 0.30 0 25 337 1,397 
Table 46 Number of Assignments Satisfying Unit Attributes – Lpers = 20 
Table 47 and Table 48 display the related results for Service attribute weights, 
showing the number of assignments that satisfy the indicated number of Service 
attributes. As the weight on the Service attributes is increased (again reading down the 
columns), the number of assignments where zero or one attributes are satisfied decreases, 
while the number of assignments where two or three attributes are satisfied increases. 
 Number of Service Attributes Satisfied 
Scenario Service Weight 0 1 2 3 
1 0.25 82 433 789 300 
3 0.40 68 412 831 310 
5 0.55 45 400 851 344 
7 0.70 34 336 922 387 
Table 47 Number of Assignments Satisfying Service Attributes – Lpers = 10 
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 Number of Service Attributes Satisfied 
Scenario Service Weight 0 1 2 3 
2 0.25 100 475 804 337 
4 0.40 61 455 861 350 
6 0.55 45 417 904 373 
8 0.70 36 327 975 421 
Table 48 Number of Assignments Satisfying Service Attributes – Lpers = 20 
As identified in Table 45 to Table 48, there is a general bias towards unit 
attributes rather than Service attributes; compared to the small number of assignments 
where only one unit attribute is satisfied, a higher percentage of assignments satisfy zero 
or one Service attributes. There are two reasons for this. First, a veto rule was included 
such that personnel could not be assigned to positions if they do not satisfy the branch 
attribute. Therefore, at least one unit attribute must be satisfied in all assignments. 
Second, the rank attribute is the first attribute for all personnel; that is, while there is a 
semi-random ordering of the attributes that motivate the personnel in their preferences, 
rank is identified as every person’s first attribute, and therefore has the highest weight. As 
a result, the rank of personnel and positions will be matched at the majority of 
assignments because there is a strong alignment in the preferences of personnel and 
positions with respect to this attribute. This reveals an important finding; if there is strong 
alignment between the preferences of the personnel and positions with respect to an 
attribute, even if the weight of that attribute is decreased, a high percentage of 
assignments will continue to satisfy the attribute.  
Figure 64 and Figure 65 further demonstrate the consistently high percentage of 
assignments where rank is matched, showing that there is only minimal responsiveness to 
the rank attribute weight; the percentage of assignments that satisfy the rank attribute 
varies between 96% and 99% in the different scenarios. A relatively high percentage of 
assignments (82% to 90%) satisfy the skill attribute, but that attribute is more responsive 
to the changing weight. The high percentage of assignments where skill is matched is 
partly reflective of the experimental design; 15% of positions are not specific to a 
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particular skill, and in these cases, if a person meets the branch requirement (which the 
veto rule makes necessary), then a skill match is also recorded. Therefore, a skill match is 
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Figure 64. Percentage of Assignments that Satisfy each Positions’ Attribute – 
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Figure 65. Percentage of Assignments that Satisfy each Positions’ Attribute – 
Scenarios 2, 4, 6 and 8  
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As described, the high percentage of assignments where rank is matched is the 
result of the correlation in the personnel and positions’ preferences. In contrast, the lower 
percentage of assignments where locations match (that is, where no geographic move is 
required) is the result of lower correlation between the personnel and positions’ 
preferences. Location is the one attribute where the model of homophilous attraction is 
not used; personnel seek locations based on the desirability of locations as determined 
from the Electronic Preference and Restrictions form. These results demonstrate that 
where the preferences of personnel and positions are not correlated with respect to an 
attribute, a lower percentage of assignments are likely to satisfy that attribute. However, 
the results also demonstrate that this attribute is the most responsive to changes in the 
attribute weights. The percentage of assignments where geographic stability is achieved 
is 33% in Scenario 1 and 36% in Scenario 2, the two scenarios where location has a 
weight of 0.1. However, the geographic stability increases to 44% and 48% for Scenarios 
7 and 8, where the location weight is 0.3. None of the other attributes exhibit such 
responsiveness to the attribute weight. 
A final way of analyzing the assignment results is to look at the total number of 
attributes that were satisfied at each scenario. Table 49 identifies the numbers of 
assignments (and percentage in parentheses) that satisfy the indicated number of position 
attributes. Across all scenarios, at least 90% of assignments satisfied four or more of the 































































































1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
Assignments 
1,604 1,716 1,621 1,727 1,640 1,739 1,679 1,759 
Table 49 Number of Assignments that Satisfy Specified Number of Position Attributes 
The results that have been presented here demonstrate that position preferences 
can be constructed with multi-attribute utility functions, and that assignments are 
responsive to the attribute weights. The strength of correlation between the personnel and 
positions’ preferences influences the responsiveness of assignments to attribute weights 
and the percentage of assignments where attributes are matched. In situations where 
preference lists are strict, increasing the personnel preference list length cannot improve 
the outcomes of the personnel or worsen the outcomes of the positions. However, where 
preference list indifference exists and ties are randomly broken, although increasing the 
personnel preference list length will worsen the outcomes for most personnel, some 
personnel can benefit due to the random tie breaking.  
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C. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Two Assignment Rounds 
The scenario results show that, depending on the position utility weights used, 
between 90% and 98% of personnel could be assigned using the two-sided matching 
algorithm, noting that in these scenarios there are more positions available for assignment 
than there are personnel (1,790 personnel and 1,997 positions). Results from the last 
chapter show that the percentage of personnel assigned would decrease if some individual 
personnel choose to submit preference lists that are shorter than the 10 or 20 used in these 
scenarios. The personnel who are not assigned at the end of the two-sided match could 
either pass into a second round match using new preferences based on the remaining 
personnel and positions, or a manual assignment process could be undertaken.  
Two alternative approaches are discussed here to indicate other possible means 
for implementation, with each approach based on two assignment rounds. One approach 
would include only high performance positions (say, the top two quartiles) in the first 
round of assignments, with the second round including the lower performance positions 
and all personnel and positions that remain unmatched from the first round; the rational 
for such an approach is that the high performance positions are probably the most 
important and therefore the decision maker would wish to maximize the number of these 
positions that are filled. Another approach, similar to the first, would include only the 
high quality personnel in the first round of assignments; the rationale for this approach is 
that high quality personnel are the most important to the organization and the most 
important to retain, and therefore it is best to maximize the number of high performance 
personnel who receive a first round assignment.  
Analyzing the results from Scenario 2 shows that 873 personnel from the top two 
performance quartiles were assigned, representing 96% of the 910 personnel in the top 
two quartiles (it might have been assumed that the number of personnel in the top two 
quartiles would be 895, half of the 1,790 personnel who require assignment. However, 
the allocation of personnel and positions to the performance quartiles occurred prior to 
randomly reducing the population to the one third who require assignment, and therefore 
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the number of personnel and positions in the top two quartiles is 910, not 895). Further, 
886 positions from the top two quartiles were assigned, representing 87% of the 1,024 
positions in the top two quartiles.  
The data from Scenario 2 is used to demonstrate how a two round process may 
work (Scenario 2 was arbitrarily chosen for comparison). The first round involves all 
1,790 personnel and the 1,024 positions from the top two performance quartiles. The 
personnel and positions’ preferences were determined using the same utility functions 
and weights as previously used in Scenario 2, but excluding positions from the bottom 
two performance quartiles in the first round. A first round assignment was created based 
on these preferences, and this resulted in all 1,024 positions being assigned. The 766 
remaining personnel (the balance of the 1,790) progressed to the second assignment 
round with the remaining 973 positions (the bottom two performance quartile positions).  
Preference utility functions were recalculated based on the personnel and positions that 
were participating in the second round of assignments. The second round of assignments 
resulted in a further 737 assignments.  
A total of 1,761 assignments were achieved in the two assignment rounds, 
representing 98% of the 1,790 personnel requiring assignment. All positions from the top 
two performance quartiles were assigned in the two round processes, which compares to 
87% that were assigned in Scenario 2. A fair comparison cannot be made of the personnel 
preference outcomes for the two processes because preferences were recalculated in the 
two-round process. However, it is possible to make a comparison of the two processes in 
terms of position outcomes because the position requirements remain constant. Figure 66 
shows the percentage of positions’ attributes that were matched in the two-round process 
and compares this against Scenario 2.  
























Figure 66. Percentage of Assignments that Satisfy each Positions’ Attributes - 
Comparison of Scenario 2 and the Two-round Process 
Figure 66 shows that the two-round process resulted in a lower percentage of 
assignments matching the performance attribute of personnel and positions. This is the 
result of the two round process, which segmented the assignment rounds by position 
performance quartiles, with only high performance positions available in the first round 
and only low performance positions available in the second round. At each of these 
rounds, the positions’ performance weight was 0.05—the lowest of the six attributes. Due 
to the segmentation, there was an even spread of high and low quality personnel assigned 
to the high performance positions in the first round, and similarly an even spread of high 
and low quality personnel assigned to the low performance positions in the second round.  
Simultaneously segmenting the personnel and positions by performance quartiles 
could be used in a two-round process to maximize the percentage of high performance 
personnel assigned to high performance positions in the first round. The second round 
would then include all remaining personnel and positions. However, any such 
manipulations would reduce the quality of assignments with respect to the other 
attributes. 
The goal here was to demonstrate that more high performance positions could be 
assigned if a two round process is used, and the results have shown this; in Scenario 2 
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only 87% of the 1,024 high performance positions were assigned, and 100% of these 
positions were assigned in the two-round process. Depending on the situation, a decision 
maker may decide to segment positions and / or personnel in a two round process. 
Segmentation on different attributes would be possible. 
While the results of each individual assignment round in a two round process 
would be stable in their own right, the overall assignments from a two round assignment 
process that excludes certain personnel or positions from the first round will not produce 
an overall stable result. That is, it could be possible to find situations where a person and 
position are assigned in the first round, but each would prefer to be assigned to another 
partner who is only available in the second round. This also leads to the possibility that 
participants might seek to manipulate their preferences in a two round process; for 
example, the preference list lengths that personnel submit in the first round may be 
shorter or longer depending on how they consider the prospects of being assigned to a 
position in the second round. The type of segmentation and the positions that are offered 
in each round might influence the number of preferences that personnel identify. 
Depending on the nature of the hierarchy, and the degree of subordination that exists, the 
extension or shortening of first round personnel preference lists may or may not be a 
problem. A decision maker would need to carefully weigh the advantages of a two round 
process against the potential disadvantages. Participant experiments would be useful to 
examine whether personnel would change their preferences if they know that the process 
is segmented into two rounds 
2. Limiting Position Preference Lists Based on Utility 
All scenarios conducted so far in this chapter involve position preference list 
lengths set at 50. However, a preference list of 50 may include personnel who satisfy 
only one or two attributes for some positions, and may therefore be poorly suited to the 
positions. Table 50 shows that 14 of the assigned positions only satisfied two of the six 
position attributes in Scenario 2, and 145 assigned positions satisfied three attributes. 
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Number of Attributes Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of Assignments 0 14 145 520 718 319 
Table 50 Number of Assignments Satisfying Indicated Number of Attributes – Scenario 2 
An option for increasing the quality of the positions’ assignments, measured in 
this case by the number of position attributes satisfied at each assignment, is to limit 
preference list lengths based on the utility value rather than an arbitrary preference list 
length. For some positions this may result in a preference list length that is longer than 
50, while for others this may result in a shorter preference list length. 
A new scenario was created based on the same position attribute weights and the 
personnel preference list length from Scenario 2; for this new scenario, position 
preference list lengths were no longer limited to 50 preferences, but were restricted so 
that only personnel who provided a utility of greater than 0.7 were included in positions’ 
preference lists. Personnel preference lists were then created, but still limited to 20 
preferences. Assignments were then determined based on these updated preferences. 
There were 1,716 assignments achieved in the original Scenario 2, however, 
limiting positions preferences in the manner described here reduced the number of 
assignments to 1,625. Although the number of assignments decreased, Table 51 shows 
that the positions’ assignment quality improved; no assignments satisfied fewer than 
three attributes, and the number of assignments where three attributes were satisfied 
decreased from 145 to 110. The number of assignments where all six attributes were 
satisfied increased.  
 
Number of Attributes Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of Assignments 0 0 110 491 688 336 
Table 51 Number of Assignments Satisfying Indicated Number of Attributes – Modified 
Scenario 2  
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The results here demonstrate that decision makers may wish to consider limiting 
positions’ preferences based on the utility that personnel provide to the positions, rather 
than a fixed preference list length. There will inevitably be a tradeoff between the quality 
and number of assignments. 
3. Other Considerations 
A decision support system is unlikely to be able to consider all of the complexities 
of military assignments; therefore, the assignments produced by the two-sided matching 
should be considered as a good starting point, and should provide a good solution for a 
large percentage of the personnel and positions involved. 
Decision makers in military assignment applications have the authority to assign 
personnel and positions as required. The subordination in military applications is such 
that personnel must abide by the assignments that are provided if they wish to continue to 
serve in the military; there is no opportunity to “opt out” and be assigned through 
alternate means. Therefore, the decision maker can accept the two-sided matching results 
as is, or may choose to make changes as desired. While stability in a military personnel 
assignment situation is not a requirement, it is a desirable feature.  
If a decision maker rejects an assignment that is produced by the two-sided 
matching, this might indicate that the position preference lists were incorrectly 
determined. For example, assume that there is a person, William, who is assigned to 
position 123, but the decision maker chooses to manually change the assignments so that 
James is now assigned to position 123. A couple of possibilities exist. If James prefers 
position 123 to his previous assignment, then he would have already “proposed” to 
position 123, and at some point position 123 rejected James in favor of William; this 
implies that the manual reassignment is the result of incorrect position preference lists, 
and the preferences should have been ranked so that James was ahead of William. 
Alternatively, if James does not prefer position 123 to his previous assignment, then 
changing the assignments would indicate that an unstable situation is now created. 
The assignment process used in these experiments has been the person optimal 
algorithm whereby the personnel “propose” to the positions. The advantage of the person 
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proposing algorithm is that it is a dominant strategy for personnel to submit their true 
preferences. Although it has not been explored here, the decision maker may choose to 
consider implementing the position proposing algorithm. While this would no longer 
make it a dominant strategy for personnel to submit truthful preferences, the amount of 
information that personnel would need to manipulate the preferences is high (Gale & 
Sotomayor, 1985; Roth & Rothblum, 1999). Therefore, it is unlikely that personnel 
would be able to manipulate their preferences to obtain a preferred assignment. 
Consequently, a decision maker might choose to apply and compare the results of the 
personnel and position proposing algorithms. 
D. SUMMARY 
Assignments in hierarchical organizations may require consideration of attributes 
that are of interest to the organization and its subordinate elements. Such a situation 
already exists in some school matching processes, and it is also relevant if applied to 
military organizations. This chapter has demonstrated that multi-attribute utility functions 
can usefully generate preferences in these situations. It has also demonstrated that the 
two-sided matching assignments are responsive to changing weights in the multi-attribute 
utility function. This allows a decision maker to adjust the weights so that the 
assignments provide the best possible consideration of all attributes. 
This research suggests that assignment processes in large hierarchical 
organizations, in particular militaries, could benefit from decision support. Two sided 
matching provides a sound mechanism for generating assignments and has desirable 
properties; in particular, stable outcomes and truthful revelation of preferences. The 
position preferences, as required for the two-sided matching, can be determined from a 
multi-attribute utility function that combines unit and Service attributes. A system built 
on such processes would allow a decision maker to examine a wide range of assignment 
options in a relatively short time period. The decision maker would retain the ability to 
accept or reject any assignments, and such a system would provide a range of options for 
the decision maker to consider. Further, the quality of assignments would be less variable 
and dependent on the decision maker’s skills. 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
1. Human Decision Making 
Eppler and Mengis (2004) reviewed a considerable number of studies that 
examined information overload. The existence of information overload is in little doubt; 
however, previous research has not examined information overload in an assignment 
decision-making context. Prior studies on human decision making have examined 
scenarios where the decision maker is presented with a series of choices and must select 
the choice that best satisfies certain attributes; for example, selection of the best laundry 
detergent (Jacoby et al., 1974) or the person most likely to become bankrupt (Casey, 
1980). However, this research examined assignment decision-making scenarios, where 
the decision maker must assign (match) personnel and positions based on personnel 
preferences and position attribute requirements. These scenarios may be considered to be 
more complex because each assignment made by the decision maker limits the remaining 
assignment options available. The results of these experiments provide insights into the 
ways that decision makers operate and the effect of information overload when there are 
two groups whose needs must be considered. 
This research demonstrates the difficulty that decision makers experience when 
making assignments; there is a requirement to balance the desires of two different groups, 
which in this research are the personnel and positions. The experiments conducted here 
demonstrate that most decision makers fail to achieve an appropriate balance for the two 
groups, with decision makers tending to focus on one group to the detriment of the other. 
In a military assignment context or other similar situations, there may be a tendency to 
focus on the position requirements to the detriment of the personnel; this could have 
follow-on consequences for retention if personnel satisfaction decreases.   
There is evidence from the results that decision makers focused on the position 
requirements to the detriment of personnel preferences. Evidence of this is that the 
decision makers achieved an average of 93% of the optimal position solution, yet only 
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70% of the optimal personnel solution. Further, while high-performing decision makers 
produced assignments that appropriately balanced the personnel and positions’ 
preferences, the lower performing decision makers produced results where the 
assignment quality (measured as a percentage of the optimal solution) was far lower for 
the personnel than the positions; this indicated that decreases in quality were more likely 
to be experienced by the personnel than the positions. Finally, the variability in personnel 
points was greater than the variability in position points, indicating that the decision 
makers focused on position requirements more than the personnel. 
The decision makers were from a relatively homogenous background: they were 
all military officers, indicating that they have all met the aptitude test requirements for 
entry into the military; they had all completed a Bachelors level degree and were 
undertaking master’s-level coursework. Despite this level of decision maker 
homogeneity, the results show considerable variability, even for the scenarios that had the 
least number of attributes and fewest assignments to make. Decision makers from a less 
homogenous background are likely to exhibit greater variability.  
Some decision makers developed a simple heuristic whereby they assigned agents 
sequentially as presented in the experiments, rather than considering all holistically. This 
heuristic leads to a sub-optimal solution because the decision maker only considers a sub-
set of the agents, and therefore does not consider alternative assignment options that 
might improve the overall outcome. These results indicate that, in the absence of decision 
support, assignment quality for some agents may be influenced by how their information 
is presented to the decision maker. Decision makers need to be aware of this limitation 
and ensure that the processes they use provide the best opportunity for achieving high 
quality assignments. 
This research indicates that decision makers in assignment situations are likely to 
over-estimate their abilities. Based on the decision makers’ self-assessments, most 
believe that their performance relative to their peers is better than it actually is. Arnhart 
(2007) identified the difficulty that can be expected in getting career managers to accept 
decision support systems, a situation that may partly be the result of decision makers’ 
over-confidence. The results of these experiments help highlight to decision makers the 
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difficulty of making assignments without decision support, and that although they may 
feel confident in their own abilities, a decision support system would improve 
consistency, consider a broader range of factors, and better balance personnel and 
position needs. 
2. The Effects of Indifference on Two Sided Matching Assignments 
When two-sided matching preferences are strict, the set of agents who are 
unmatched is the same at every stable matching (Roth & Sotomayor, 1990). However, 
when preferences are not strict, it is possible for an agent to be assigned at one stable 
outcome and unassigned at another. Therefore, on the basis that agents only list 
preferences that are considered acceptable and would prefer to be assigned to one of their 
preferences than remain unassigned, not all agents will agree on which tie breaking 
produces the best result.  While Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide the theoretical basis 
for the effect of tied preferences, no empirical results are available to demonstrate how 
assignment outcomes vary with preference list indifference. This research examined how 
the number and quality of assignments varies as the conditions vary.  
Some two-sided matching applications, such as the NRMP, rely upon voluntary 
participation, and in such applications it is important that preferences are strict so that the 
assignments are determined directly by the preferences; that is, there is a single 
assignment set and the administrator has no influence on the assignments. However, as 
identified in this research, there are some applications, such as assigning students to 
schools and military personnel to positions, where participation is not voluntary and 
subordination exists. Preference list indifference could be permitted in such applications 
because different assignment outcomes will not lead to decreased participation. This 
research demonstrates that allowing participants to express indifference is advantageous 
because it provides the central authority with options and allows them to select the tie 
breaking that produces the best assignments from a holistic perspective. When preference 
list indifference exists and ties are randomly broken, the two-sided matching results 
remain weakly stable, meaning that there is no couple who each strictly prefer the other 
to their assigned partner. 
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Computational experiments were used to assign agents using the instability chain 
algorithm (Roth & Vande Vate, 1990). Agents were randomly created according to 
defined parameters: the number of agents (n), the maximum preference list length (L), the 
preference correlation (C), and the degree of indifference in the agents’ preferences 
(DOI). The experiments were designed to analyze how different tie breakings influence 
assignments. 
The experiments involved a variety of scenarios, with each scenario defined by a 
setting of the parameters n, L, C and DOI. Multiple trials were conducted for each 
scenario; the tied preferences were randomly reordered in each trial and assignments 
were produced. Two variables of interest were recorded; the number of agents assigned 
and the assignment quality (measured by the preference rank of assigned agents).  
The number of agents who are assigned from a scenario depends on how 
preference list ties are broken; different tie breakings result in different numbers of agents 
being assigned. Consequently, there is a range in the number of assigned agents, where 
the range is the difference between the highest and lowest number of assignments 
achieved from the many trials. There is a low probability that the number of assignments 
at any single trial will be at the lower or upper end of this range, with most trials 
producing a number of assignments near the midpoint of this range. As the number of 
agents and the number of trials increases, the frequency distribution of the number of 
assigned agents resembles a binomial distribution. 
When analyzing the assignment quality and the number of assigned agents that 
result from different tie breakings, some assignment sets dominate others. The dominant 
assignments are those where it is not possible to increase the number of assigned agents 
without a decrease in assignment quality, and it is not possible to increase assignment 
quality without a decrease in the number of assigned agents. A possibility frontier can be 
created to show the dominant outcomes from which a decision maker could select. 
The effect of the number of agents and the degree of indifference was examined 
through a series of scenarios. As the number of agents in an assignment context increases,  
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the range in the number of assignments increases. However, when expressed as a 
percentage of the number of agents, the range in the number of assignments decreases as 
the size of the assignment problem increases.  
Increasing the degree of indifference increases the range in the number of 
assignments, and this occurs regardless of the number of agents in the scenario, the 
preference list length or the preference correlation. Further, as the degree of indifference 
increases, the average preference rank of assigned agents decreases. This is the result of 
agents ranking more preferences indifferently; for example, a person with strict 
preferences might be assigned to their fourth preference, whereas an agent who is 
indifferent between their fourth, fifth and sixth preferences could be assigned to any of 
these and still be considered to have been assigned to their fourth preference.  
If an assignment decision support system is to be implemented, it is necessary to 
consider the preference list length that participants should be allowed to express. A series 
of scenarios were used to analyze how preference list length affects the number of 
assignments and the assignment quality. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) identify that 
increasing preference list lengths will lead to more assignments. While increasing 
preference list length will increase the number of agents assigned, the results obtained 
here show that decreasing returns are experienced; for example, the increase in the 
number of assigned agents as the preference list length increases from 10 to 15 is less 
than the increase in the number of assigned agents when the preference list length 
increases from 5 to 10. 
The preference correlation defines how similar the personnel and position agents’ 
quality scores need to be in order for them to rank one another. When preferences are 
highly correlated, agents from one group will only rank agents from the other group if 
they are quite similar in quality scores. There is a relationship between the preference 
correlation parameter and the number of preferences that an agent identifies; as 
preferences become less correlated more agents are considered acceptable because they 
are within the broader quality range identified by the preference correlation parameter. 
As preferences become less correlated, the number of assignments increases. The effect is 
similar to that identified from an increasing preference list length. 
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Agent quality scores were randomly allocated, and therefore the number of 
position (or personnel) agents that fall within each person’s (or position’s) preference 
correlation range varies. Consequently, agents’ preference lists will be of varying lengths 
when preferences are limited by the preference correlation parameter C, provided that the 
parameter L is sufficiently long to not otherwise limit the preferences. Using preferences 
based on the preference correlation parameter C, it was possible to analyze the 
relationship between the number of preferences that an agent identifies and the 
probability of being assigned. The results confirm that agents with longer preference lists 
have a higher probability of being assigned. These results align with the NRMP and has 
demonstrated that matched applicants and residency programs have longer preference 
lists than unmatched applicants and programs. Further, the NRMP advises applicants and 
programs to include all acceptable choices in their preferences because it increases the 
probability of being matched without affecting the chances of being matched to a higher 
ranked preference. 
This research has demonstrated how preference list indifference will affect two-
sided matching results. It is likely that there will be considerable preference list 
indifference for agents in large hierarchical organizations where limited attributes are 
available to differentiate agents, and where a limited number of discrete values are used 
to measure these attributes.  These characteristics typify assignment applications for 
school students and military personnel. If preference list ties are allowed in such 
applications, decision makers could examine the dominant outcomes to select the 
assignment set that best achieves the decision makers’ priorities.  
3. Using Two Sided Matching With Preferences Determined from a 
Multi-Attribute Utility Function 
The assignment of students to high schools is an example of two-sided matching 
in a hierarchical organization. The hierarchical nature and subordination is demonstrated 
in the New York City high school match by the Department of Education imposing 
constraints on the schools’ preferences; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) identify that the 
New York City Department of Education requires schools to accept a distribution of  
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students based on standardized English test scores. In addition, schools have different 
attributes that they use to construct their preference lists, such as GPA, attendance and 
disciplinary records. 
Two sided matching requires rank ordered preferences, and this research has 
demonstrated that multi attribute utility functions can be used to generate these 
preferences in hierarchical organizations. Such a process is suited to military personnel 
assignment processes where each position’s preferences need to incorporate the 
requirements of the Service and the subordinate units.  
Computational experiments were used to demonstrate how the two-sided 
matching results are affected by settings such as personnel preference list length and the 
position multi attribute utility functions. The context for these experiments was assigning 
military personnel to positions, using Australian Army data. Actual data was used 
wherever possible, but it was necessary to use simulated data in some cases where actual 
data was not available. 
The position and personnel preferences were constructed using multi attribute 
utility functions. Although participating personnel would be responsible for determining 
their preferences in an actual application, actual personnel preference data was not 
available and so the personnel preferences were also determined using multi attribute 
utility functions. The preferences revealed a high degree of indifference; 0.75 for 
positions and 0.35 for personnel. The degree of indifference in position preference lists is 
related to the number of attributes used to identify the position requirements, the scale of 
the attributes, and the weights applied to those attributes. For example, as the number of 
attributes increases it is possible to achieve greater differentiation that will decrease the 
degree of indifference. Without actual personnel preference data it is unclear what degree 
of indifference would exist in the personnel preference lists.  
As with the experiments that investigated preference list indifference, multiple 
trials were conducted on each scenario in these military personnel assignment 
experiments. The results of the military personnel assignment experiments showed that 
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the number of personnel assigned and the quality of assignments were distributed in a 
similar manner to the results of the preference list indifference experiments.  
The experiments examined how assignments would vary if the length of 
personnel preference lists varied while holding position preference list length constant. If 
preferences were strict, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) identify that increasing the personnel 
preference list length could not harm the positions and could not benefit the personnel. 
However, preference list indifference exists in these experiments, and the theory for strict 
preferences does not hold. Due to the different results possible from different tie 
breakings, some personnel were observed to achieve improved assignments when 
personnel preference list lengths were extended, although a larger number of personnel 
were observed to have worse assignments in scenarios with longer personnel preference 
list lengths. The increased preference list lengths led to more personnel being assigned.  
The experiments demonstrated that the assignments produced by two-sided 
matching are responsive to the multi attribute function weights. That is, as the relative 
weight of an attribute is increased, there is an increase in the percentage of assigned 
positions that have that attribute matched. As attribute weights are changed, the 
responsiveness of assignments can be measured by analyzing the change in the 
percentage of assigned positions the attribute satisfied. The responsiveness of 
assignments to changes in an attribute’s weight was found to be related to the preference 
correlation between the personnel and positions with respect to that attribute.  
Personnel and position preferences are highly correlated with respect to an 
attribute if the attribute is considered to be important to both the personnel and positions, 
and both groups agree on the desired attribute values. In these experiments, the rank 
attribute was highly correlated because both personnel and positions structure their 
preferences based on the rank attribute (for personnel it was the first consideration), and 
the personnel and positions agree on the attribute values (SGT positions primarily seek 
SGT personnel, and SGT personnel primarily seek SGT positions). In these experiments, 
a low correlation existed in the location preferences because there was a lack of 
alignment in what each group sought; for example, a position in Sydney would seek  
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personnel in Sydney (because this minimizes the number of relocations), but a person in 
Sydney may seek positions in other locations, depending on the desirability of the 
locations. 
Changing the multi attribute utility function weights will lead to a change in the 
percentage of assignments where the attribute is satisfied, regardless of the strength of 
preference correlation. However, the responsiveness of assignments to an attribute’s 
weight is affected by the preference correlation with respect to that weight. Assignments 
are more responsive to changes in an attribute’s weight if the preference correlation for 
that attribute is low. 
The research examined an option for conducting two assignment rounds, a 
process that might be considered during implementation. A process that involves two 
assignment rounds would increase the overall percentage of participants assigned. 
Further, if a position or personnel target demographic is identified, it is possible to 
increase the percentage of agents in that target demographic that are assigned. For 
example, the target demographic could be high quality personnel, and if the personnel are 
segmented so that only high quality personnel are included in the first round (all positions 
remain available), this process would maximize the percentage of high quality personnel 
who are assigned. Segmenting the process so that some personnel are excluded in the first 
round would not change the personnel’s dominant preference strategy; all positions 
would remain available and so the personnel who participate in the first round would still 
submit their true preferences. Alternatively, the assignment process could be segmented 
so that some position agents are excluded from the first round; however, doing so could 
change the personnel’s dominant preference strategy, because some personnel might 
prefer a position that is not available until the second round, and they may therefore 
choose to limit or manipulate their first round preferences.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The results of the decision-making experiments indicate that some subjects 
developed a heuristic that led to sub-optimal results; analyzing the results identified that 
for some subjects the agents’ assignment quality was related to the agents’ placement in 
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the experiment worksheets. Agents who were presented to the left of the worksheet were 
more likely to receive better quality assignments than those presented on the right of the 
worksheet. If true, this indicates that the order in which information is presented to a 
decision maker can influence the results. 
The decision-making experiments were not designed to test the heuristics that 
decision makers use to make their assignments. Therefore, further research would be 
required to test the hypothesis that the ordering of information influences the assignment 
results. This could be achieved through a minor modification to the experiment design. 
The same personnel and position details would be used, but the order in which the 
personnel and position details appears would be reversed. Ideally the experiments would 
be repeated with two groups of subjects; the first group would receive the experiment 
worksheets in the original order and the second group would receive the worksheets with 
the reverse order. Subjects would be randomly allocated to each group and would do the 
experiments concurrently. 
There is little evidence to suggest that decision makers in military personnel 
assignment applications are selected based on their assignment decision-making ability. 
If a simple standardized test could predict a person’s likely performance on assignment 
decision-making tasks, this would be a valuable screening tool to ensure that decision 
makers have the appropriate abilities for their task. Henry (1980) examined the effect of 
an individual’s information processing ability on their decision-making ability in the 
consumer behavior domain. A similar approach could be examined in the assignment 
decision-making context; a test of information processing ability would be developed, 
subjects would be administered the test and the assignment problems, and results of the 
two analyzed to determine the test’s predictive ability. 
The military assignments demonstrated in this research were based on actual 
personnel and position data to the maximum extent possible. However, not all desired 
data was available; in particular, no personnel preference data was available because this 
information is not captured in a consistent manner that would enable rank ordered 
preference lists to be used. Further research using actual personnel and position 
preference data is recommended. As an initial study this could involve a relatively small 
  211 
group of personnel and positions (perhaps around 200) where the assignments would be 
contained within the group; that is, personnel in the group would only be assigned to 
positions in the group, and positions in the group would only be filled by personnel in the 
group. For a small sized group, it would be possible to work with the career manager to 
capture more detailed information on preferences. The preference data would allow two-
sided matching assignments to be produced from actual preferences. Comparing the 
assignments produced by career managers against those produced by the two-sided 
matching would provide considerable information for analysis; this may provide greater 
support for implementing a decision support system and would provide further insights 
into the performance of actual decision makers in an assignment application. 
The computational experiments used the person “proposing” instability chain 
algorithm (Roth $ Vande Vate, 1990); this produces the same results as the Gale—
Shapley Deferred Acceptance algorithm when there are no partners or complexities. 
Further research on the difference in results between the person proposing and the 
position proposing algorithms would be useful. This would identify how much it is 
possible to shift between assignments that favor the personnel and assignments that favor 
the positions. If the experiments involve human decision makers in an experimental 
setting, it would also test the propensity for participants to try gaming the system. 
It is not a requirement for all medical students in the National Resident Matching 
Program to be matched, but those students who are not matched enter a period known as 
the Scramble; during the Scramble the students contact medical residency programs to 
enter into an agreement. In school assignment applications, it is necessary that all 
students are assigned; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) identify that students who are 
unmatched from the two-sided matching assignments are manually allocated to schools 
by the education department. An option for increasing the percentage of assigned 
participants is to conduct two assignment rounds. An initial round involving all personnel 
and position agents could be conducted, with the unmatched participants progressing to a 
second round, with preferences updated and resubmitted for the second round; such a 
process should not change the dominant preference strategy.  
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Alternative approaches involving the segmentation of participants in each round 
were discussed. The use of two assignment rounds could change the dominant strategy 
for personnel, particularly if the process is segmented by excluding a certain group of 
positions from the first round. If a group of positions are excluded from the first round 
(for example, only high profile positions are available for assignment in the first round), 
some participants might withhold preferences until the second round. Participant 
experiments would be useful for identifying the change in personnel behavior in a two 
round match. The participants would act as the personnel who require assignment in these 
experiments, and the experiments would examine whether the use of one or two 
assignment rounds would cause participants to vary the preference lists they submit. The 
experiments would also segment the positions to determine how personnel would behave 
in such situations. While conducting two assignment rounds could have implications for 
stability, particularly if the participants are segmented, this might be acceptable in 
hierarchical organizations where subordination is greatest.   
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research has developed and demonstrated a process that uses two-sided 
matching for assignments in hierarchical organizations. Suitable applications include 
assigning personnel to positions within militaries and assigning students to schools. In the 
military context, the personnel have preferences for the positions to which they wish to 
be assigned, and it has been demonstrated that the positions’ preference lists can be 
produced from utility functions that combine organizational and unit attributes.  
Liang and Buclatin (1988) and Klingman and Phillips (1984) identify that military 
assignment processes are large-scale complex problems; there are many personnel and 
positions to be assigned and each assignment requires considering many attributes and 
policies. Despite the scale and complexity of such problems, Gates and Nissen (2002) 
identify that many hierarchical organizations, such as militaries and government 
organizations, rely upon the cognitive process of centralized, administrative staff to 
assign personnel to positions. Eppler and Mengis (2004) reviewed research across a 
variety of disciplines and demonstrated that human decision making is poor under 
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excessive information loads, although no research specifically relating to assignment 
decision making was identified. Despite an understanding of the effect of excessive 
information loads in decision making, there is a resistance to using decision support 
systems in military assignment contexts; Arnhart (2007) identifies the difficulty that can 
be expected in gaining acceptance from career managers. 
The first part of this research utilizes participant experiments to examine decision 
making in an assignment context, showing how assignment quality varies in relation to 
the size and complexity of the assignment problems. The experiments involved human 
subjects performing the role of decision makers, with induced value theory, as outlined 
by Smith (1976), used to ensure the validity of the experiments. The experimental 
scenarios were based on assignment decision making in a hierarchical organization, and 
therefore demonstrate external validity to the career managers who must be convinced of 
the benefits of a decision-support system. 
The experiments demonstrate the need for decision support in the large-scale and 
complex process of assigning military personnel to positions. In the absence of such 
decision support, the quality of assignment decisions depends heavily on the decision 
maker’s ability; some decision makers perform well, quickly balancing the preferences of 
personnel with the position requirements; most decision makers, however, develop 
simple heuristics that lead to suboptimal outcomes. Further, decision makers are likely to 
over-estimate their abilities; for example, responses completed after the experiments 
showed that only 13% of subjects believed that they would be in the bottom 50% of 
participants, and only 3% believed that they would be in the bottom quartile. 
Having established the requirement for developing a decision support system in 
hierarchical organizations’ assignment processes, some potential assignment processes 
were reviewed. Two sided matching was selected as an appropriate mechanism for two 
key reasons. First, it is a dominant strategy for personnel to truthfully reveal their 
preferences (assuming the personnel proposing algorithm is used); this removes the 
potential for participants to game the process by manipulating their preferences. Second, 
it produces a stable match, meaning that there is no person and position who would rather 
be assigned to each other than their assigned partners. 
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Two sided matching has been used in some large assignment applications, such as 
the National Resident Matching Program and New York City high schools match. 
However, these existing applications either require participants (hospitals and medical 
students, high schools and students) to submit strictly ordered preferences, or use a single 
tie breaking rule if tied preference are allowed; for example, each participant receives a 
single random lottery number that is used to break ties in all cases.  
The second part of this research uses computational experimentation to 
demonstrate the range of outcomes that are possible when preference list ties are broken 
in different ways. This would enable a decision maker to select an outcome that delivers 
the best outcome in terms of the number of assigned participants and the quality of the 
assignments. In assignment situations, such as the National Resident Matching Program, 
where participants are voluntary and assignments are binding, it is important that the 
administrator of the assignment process act without bias and produce a single outcome, 
otherwise the process may unravel. However, decision makers in hierarchical 
organizations are not constrained in the same way because they have responsibility for 
the organization’s interests, the organizational units and participating personnel are 
subordinate, and participation is not voluntary.   
In applications, such as the New York City high schools match, schools develop 
their own preference lists of the participating students, but must do so in accordance with 
conditions imposed by the department of education. The third part of this research 
demonstrates that a multi-attribute utility function can be used to produce preferences that 
incorporate the needs of the organization and the organization’s subordinate units. The 
attribute weights can be adjusted so that the assignments achieve the appropriate balance 
between the attributes. 
The processes outlined in this research will improve the consistency of 
assignments and enable a variety of options to be produced in a short time frame. By 
changing the utility function weights, the decision maker can compare a variety of 
assignments that meet different objectives. These will provide the decision maker with a 
good starting point for consideration.  
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Respondents to the Australian Defence Organization’s annual Defence Attitude 
Survey indicate that more needs to be done with respect to personnel assignment 
processes; 70% of Army personnel agreed that “Individual posting preferences need to 
have more influence,” while 50% agreed that “My views are considered when postings 
are planned.”2 The decision-making experiments demonstrated that most subjects could 
have assigned more personnel to positions that they preferred without overall detriment to 
the positions. If a decision support system of the type that is outlined in this research is 
implemented, this could improve the satisfaction of the personnel being assigned and in 
turn lead to improved retention rates. If this is achieved, then the effort will have been 
worth it. 
                                                 
2 Australian Defence Organization, 2009 Defence Attitude Survey. 
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APPENDIX A 
A. ASSIGNMENT EXPERIMENT—INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment that examines decision-making performance. You will have 
the opportunity to earn monetary prizes in these experiments. How well you perform 
increases your chances of earning these prizes. Your decisions will be made individually 
and do not require interaction with others. 
I will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will 
be given a complete description of the experiment. If you have any questions during the 
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can 
hear. If you have problems during the experiment, raise your hand and someone will 
come and assist you.  
Please turn to the pages with 1a and 1b marked on the top right corner, and place 
these pages side by side on your desk. These pages are an example of the information you 
will soon receive for the experimental work, and they contain information regarding four 
positions and three personnel who require assigning. Your job is to assign the personnel 
so that each person is assigned to one and only one position. Each position may be 
assigned only one person. All personnel must be assigned, and consequently one position 
will be left vacant.  
Please focus now on page 1a.—this page has all the data pertaining to the 
personnel. Look first at the top table on the page. Across the top of the table you will see 
that there are three personnel indicated by the identifiers 101, 102 and 103, with data 
pertaining to each person in the column below them. On the left hand side of the table 
you will see there are five characteristics indicated, and each person is measured 
according to these five characteristics. Therefore, Person 101 has a Rank of O-3, belongs 
to the Armor Branch, has attained primary and secondary skills of D and T respectively, 
and is currently located in the West. The skill names, for example D and T, are arbitrary, 
and the letters have no meaning other than indicating distinguishable types of skills. 
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In the next table down on the same page, you will see the same three personnel 
listed. This table indicates the positions that each person would like to be assigned to. 
Person 101’s first preference is to be assigned to position number 3, has a second 
preference to be assigned to position number 1 and has a third preference to be assigned 
to position number 4.  
The last table on this page is where you will record the assignments that you 
make. During the actual experiments you will be required to write in the position number 
that each person is to be assigned to. 
Now look at page 1b. Looking across the top of the table, you will see that there 
are four positions indicated, with data pertaining to each position in the column below it. 
This table is used to indicate what type of person each position seeks. On the left hand 
side of the page you will see there are five criteria used to indicate the ideal type of 
person for a position. In the actual experiments, you will sometimes have five criteria to 
consider, and sometimes have three criteria. Weights are used to indicate the relative 
importance of each of the criteria. A higher weight indicates that a criterion is more 
important.  
Each position criterion is measured by four different types. For example, Rank 
can take the values of O-2, O-3, O-4 and O-5. At the intersection of a row criterion type 
and a column position number, a value is provided to indicate the utility that the position 
attains from that criterion value. For example, where the row for Rank O-3 intersects with 
the column for Position 1, a value of 1.0 is recorded. A value of 1.0 is the highest that can 
be recorded for any of the criterion values; therefore this indicates that with respect to 
rank, Position 1 ideally seeks a person who has the rank O-3. For the same position, the 
value of 0.5 in the row for Rank O-2 indicates that the position is less willing to accept a 
person of rank O-2, however prefers such a person to say an O-5 for which no utility 
value is recorded.  
Each of the four other criteria works the same; a value indicates the extent to 
which the position seeks a person of the specified type. Ideally, Position 1 would seek to 
be assigned with a person that has the following characteristics; Rank of O-3, Branch of 
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Armor, Primary Skill of type C, Secondary Skill of type S and someone who is located in 
the North area. However, tradeoffs may be necessary because there may be no person 
with such characteristics, or other positions may compete for the same criteria values. 
The overall measure of how well a person suits a position is obtained by multiplying each 
criterion value by the criterion weight, and then summing these values. For example, if 
Person 101 was to be assigned to position 1, then the overall measure would be the sum 
of the Rank value (0.267 x 1.0), the Branch value (0.267 x 1.0), the Primary Skill value 
(0.267 x 0), the Secondary Skill value (0.1 x 0) and the Location value (0.1 x 0), giving a 
total utility of 0.53. You may find that assigning a different person to position 1 would 
give a higher utility value, indicating that this other person is better suited to position 1. 
However some tradeoffs will be necessary. 
You will be presented with six different assignment markets similar to the 
example you have in front of you. Some of the assignment markets will have more 
personnel and positions than others. In each case, there will be more positions available 
than there are personnel to assign. Remember to assign every person – and that some 
positions will remain vacant. Your goal is to seek the best overall assignment outcome 
that you can achieve. This will be measured in two parts: The first part is how well 
positions get the type of person that they seek; and the second part is how well the 
personnel get their preferred positions. 
You will receive points for each of the six markets. How many points you receive 
depends on the quality of the assignments you make. Once all the results have been 
collected, the total number of points earned by all participants will be determined. You 
will own a share of the total points based upon your performance. The better you do, the 
more points you own and the higher share you have. Everyone’s points will be converted 
to virtual raffles tickets. A raffle draw will be undertaken in class next week, with first to 
fourth prizes being $40, $30, $20 and $10. Your chances of winning these prizes are 
determined by your performance and how many virtual raffle tickets you earn. Let me 
describe how you earn points. 
Your points will be determined in two parts. I will use an example to demonstrate 
how you will earn your points. Please turn over both of your example papers so that sides 
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2a and 2b are showing. This is the same data you have already seen with a sample 
assignment set given. You will see on page 2a that person 101 has been assigned to 
position 1, person 102 to position 4 and so on. On page 2b, the characteristics of the 
personnel who are assigned to each position are circled in the columns under the position 
identifiers. This is to make it easy to identify the utility scores that are provided at the 
bottom of each column. You will see from the scores below the columns that position 2 
gets a higher utility from the assignment than the other positions. The average of the 
utility scores for the three matched positions is 0.653. The first part of your points for this 
exercise would be 200 multiplied by this average utility, giving a total of 130.6 points 
earned. In each exercise, you will earn 200 points multiplied by the average utility that 
the positions receive. In addition, for each exercise you will also earn 100 points 
multiplied by the inverse of the average rank of the matched personnel. On page 2a, you 
will see that the average rank for the personnel is 1.67, and the inverse of this is 
multiplied by 100 to give 59.88 points. The inverse is used because it is preferable to get 
a lower average rank for the personnel. The total points earned for this exercise would be 
190.48 
You will note that not every person ranks every position as a preference. If you 
assign a person to a position that the person does not rank, the rank value to be used for 
calculation of your points corresponds to the number of positions in the experiment—so 
four in this example.  
In the six experiments, you will have different numbers of personnel and positions 
to assign. Each of the six experiments will be strictly timed and you will be advised how 
long you have before commencing each experiment. You will be given warnings 60 
seconds and 30 seconds before your time for each experiment is finished. You need to 
make sure each person is assigned before the time runs out. You may not look at or 
proceed to the next experiment until you have been told to do so. The total time for the 
experiments will be approximately 45 minutes.  
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Once the experiments have been completed, the papers will be collected. During 
the next week, I will analyze the results and determine your points. The raffle for the 
prizes will be conducted in class next week and at that time I will provide some 
preliminary indications of the overall results.  
Are there any questions? 
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APPENDIX B. 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS FOR SIMULATION 
Personnel by Rank, Branch and Skill: 
    Rank   
Branch Skill E06 E08 E09 Total 
101   144 132 33 309 
201 98 106 1 205 
215 19 8 1 28 
221 19 10 1 30 
222     24 24 
256 7 6 4 17 
272 1 2 2 5 
102   206 143 69 418 
203 74 54 24 152 
206 80 48 25 153 
211 36 31 13 80 
222     3 3 
237 3 2   5 
253 5 2 2 9 
257 2     2 
259 6 6 2 14 
103   102 88 36 226 
207 30     30 
217 17     17 
218 14 10   24 
222     1 1 
228 4 45   49 
233 10 9   19 
234 11     11 
238 5 3 1 9 
246 3     3 
251     26 26 
258 3 19   22 
263 1     1 
266 2 1   3 
269 2 1   3 
271     7 7 
280     1 1 
104   62 41 17 120 
202 38 27 3 68 
222     6 6 
231 5 2 1 8 
232 8 6 4 18 
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235 7 3 2 12 
240 4 3 1 8 
105   56 38 17 111 
204 18 15 1 34 
222     7 7 
230 5 3   8 
236 8 4 2 14 
239 4 2 1 7 
243 11 7 1 19 
260 2 1   3 
270 5 3   8 
273 3 2   5 
277     1 1 
278     4 4 
281   1   1 
106   60 40 17 117 
208 26 22 4 52 
213 17 10 5 32 
216 8 4 2 14 
222     4 4 
226 8 4 2 14 
257 1     1 
107   41 30 6 77 
205 28 22   50 
220 12 8   20 
222     6 6 
280 1     1 
108   47 37 12 96 
212 11     11 
222     11 11 
223 9 5   14 
245 6 27 1 34 
247 4     4 
250 6     6 
252 5     5 
254 2     2 
268 4 5   9 
109   55 26 9 90 
209 31 18 2 51 
222     4 4 
229 18 7 2 27 
257 1     1 
264 2   1 3 
274 2     2 
276 1 1   2 
110   30 17 5 52 
214 24 14 4 42 
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249 6 3 1 10 
111   17 12 4 33 
222     2 2 
242 9 5 1 15 
244 3 2 1 6 
248 5 5   10 
112   21 16 3 40 
219 21 16 2 39 
222     1 1 
113   22 14 5 41 
222     2 2 
224 14 9 1 24 
262 8 5 2 15 
114   16 8 3 27 
225 16 8 3 27 
115   10 6 2 18 
227 10 6 2 18 
116   4 1 1 6 
222     1 1 
255 3 1   4 
279 1     1 
117   4 3 2 9 
261 4 3 2 9 
Total   897 652 241 1790 
 
Positions by Rank, Branch and Skill: 
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217 21     21 
218 17 11   28 
228   46   46 
233 12 8   20 
234 13     13 
238 4 2 1 7 
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280 4 2 1 7 
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204 16 12   28 
222     4 4 
230 5 3   8 
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239 3 3   6 
243 11 4   15 
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260 2 1   3 
270 5 4   9 
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208 27 17 6 50 
213 17 10 4 31 
216 10 7 3 20 
222     2 2 
226 10 5 2 17 
257 1     1 
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  280 5 2   7 








  44 26 4 74 
205 28 10   38 
220 8 4   12 
222     2 2 
257 1     1 
280 6 3 1 10 














  54 32 7 93 
212 17     17 
222     4 4 
223 6 5   11 
245   13   13 
247 6     6 
250 5     5 
252 7     7 
254 2     2 
257 2     2 
268   4   4 
280 5 2 1 8 










  60 25 5 90 
209 34 14 2 50 
222     1 1 
229 19 6 1 26 
264 3 1 1 5 
274 1     1 
276 2     2 
280 1 1   2 





  30 13 4 47 
214 21 10 3 34 
249 7 2   9 








  16 13 4 33 
222     1 1 
242 7 4 2 13 
244 4 2   6 
248 4 4 1 9 
280 1     1 





  35 17 2 54 
219 33 15 2 50 
280 1 1   2 
Any  1 1   2 
113   23 13 5 41 





222     1 1 
224 12 6   18 
262 10 5 2 17 




  18 9 2 29 
225 17 9 2 28 




  10 7 3 20 
227 8 7 3 18 




  5 2   7 
255 3 2   5 
279 2     2 
117 
  
  4 4 1 9 
261 4 4 1 9 
151   35 66 29 130 
161   13 16 3 32 
162   7 10 6 23 
163     1   1 
Total   1057 710 223 1990 
Branches 151, 161, 162 and 163 are the “position only” branches:  
Branch 151 can accept any personnel from any branch 
Branch 161 can accept any personnel from branches 101, 107 and 108 
Branch 162 can accept any personnel from branches 102, 103 and 104 
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Personnel by Rank and Locality: 
  Rank   
Locality E06 E08 E09 Total 
ACT 40 32 23 95 
NSW OTHER 98 73 28 199 
NSW SYD 160 105 43 308 
NT DARWIN 101 61 14 176 
OVERSEAS 3 9 3 15 
QLD NORTH 146 94 20 260 
QLD SOUTH 177 117 53 347 
SA ADELAIDE 27 22 14 63 
TAS 5 4 3 12 
VIC MELB 44 55 19 118 
VIC OTHER 45 45 14 104 
WA OTHER 3 5   8 
WA PERTH 48 30 7 85 
Total 897 652 241 1790 
 
Positions by Rank and Locality: 
  Rank   
  E06 E08 E09 Total 
ACT 44 38 21 103 
NSW OTHER 149 106 38 293 
NSW SYD 193 124 39 356 
NT DARWIN 128 71 15 214 
OVERSEAS 4 10 2 16 
QLD NORTH 165 88 22 275 
QLD SOUTH 173 105 38 316 
SA ADELAIDE 37 24 8 69 
TAS 7 6 2 15 
VIC MELB 52 56 24 132 
VIC OTHER 57 48 9 114 
WA OTHER 4 7   11 
WA PERTH 49 29 5 83 
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Personnel by Career Development Requirements: 
  Rank   
  E06 E08 E09 Total 
Headquarters 153 137 59 349 
Regimental 473 315 119 907 
Reserves 86 58 22 166 
Training 185 142 41 368 
Total 897 652 241 1790 
 
Positions by Career Development Provided: 
  Rank   
  E06 E08 E09 Total 
Headquarters 141 165 100 406 
Regimental 599 308 62 969 
Reserves 84 85 26 195 
Training 238 154 35 427 
Total 1062 712 223 1997 
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APPENDIX C. 
A. DECISION-MAKING RESULTS—POINTS FOR EACH SUBJECT AND 
SCENARIO 
 














1 1 41.67 120.00 161.67 71.43 124.00 195.43 
1 2 41.67 120.00 161.67 41.67 96.00 137.67 
1 3 33.33 113.33 146.67 41.67 96.00 137.67 
1 4 62.50 126.67 189.17 62.50 129.33 191.83 
1 5 62.50 126.67 189.17 45.45 113.33 158.79 
1 6 41.67 120.00 161.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 7 62.50 126.67 189.17 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 8 41.67 120.00 161.67 35.71 96.00 131.71 
1 9 25.00 106.67 131.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 10 29.41 106.67 136.08 29.41 89.33 118.75 
1 11 41.67 113.33 155.00 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 12 50.00 126.67 176.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 13 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 14 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 15 41.67 120.00 161.67 55.56 125.33 180.89 
1 16 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 17 35.71 106.67 142.38 38.46 102.67 141.13 
1 18 35.71 113.33 149.05 55.56 124.00 179.56 
1 19 45.45 120.00 165.45 71.43 132.00 203.43 
1 20 45.45 120.00 165.45 41.67 96.00 137.67 
1 21 41.67 120.00 161.67 55.56 109.33 164.89 
1 22 35.71 113.33 149.05 41.67 105.33 147.00 
1 23 62.50 120.00 182.50 62.50 120.00 182.50 
1 24 41.67 113.33 155.00 62.50 120.00 182.50 
1 25 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 124.00 195.43 
1 26 62.50 126.67 189.17 71.43 124.00 195.43 
2 27 62.50 126.67 189.17 62.50 129.33 191.83 
2 28 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 29 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 30 50.00 126.67 176.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 31 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 32 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 124.00 195.43 
2 33 62.50 126.67 189.17 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 34 62.50 126.67 189.17 62.50 121.33 183.83 
2 35 35.71 120.00 155.71 45.45 104.00 149.45 
2 36 62.50 126.67 189.17 41.67 96.00 137.67 
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2 37 55.56 126.67 182.22 62.50 121.33 183.83 
2 38 62.50 126.67 189.17 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 39 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 40 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 124.00 195.43 
2 41 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 124.00 195.43 
2 42 38.46 113.33 151.79 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 43 50.00 126.67 176.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 44 41.67 120.00 161.67 50.00 105.33 155.33 
2 45 62.50 126.67 189.17 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 46 50.00 126.67 176.67 55.56 117.33 172.89 
2 47 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 124.00 195.43 
2 48 41.67 120.00 161.67 71.43 132.00 203.43 
2 49 62.50 120.00 182.50 55.56 109.33 164.89 
2 50 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
3 51 55.56 126.67 182.22 29.41 88.00 117.41 
3 52 62.50 120.00 182.50 29.41 94.67 124.08 
3 53 71.43 120.00 191.43 55.56 109.33 164.89 
3 54 35.71 120.00 155.71 29.41 86.67 116.08 
3 55 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
3 56 50.00 126.67 176.67 41.67 106.67 148.33 
3 57 55.56 120.00 175.56 71.43 124.00 195.43 
3 58 35.71 120.00 155.71 35.71 89.33 125.05 
3 59 55.56 126.67 182.22 41.67 104.00 145.67 
3 60 35.71 120.00 155.71 62.50 121.33 183.83 
3 61 71.43 120.00 191.43 71.43 132.00 203.43 
3 62 50.00 126.67 176.67 55.56 109.33 164.89 
3 63 55.56 126.67 182.22 62.50 121.33 183.83 
3 64 62.50 126.67 189.17 45.45 104.00 149.45 
3 65 62.50 126.67 189.17 62.50 129.33 191.83 
3 66 71.43 120.00 191.43 62.50 121.33 183.83 
3 67 55.56 126.67 182.22 62.50 121.33 183.83 
3 68 35.71 106.67 142.38 38.46 100.00 138.46 
3 69 55.56 126.67 182.22 41.67 96.00 137.67 
3 70 62.50 126.67 189.17 62.50 124.00 186.50 
3 71 35.71 120.00 155.71 62.50 129.33 191.83 
3 72 55.56 126.67 182.22 71.43 132.00 203.43 
3 73 62.50 126.67 189.17 45.45 104.00 149.45 
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1 1 55.56 126.67 182.22 58.82 126.00 184.82 
1 2 55.56 126.67 182.22 32.26 95.33 127.59 
1 3 23.81 106.67 130.48 33.33 96.67 130.00 
1 4 52.63 126.67 179.30 47.62 119.33 166.95 
1 5 58.82 133.33 192.16 58.82 124.67 183.49 
1 6 35.71 120.00 155.71 55.56 130.00 185.56 
1 7 62.50 133.33 195.83 58.82 119.33 178.16 
1 8 21.28 100.00 121.28 26.32 96.00 122.32 
1 9 25.64 116.67 142.31 52.63 127.33 179.96 
1 10 45.45 120.00 165.45 33.33 103.33 136.67 
1 11 47.62 123.33 170.95 24.39 100.67 125.06 
1 12 58.82 133.33 192.16 34.48 124.67 159.15 
1 13 50.00 130.00 180.00 62.50 132.67 195.17 
1 14 58.82 133.33 192.16 62.50 132.67 195.17 
1 15 35.71 123.33 159.05 58.82 132.67 191.49 
1 16 33.33 113.33 146.67 55.56 135.33 190.89 
1 17 26.32 120.00 146.32 58.82 138.00 196.82 
1 18 32.26 116.67 148.92 43.48 109.33 152.81 
1 19 35.71 120.00 155.71 52.63 117.33 169.96 
1 20 45.45 120.00 165.45 58.82 122.00 180.82 
1 21 26.32 120.00 146.32 32.26 106.00 138.26 
1 22 58.82 130.00 188.82 62.50 128.67 191.17 
1 23 52.63 133.33 185.96 58.82 112.00 170.82 
1 24 50.00 123.33 173.33 32.26 98.67 130.92 
1 25 58.82 133.33 192.16 52.63 134.67 187.30 
1 26 20.41 110.00 130.41 38.46 120.00 158.46 
2 27 58.82 133.33 192.16 20.83 110.00 130.83 
2 28 58.82 130.00 188.82 62.50 132.67 195.17 
2 29 50.00 123.33 173.33 55.56 136.00 191.56 
2 30 58.82 133.33 192.16 52.63 130.00 182.63 
2 31 50.00 130.00 180.00 62.50 128.67 191.17 
2 32 37.04 116.67 153.70 52.63 111.33 163.96 
2 33 58.82 130.00 188.82 62.50 132.67 195.17 
2 34 55.56 126.67 182.22 58.82 129.33 188.16 
2 35 58.82 130.00 188.82 58.82 124.67 183.49 
2 36 55.56 130.00 185.56 55.56 113.33 168.89 
2 37 58.82 126.67 185.49 58.82 121.33 180.16 
2 38 52.63 130.00 182.63 55.56 113.33 168.89 
2 39 50.00 120.00 170.00 58.82 138.00 196.82 
2 40 33.33 123.33 156.67 50.00 110.67 160.67 
2 41 58.82 120.00 178.82 58.82 110.00 168.82 
2 42 58.82 133.33 192.16 18.87 103.33 122.20 
2 43 15.87 100.00 115.87 58.82 138.00 196.82 
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2 44 62.50 133.33 195.83 37.04 113.33 150.37 
2 45 58.82 130.00 188.82 55.56 133.33 188.89 
2 46 55.56 123.33 178.89 52.63 111.33 163.96 
2 47 33.33 110.00 143.33 62.50 128.67 191.17 
2 48 27.03 113.33 140.36 62.50 136.00 198.50 
2 49 26.32 116.67 142.98 33.33 100.00 133.33 
2 50 62.50 133.33 195.83 58.82 112.00 170.82 
3 51 26.32 106.67 132.98 15.87 84.00 99.87 
3 52 37.04 123.33 160.37 33.33 98.00 131.33 
3 53 55.56 133.33 188.89 33.33 111.33 144.67 
3 54 26.32 120.00 146.32 18.87 99.33 118.20 
3 55 55.56 133.33 188.89 62.50 136.00 198.50 
3 56 55.56 123.33 178.89 23.81 89.33 113.14 
3 57 58.82 130.00 188.82 52.63 116.67 169.30 
3 58 17.24 106.67 123.91 26.32 102.67 128.98 
3 59 24.39 100.00 124.39 19.61 103.33 122.94 
3 60 35.71 123.33 159.05 20.83 98.67 119.50 
3 61 62.50 130.00 192.50 21.28 112.67 133.94 
3 62 58.82 130.00 188.82 24.39 98.00 122.39 
3 63 35.71 113.33 149.05 15.15 71.33 86.48 
3 64 58.82 130.00 188.82 62.50 136.00 198.50 
3 65 58.82 130.00 188.82 58.82 132.67 191.49 
3 66 37.04 126.67 163.70 55.56 118.67 174.22 
3 67 58.82 130.00 188.82 26.32 100.00 126.32 
3 68 30.30 113.33 143.64 32.26 108.00 140.26 
3 69 58.82 130.00 188.82 20.00 89.33 109.33 
3 70 58.82 126.67 185.49 23.26 88.67 111.92 
3 71 38.46 123.33 161.79 10.99 67.33 78.32 
3 72 55.56 126.67 182.22 62.50 132.67 195.17 
3 73 58.82 120.00 178.82 52.63 124.00 176.63 
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1 1 37.50 137.78 175.28 53.57 132.44 186.02 
1 2 19.48 111.11 130.59 15.96 116.44 132.40 
1 3 28.30 124.44 152.75 34.09 130.22 164.31 
1 4 53.57 137.78 191.35 62.50 133.33 195.83 
1 5 51.72 140.00 191.72 55.56 140.44 196.00 
1 6 65.22 137.78 203.00 75.00 130.67 205.67 
1 7 75.00 140.00 215.00 75.00 130.67 205.67 
1 8 23.81 128.89 152.70 34.88 134.22 169.11 
1 9 35.71 133.33 169.05 35.71 140.00 175.71 
1 10 48.39 128.89 177.28 50.00 130.22 180.22 
1 11 23.44 133.33 156.77 16.13 116.44 132.57 
1 12 16.67 131.11 147.78 33.33 132.89 166.22 
1 13 65.22 131.11 196.33 57.69 144.44 202.14 
1 14 75.00 140.00 215.00 62.50 131.11 193.61 
1 15 57.69 137.78 195.47 55.56 138.22 193.78 
1 16 57.69 133.33 191.03 42.86 131.11 173.97 
1 17 57.69 131.11 188.80 42.86 132.44 175.30 
1 18 18.99 113.33 132.32 45.45 128.44 173.90 
1 19 40.54 135.56 176.10 35.71 128.89 164.60 
1 20 55.56 140.00 195.56 51.72 129.78 181.50 
1 21 16.30 117.78 134.08 32.61 131.56 164.16 
1 22 37.50 133.33 170.83 55.56 137.78 193.33 
1 23 60.00 140.00 200.00 62.50 131.56 194.06 
1 24 33.33 135.56 168.89 57.69 130.67 188.36 
1 25 24.59 133.33 157.92 57.69 144.44 202.14 
1 26 50.00 140.00 190.00 60.00 131.56 191.56 
2 27 31.91 142.22 174.14 23.08 128.00 151.08 
2 28 13.39 124.44 137.84 62.50 132.00 194.50 
2 29 12.40 102.22 114.62 35.71 132.44 168.16 
2 30 48.39 140.00 188.39 62.50 137.78 200.28 
2 31 65.22 140.00 205.22 65.22 138.67 203.88 
2 32 53.57 140.00 193.57 55.56 129.78 185.33 
2 33 37.50 128.89 166.39 57.69 138.22 195.91 
2 34 26.32 128.57 154.89 57.69 129.33 187.03 
2 35 24.59 135.56 160.15 65.22 137.33 202.55 
2 36 15.63 115.56 131.18 37.50 120.89 158.39 
2 37 62.50 140.00 202.50 65.22 137.33 202.55 
2 38 35.71 122.22 157.94 50.00 131.11 181.11 
2 39 25.86 126.67 152.53 65.22 134.67 199.88 
2 40 60.00 140.00 200.00 65.22 128.00 193.22 
2 41 60.00 131.11 191.11 60.00 130.67 190.67 
2 42 55.56 140.00 195.56 65.22 137.33 202.55 
2 43 11.54 108.89 120.43 71.43 120.89 192.32 
2 44 11.63 115.56 127.18 13.64 118.22 131.86 
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2 45 19.23 122.22 141.45 60.00 138.67 198.67 
2 46 12.30 104.44 116.74 65.22 137.33 202.55 
2 47 23.81 128.89 152.70 71.43 124.44 195.87 
2 48 55.56 140.00 195.56 40.54 133.78 174.32 
2 49 7.32 71.11 78.43 36.59 122.67 159.25 
2 50 21.43 124.44 145.87 65.22 129.78 195.00 
3 51 75.00 140.00 215.00 34.88 117.33 152.22 
3 52 34.09 144.44 178.54 37.50 123.56 161.06 
3 53 62.50 133.33 195.83 34.09 127.56 161.65 
3 54 65.22 133.33 198.55 24.59 132.89 157.48 
3 55 75.00 140.00 215.00 39.47 135.11 174.58 
3 56 62.50 142.22 204.72 65.22 138.67 203.88 
3 57 53.57 137.78 191.35 50.00 119.56 169.56 
3 58 19.48 126.67 146.15 15.96 110.67 126.62 
3 59 31.91 131.11 163.03 50.00 126.67 176.67 
3 60 38.46 135.56 174.02 31.91 129.78 161.69 
3 61 34.09 144.44 178.54 17.05 99.11 116.16 
3 62 23.81 133.33 157.14 31.91 126.67 158.58 
3 63 18.75 133.33 152.08 16.13 121.33 137.46 
3 64 75.00 140.00 215.00 37.50 124.89 162.39 
3 65 37.50 137.78 175.28 36.59 131.11 167.70 
3 66 57.69 142.22 199.91 25.86 136.00 161.86 
3 67 57.69 140.00 197.69 13.89 105.78 119.67 
3 68 51.72 140.00 191.72 34.09 125.78 159.87 
3 69 39.47 135.56 175.03 29.41 122.22 151.63 
3 70 65.22 135.56 200.77 12.50 96.44 108.94 
3 71 65.22 135.56 200.77 71.43 124.00 195.43 
3 72 53.57 140.00 193.57 55.56 144.44 200.00 
3 73 46.88 140.00 186.88 62.50 128.00 190.50 
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APPENDIX D. 
A. ASSIGNMENT EXPERIMENT SCENARIOS 
The assignments are referred to be the assignment size followed by the number of criteria. For example, Scenario A is a 5-3 





of Personnel to 
be Assigned 
5 A B 
10 C D 
15 E F 
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Scenario A: 5-3. 
 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.333 Rank
O-2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
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 Person 
Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 
Rank O-3 O-3 O-4 O-3 O-2 
Branch Engineers Armour Infantry Artillery Artillery 
Primary Skill A D B A C 





Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 
1st 2 2 3 2 5 
2nd 4 6 6 4 1 
3rd 5 1   1 3 
5-3: Person Preferences 
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Scenario B: 5-5. 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.267 Rank
O-2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5










































5-5 Position Criteria 
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 Person 
Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 
Rank O-3 O-3 O-4 O-3 O-2 
Branch Engineers Armour Infantry Artillery Artillery 
Primary Skill A D B A C 
Secondary Skill T R Q S S 
Location West South North West East 





Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 
1st 2 2 3 2 5 
2nd 4 6 6 4 1 
3rd 5 1   1 3 
5-5: Person Preferences 
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Scenario C: 10-3. 
 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.333 Rank
O-2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
O-3 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0
O-4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5
O-5 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.333 Branch
Infantry 1.0 1.0 1.0
Artillery 1.0 1.0 1.0
Armor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Engineers 1.0 1.0
0.333 Primary Skill
A 1.0 1.0 1.0
B 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.0 1.0 1.0
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Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
Rank O-2 O-3 O-5 O-2 O-4 O-4 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-3
Branch Infantry Artillery Armor Artillery ArtilleryEngineersEngineersArtillery Infantry Engineers
Pri. Skill D C D A B C B A C A
Person
 
10-3: Person Characteristics 
 
 
Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
1st 5 6 7 5 4 4 4 7 6 11
2nd 8 3 2 3 9 9 2 9 11 4
3rd 11 10 12 10 10 1 12 4 8 2




10-3: Person Preferences 
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Scenario D: 10-5. 
 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.267 Rank
O-2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
O-3 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0
O-4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5
O-5 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.267 Branch
Infantry 1.0 1.0 1.0
Artillery 1.0 1.0 1.0
Armor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Engineers 1.0 1.0
0.267 Primary Skill
A 1.0 1.0 1.0
B 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.0 1.0 1.0
D 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.100 Secondary Skill
Q 1.0 1.0 1.0
R 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
S 1.0 1.0 1.0
T 1.0 1.0
0.100 Location
North 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
South 1.0 1.0 1.0





















10-5: Position Criteria 
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Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
Rank O-2 O-3 O-5 O-2 O-4 O-4 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-3
Branch Infantry Artillery Armor Artillery Artillery EngineersEngineers Artillery Infantry Engineers
Pri. Skill D C D A B C B A C A
Sec. Skill S T R Q T R S S Q R
Location South West East East South North South South North West
Person
 




Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
1st 5 6 7 5 4 4 4 7 6 11
2nd 8 3 2 3 9 9 2 9 11 4
3rd 11 10 12 10 10 1 12 4 8 2




10-5: Person Preferences 
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Scenario E: 15-3. 
 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0.333 Rank
O-2 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
O-3 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0
O-4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
O-5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.333 Branch
Infantry 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Artillery 1.0 1.0 1.0
Armor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Engineers 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.333 Primary Skill
A 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
B 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.0 1.0 1.0
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Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115
Rank O-2 O-3 O-5 O-2 O-4 O-4 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-3 O-4 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5
Branch EngineersArtillery Infantry Armor Infantry EngineersEngineersArtillery Infantry Engineers Infantry Engineers Armor ArtilleryEngineers
Pri. Skill C D D B D C A A C A B D B A D
Person
 




Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115
1st 10 5 6 13 5 16 8 16 1 7 1 12 13 18 6
2nd 4 7 14 4 11 3 18 5 17 16 9 2 15 5 8
3rd 12 2 8 2 1 9 3 10 3 11 15 2 3
4th 15 15 6 8 18 9 17 16
5th 17 14 14
Person
 
15-3: Person Preferences 
  248 
Scenario F: 15-5. 
 
Weight Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0.267 Rank
O-2 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
O-3 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0
O-4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
O-5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.267 Branch
Infantry 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Artillery 1.0 1.0 1.0
Armor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Engineers 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.267 Primary Skill
A 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
B 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.0 1.0 1.0
D 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.100 Secondary Skill
Q 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
R 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
S 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
T 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.100 Location
North 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
South 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
East 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0




















15-5: Position Criteria 
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Characteristics 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115
Rank O-2 O-3 O-5 O-2 O-4 O-4 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-3 O-4 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5
Branch EngineersArtillery Infantry Armor Infantry EngineersEngineersArtillery Infantry Engineers Infantry Engineers Armor ArtilleryEngineers
Pri. Skill C D D B D C A A C A B D B A D
Sec. Skill S T R Q T R S S Q R T Q R Q T
Location North East East West South South North South North West East North West North West
Person
 




Preferences 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115
1st 10 5 6 13 5 16 8 16 1 7 1 12 13 18 6
2nd 4 7 14 4 11 3 18 5 17 16 9 2 15 5 8
3rd 12 2 8 2 1 9 3 10 3 11 15 2 3
4th 15 15 6 8 18 9 17 16
5th 17 14 14
Person
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